MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS

00107792

GOD
355.00942
Fur/M:1
107792

00107792

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020

MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.

MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

BEYOND THE SEAS.

BY

COLONEL GEORGE ARMAND FURSE, C.B.

(LATE OF THE "BLACK WATCH").

107792

"But, in the art of war, as in every other art, all our teachings come from those who have preceded us, and the most important of these are recorded in the books they have left for our consideration."

KIRK MUNROE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LIMITED,

13, CHARING CROSS, S.W.

1897.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER		PAGE
XIV.	SOME EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS IN THE EARLY AGES	1
XV.	REVOLUTION OF 1688: CROSSING OF THE PRINCE OF ORANGE	39
XVI.	THE TWO CAPTURES OF LOUISBOURG ...	56
XVII.	LANDING OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN EGYPT IN 1801	91
XVIII.	FRENCH EXPEDITION TO ALGERIA	126
XIX.	SCALING OF THE HEIGHTS ABOVE QUEBEC BY WOLFE	158
XX.	UTTER COLLAPSE OF AN EXPEDITION THROUGH A TEMPEST AT SEA	195
XXI.	GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN VIRGINIA	215
XXII.	INVASIONS	260
XXIII.	PER MARE, PER TERRAM	307
XXIV.	THE DEFENCE	338
XXV.	RE-EMBARKATION EFFECTED IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY	373
	INDEX	397

MAPS AND PLANS IN VOL. II.

MAP OF LOUISBOURG ... ... *To face page* 56

„ LANDING AT ABOUKIR ... ... „ „ 91

„ ALGERIA ... ... „ „ 126

„ QUEBEC ... ... „ „ 158

„ PENINSULA OF VIRGINIA AND GROUND ROUND RICHMOND ... ... „ „ 215

MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.

CHAPTER XIV.

SOME EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS IN THE EARLY AGES.

Carthage in 490 U.C. was mistress of the sea—The Romans build a fleet—Naval tactics of the period—The Romans substitute boarding for ramming—Battle of Mylae—Carthage assailed in Africa—Battle of Ecnomus—Regulus lands in Africa—His defeat and capture—Survivors shut up in Clupea—Battle near the Hermaean promontory—Clupea relieved—The Roman fleet overtaken by a storm—The Romans build a second fleet—Publius Claudius defeated before Drepanum—Destruction of the Roman fleet—Another fleet built by private subscription—Carthaginian fleet defeated at Aegusa—End of the First Punic War—Second Punic War, Publius Cornelius Scipio appointed to command—Scipio lands in Africa—He surprises and sets fire to the enemy's camps—Hannibal recalled from Italy—Battle of Zama—End of the war—Cæsar and Pompey, the latter flies to Brundisium and crosses to Greece—Forces of the two leaders—Cæsar crosses over to the coast of Epirus—His first successes—Cæsar's fleet attacked when returning to Italy—Brundisium blockaded—Blockade raised, Mark Antony crosses to Epirus with reinforcements for Cæsar—Pompey fails in preventing the junction of Mark Antony and Cæsar—Cæsar fails in carrying Dyrrhachium and retires to Apollonia—Marches to

Thessaly—Battle of Pharsalia—Cæsar experiences difficulties in provisioning his army.

In war the results are guided by law, and there are certain fixed principles which, notwithstanding succeeding changes in weapons and in the mode of combating, have remained fundamental. The history of the past has not lost any of its instructiveness when the conditions of strategy are more or less what they were in bygone ages, and this history must endure as a guide for our actions in the future.

The armies of the Roman republic and empire had to contend with adversaries in many countries, and, like ours, had often to cross the sea to get at their enemy. Historians have dwelt on their victories and defeats, and have recorded a mass of facts from which the military student can draw very profitable lessons.

In the year 490 of Rome* Carthage was the first maritime nation of the world, and her fleets ruled the central and western Mediterranean without a rival. At the outbreak of the first Punic War, the Romans had an insignificant fleet; they were, however, not slow in realizing how fruitless it was without a navy to attempt to put an end to the ravages of the Carthaginian squadrons, and prevent the commerce of Rome and of her allies being paralyzed by the irruptions of the Africans. They consequently determined to build a fleet. Hitherto they had only triremes, galleys with three banks of oars;

* This corresponds with the year 264 B.C.

but their opponents, who were further advanced in naval construction, had introduced the quinquereme as the latest description of ship for naval warfare.* As no ship of this stamp had yet been built in Italy, the Romans solved the difficulty by referring their master shipbuilders to a stranded Carthaginian quinquereme, which a storm of wind had fortunately cast on the Italian shores, bidding them take that as a model.

History often repeats itself; Jurien de la Gravière extols the elegance and proportions of the French warships, and states that the captured *Commerce-de-Marseilles*—a splendid three-decker, by five hundred tons larger than the *Victory*—the *Pompée*, the *Tonnant*, and the *Franklin*, all of which at that period (about the battle of the Nile) had no equal in any navy in the world, were taken as models by English naval architects.† In the American War of 1812, the superiority of the American frigates was so apparent, that the British Admiralty were compelled to build ships on the same lines.

What is very remarkable is the shortness of time in which fleets were constructed in those early

* The total absence of any scientific treatise on the construction of Roman, Carthaginian, or Grecian vessels has led to much controversy as to the manner in which the oars were arranged in the ancient galleys. Nothing absolutely positive appears to be known on this point.

† Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres Maritimes sous la République et l'Empire," chap. iv. p. 53.

days. No doubt the ships were of no great size and very simple in construction, still the builders lacked the appliances, tools, and machinery which we have now. It has been related that the twenty triremes and hundred quinqueremes which constituted the first Roman fleet, built on the coast of Brutti, were launched in sixty days from the time the trees were felled. This rapidity of construction might appear greatly overdrawn if it were the only instance; but there are others, as this chapter will show.* While the ships were building, the crews were trained in rowing on scaffolds set up on land, and disposed like the benches of a ship at sea. We can well be astonished at the daring of the Romans, who, with ships thus hastily and clumsily built, and with crews imperfectly trained, sailed to attack the navy of the first maritime state in the world.

With the Romans the naval service was little esteemed in comparison with the honour of serving in the legions; many of their naval officers were Greek, and the crews were composed of subjects, or even slaves and outcasts. With all these drawbacks the Roman fleet was the noblest creation of genius in this war, and, as at its beginning, so at its close, it was the fleet that turned the scale in favour of Rome.

* When, in 1692, Louis XIV. was preparing for a mighty invasion of England, great efforts were made to get Admiral Edward Russell's fleet ready for sea. So great was the promptness displayed that one of the first-rates was equipped and went to sea ten days after she was launched.

According to Herodotus, in the Ionian trireme there were forty marines besides the crew. The Athenians, who relied more on the skilful handling of their vessels, reduced the number of fighting men on board ; with a crew of about two hundred men in a Greek trireme there were only about ten soldiers. Polybius gives as the complement of a quinquereme, three hundred seamen and a hundred and twenty soldiers.

The soldier of the present day crosses the sea in first-class transports, with a minimum of distress and discomfort. It was not so in the early ages, and we can barely realize what the legionary must have had to endure when journeying by sea, cramped for days in vessels of no great dimension, exposed to all the vicissitudes of the weather.

Though in the maritime warfare of that period hoplites * and archers fought from the deck, and projectiles and missiles were hurled from it, nevertheless the real object was to dash with the greatest possible momentum against the enemy's vessel and strike it amidships. The naval tactics, therefore, consisted in manœuvring, the vessels engaged rowing round each other till one or the other succeeded in ramming, for which purpose the prows were furnished with heavy iron beaks.

The trireme and quinquereme were also provided with a square sail. This was used when the

* Heavy-armed infantry soldiers, ὁπλίτης, from ὅπλον, tool or weapon.

wind was favourable as a means for relieving the rowers from their labours, but was never used in action.

Well aware of the inferior manœuvring ability of their crews, the Romans in this war introduced a change of tactics, and resorted to boarding. For this purpose they furnished each warship with a boarding-bridge. This bridge was thirty-six feet in length, and was kept at the prow, pulled up by a rope and fastened to a mast; it could be lowered in front or on either hand; it was furnished on both sides with parapets, and was broad enough to admit two men moving abreast. When the adversary's vessel was sailing up to strike the Roman ship, or was lying alongside of it after the ram had been evaded, the bridge was suddenly lowered and fastened to the adversary's ship by means of a grappling iron. The Roman soldiers then passed swiftly along the bridge, gained the enemy's deck, and carried it by assault in a hand-to-hand conflict.

This change in naval tactics was a happy idea, as boarding and a hand-to-hand fight offered a fair field for the superior prowess of the Roman soldier. Very soon the Romans had an opportunity of putting it to a practical test in the battle of Mylea —to the north-west of Messana—in which the Consul Duilius inflicted a signal defeat on the Carthaginians. In that battle the Carthaginians, seeing in the ill-sailing and awkward vessels of the Romans an easy prey, fell upon them in irregular order, but the

Roman ships, through the newly-invented boarding-bridges, stormed the enemy's vessels as they came on one by one, and captured or sunk about fifty of them. Amongst the captured ships was that of Hannibal, the Carthaginian admiral. Thus in one victory Rome asserted itself as a naval power, and became more than a match for her adversary. Duilius was honoured in Rome with the first naval triumph that was ever seen in that city.

At the commencement of the Punic War the Romans attacked Carthage on the Italian islands, and tried to deprive her of the coast fortresses in Sicily and Sardinia, but the operations had no result beyond stopping the pillaging of the coast of Italy. In 498 the Senate resolved to change the system hitherto pursued for a bolder one, and to assail Carthage in Africa. The conception was good; neglecting the islands, the Romans were to throw themselves at once with all their strength on Africa, leaving a strong fleet to guard the communications of the invading army with Italy.

In the spring of the year a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships set sail for the coast of Libya, and at the mouth of the River Himera, on the south coast of Italy, it embarked four legions, commanded by the two consuls, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vólso, both experienced leaders.

The Carthaginian admiral did not hinder the embarkation of the Roman troops, but drew up

his fleet in order of battle off Ecnomus, with the object of arresting them on the coast of Sicily, and preventing an invasion of his native land.

The Romans had 330 quinqueremes and their adversaries 350. As each Roman vessel was furnished with 300 rowers and 120 combatants, it is computed by Polybius that their force amounted to 140,000 men; the strength of the Carthaginians, whose ships were manned by at least an equal number, is reckoned at 150,000. These numbers might appear incredible did they not rest on the highest authority.

The Carthaginians were formed in a single and widely-extended line, their left wing resting on the Sicilian coast. The Romans arranged themselves in the form of a wedge or a triangle; the ships of the two consuls were at the apex, and the first and second squadrons were drawn up in an oblique line to the right and left. A third squadron, having the horse transports in tow, formed the rear face of the triangle. A fourth squadron, in the form of a crescent, the horns overlapping the rear face of the triangle, followed as a reserve at a slow pace. The Roman fleet bore on the enemy in this formation.

This wedge-shaped attack without great difficulty broke the Carthaginian line, for its centre, which was first assailed, intentionally gave way, and the battle resolved itself into three separate engagements. While the admirals with the two squadrons on the wings pursued the Carthaginian centre, and were

closely engaged with it, the left wing of the Carthaginians, drawn up along the coast, wheeled round upon the third Roman squadron, which was prevented by the vessels which it had in tow from bearing up with the two others, and by a vehement onset drove it against the shore; at the same time the Roman reserve was turned on the open sea, and assailed from behind, by the right wing of the Carthaginians. The first of these three engagements was soon at an end; the ships of the Carthaginian centre, manifestly much weaker than the two Roman squadrons with which they were engaged, took to flight. Meanwhile, the two other divisions of the Romans had a severe encounter with a superior enemy; but in close fighting the dreaded boarding-bridges stood them in good stead, and by this means they succeeded in holding their own till the two admirals with their vessels could come to their aid. By their arrival the Roman reserve was relieved, and the Carthaginian vessels of the right wing retired before superior forces. And now, when this conflict had been decided in favour of the Romans, all the Roman vessels that still could keep the sea fell in the rear of the Carthaginian left wing, which was obstinately following up its advantage, so that it was surrounded, and almost all the vessels composing it were taken. The Romans lost four-and-twenty of their ships, and the Africans lost thirty that were sunk, and threescore-and-four that were taken.

The rest of the Carthaginian fleet retired and made for the gulf of Carthage—where it was believed that the Romans would make their descent—and, regardless of the considerable loss it had lately sustained, purposed to give battle a second time. The Romans, however, disembarked on the eastern side of the peninsula which goes to form the gulf, where the bay of Clupea presented a spacious harbour, affording protection from all winds. Here, at a distance of about fifty miles from Carthage, they landed without opposition, took post on a hill, and constructed an intrenched camp.

The Roman troops overran the country, levied contributions, and captured slaves. The end seemed almost attained, and the feeling of confidence this evoked caused the Senate to recall the greater part of the fleet and half of the army. According to these directions, Manlius, the consul, returned to Rome (whither he carried twenty thousand African captives), with all the Roman fleet and army except forty ships, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse that were left with Attilius.

Everything otherwise promised well, for as the Carthaginians did not venture forth into the plain, and the Numidians had risen in rebellion, there appeared every prospect of Regulus being able to initiate the next campaign by the siege of the capital. With the forces left to him, he defeated the Carthaginians before Adis, and took by assault Tunis, a city within sixteen miles of Carthage. By

the loss of the battle of Adis, and more especially by the capture of Tunis, the Carthaginians were greatly dismayed; they consequently sued for peace. The conditions proposed by the consul could not be accepted, and preparations were made for continuing the war. Hamilcar came over from Sicily with the flower of the Sicilian soldiery, many troops of excellent Numidian horse were enlisted, and also numerous Greek mercenaries. Amongst the latter was the celebrated Greek Captain Xanthippus, renowned for strategical skill and talent in organization. Xanthippus gave out publicly that the Carthaginian overthrow near Adis was to be attributed to the errors of their commanders. Having assigned just reasons for this, he was made general of the African forces.

When spring came, the Carthaginians considered themselves strong enough to take the field and offer battle. Their army consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and one hundred elephants. Xanthippus ranged his troops on fair level ground fitted for both his elephants and horse. Relying on the invincibility of the Romans in the open, their leader accepted the challenge, and, owing principally to the superior number of the enemy's cavalry, sustained a crushing defeat. Only two thousand men were able to escape and seek refuge in Clupea; amongst the few prisoners taken was the consul himself.

When this terrible news reached Rome, the first

efforts of the Romans was naturally directed to save the force shut up in Clupea. A Roman fleet of three hundred and fifty vessels, commanded by M. Aemilius and Ser. Fulvius, immediately started; a battle ensued near the Hermaean promontory in which victory remained with the Romans, their adversaries losing one hundred and fourteen ships. The road to Clupea was opened, and the fleet reached it just in time to relieve the hard-pressed remnants of Regulus' army. Notwithstanding a successful conflict before Clupea, the Romans embarked all their troops and sailed home. Independently of the cruel fate to which they left their numerous African allies, they committed a serious blunder in evacuating an important and easily-defended position, which would have secured them great facilities for landing in Africa.

Misfortunes seldom come singly; the mariners had foretold rough weather, as the season threatened some violent storms; still, despite this warning, the extemporised Roman admiral gave the orders to sail. The fleet was caught in a violent storm off Camarina, in Sicily, and of three hundred and forty ships, all but eighty perished with their crews.

Hearing what had happened to the Roman fleet, the Carthaginians repaired all their vessels, hoping once again to have the mastery on the sea. The party in the Senate, which was opposed to the war in Africa regained the ascendency, and the old plan of subjugating the islands was resumed. To do

this a fleet was needed, and, as that which had conquered at Mylae, at Ecnomus, and at the Hermaean promontory had been destroyed, steps were taken to build a new one. Keels were at once laid down for two hundred and twenty war vessels; never before had the Romans undertaken the building of so many simultaneously, and in the incredibly short period of three months all were ready for sea.

The following year, half of this fleet was lost in a storm off Cape Palinurus. The consuls were returning from a plundering expedition in Africa, and though entreated by the pilots to take the course along the coast, they turned a deaf ear to their warnings and compelled them to steer straight from Panormus across the open sea to Ostia.

After the signal victory gained by Metellus under the walls of Panormus in 503, the Carthaginians were anxious to bring the war to an end, and sent an embassy to Rome to offer terms of peace; these were declined. The siege of Lilybœum followed, and, on the change of consuls, Publius Claudius formed the idea of attacking the Carthaginian fleet in the neighbouring harbour of Drepanum. The auguries warned him against the enterprise. The keeper of the sacred chickens told him that they would not eat; "at any rate"—the consul replied—"let them drink," and he ordered them to be thrown overboard. He was defeated with great loss, ninety-three of his ships were taken or destroyed and only thirty escaped.

His colleague, Lucius Junius Pullus, had been detailed to land at Syracuse the supplies destined for the army at Lilybœum, and with one hundred and twenty war galleys to convoy the transports, eight hundred in number, along the south coast of Sicily. He committed the imprudence of allowing the first division of transports to depart unattended, whilst he only followed with the second. The Carthaginian vice-admiral, Carthalo, was sent with a hundred select galleys to try what good he could do against the Roman fleet in the harbour of Lilybœum. He first entered the mouth of the haven, and charged their fleet, taking some and setting fire to the rest. Having done this, he ran along the south coast of Sicily, devising mischief to the enemy. His scouts told him of the provision ships sent by Junius, and that they were coming; but the Romans having no mind to fight, gladly took shelter in an open roadstead full of rocks on the inhospitable coast of Gela and Camarina. There they repelled the attacks of the Carthaginians who, however, after a while desisted and laid in wait, expecting that the Roman ships could not stay long amongst those rocks, but would be forced by any great change of wind to get out. While Carthalo was so intent the consul drew nigh, but, having no ability to fight or opportunity to fly, he likewise took shelter in a dangerous creek. Carthalo occupied a station between the two Roman fleets ready to pounce on the one that should stir first.

The three fleets were on the south coast of Sicily, between the promontory of Pachinus and Lilybœum, and this coast is exceedingly dangerous when the wind blows strong from the south. At the first indication of bad weather, Carthalo hastened to double the cape of Pachinus, to find shelter for his fleet in the coming storm. The Romans remained at their anchorage exposed to all its fury, and the whole of their galleys were forced against the rocks and wrecked. From want of energy the Carthaginians neglected this opportunity for humbling their enemy, and a fruitless contest was carried on for six years more. The Roman Senate remained indolent, till a number of high-spirited citizens generously came forward to put an end to the ruinous Sicilian war. A private subscription was raised, by means of which they built two hundred warships, and manned them with sixty thousand sailors. This great effort of the Roman patriots bore fruit; it brought victory, and with victory came peace.

Carthage was completely taken by surprise, and in the spring of the following year sent a hurriedly-prepared fleet to Drepanum. The Carthaginians had hoped to land their stores and to take on board the troops required for a naval battle, but Publius Valerius Falto intercepted them on the way and defeated them at Aegusa with little difficulty.

For the loss of the battle of Aegusa the Carthaginians crucified their luckless admiral. Very much closer to our times we have seen death made the

punishment of defeat or miscarriage of orders. Not for treachery, not for cowardice or ignorance of his profession was Admiral Byng executed, but for an error of judgment, which any great commander might have committed. Therefore the punishment was unjust. What made it more so was, that his guilt was established to appease a popular cry for vengeance.

Baron Opdam, who commanded the Dutch fleet in the action off Lowestoft in 1665, sent an express to the States-General, informing them that he did not deem it wise to attack the English while they had the wind with them. Regardless of this remonstrance they ordered him to fight, "let the wind be as it would, on peril of losing his head." *Væ Victis!* for the loss of that battle, the States-General shot four officers at the Helder; four more were ordered to have their swords broken over their heads by the common executioner; the master of Vice-admiral Cortenaer's ship was ordered to stand upon a scaffold with a halter about his neck while the others were executed, after which he was banished. Two other officers were degraded and expelled from the service.

After Pope's defeat on the 2nd of September, 1862, the people of the North were clamorous for a victim on whom to vent their anger. General McDowell was selected, and an outcry raised against him; he was accused of being a traitor, and many of the defeats were imputed to him.

However, no blood was shed, Pope was removed to Minnesota and McDowell was sent away on furlough.

There can be little doubt that nothing is more likely to deprive an officer of calmness and self-possession at a most important period than the knowledge that he will be shamefully executed should fortune be adverse to him in battle. The tyrannical rule of the first French republic did not recognize this fact, and made no allowance for failure or non-compliance with orders. The only option was to die honourably by the enemy's bullets on the battle-field, or by the guillotine as a felon. This was very akin to the custom of the Zulu despots, who visited with death any failure of their *Indunas*. Tshaka and the Amazulu by a rigorous discipline became great; capital punishment was freely awarded, and the daring courage displayed by the Zulus was principally due to the knowledge that for the warriors there was no alternative but to conquer or to die. Who can say, after all, but that death in some cases is preferable to the ban of disgrace, which, when no opportunity is given to wipe it out, becomes a lasting torment to the true soldier? Victor, deprived of his command for neglecting to occupy the bridge of Montereau, implored to be allowed to carry a musket as a simple grenadier. Could a Marshal of France, a veteran of many campaigns, have submitted to greater degradation?

With the defeat of the Carthaginians at Aegusa the first Punic War came to an end, and Hamilcar was deputed to conclude peace. The struggle between the two powerful nations lasted twenty-three years, during which four Roman fleets were lost, three of which perished with all the troops on board.

The peace of 513 was, for Carthage, but a truce, for only by a renewal of the war could she secure for herself an existence which would be really independent of the will of the enemy. The second Punic War, or, as the Romans more correctly called it, the Hannibalic War, lasted seventeen years. Hannibal emerged from the Alps in the year 536, so that in 549 the Carthaginians had been thirteen years in Italy. The war made no progress, and, after Hasdrubal's defeat on the Metaurus, Hannibal with his forces retired to the lands of the Bruttians, whose ports formed his only means of withdrawal from Italy. Notwithstanding that the Carthaginian troops still remained in that country, the people of Carthage anticipated with considerable apprehension the landing of the Romans on their soil.

The Roman Senate, on the other hand, though they could not fail to see that an expedition to Africa was unavoidable, yet much dreaded to enter on its preparation. A commander was needed, and the choice of one was a difficult matter. Quintus Fabius and Quintus Fulvius were too old; Caius Nero and Marcus Livius, the consuls

who had defeated Hasdrubal at Sena, were both unpopular aristocrats; Publius Scipio's Greek refinement and modern culture were obnoxious. That body, however, was not blind to the fact that in Scipio they had a very able officer, and one in every way well adapted as a leader for the war.

Publius Cornelius Scipio may be regarded as the greatest general Rome had before Julius Cæsar. Whether he owed much to fortune or not, the fact still remains that he won a multitude of splendid successes, and made the most of his advantages. When only a youth of nineteen—according to others sixteen—he fought at the battle of the Ticinus, where he saved his father's life; two years later, as a military tribune, he took part in the battle of Cannae. In the year 544 he proceeded in command of the Roman forces to Spain, and did much to restore the fortune of the Roman arms in that country.

The majority of the Senate displayed wisdom enough to overlook their unfriendly disposition towards the young general, and Scipio proceeded to Sicily to superintend the building of the fleet, the preparation of siege materials, and the formation of the expeditionary army. The two legions formed out of the remnants of the defeated army of Cannae, which, as a degradation, had been banished to Sicily, were available as combatants. Another leader, more jealous of his own reputation

than of the national prestige, might have objected to trust to such men, but Scipio accepted the army as it was, and completed the legions with volunteers from Italy.

In forty days the fleet was ready for sea, the crews having been reinforced by seamen from the Italian coast. In the spring of 550, Scipio set sail for Africa with two strong legions of veterans—about thirty thousand men—forty vessels of war, and four hundred transports, and, without meeting with the least resistance, landed successfully at the Fair Promontory, in the neighbourhood of Utica. There he was soon joined by Massinissa, the deposed ruler of the Massylians.

The campaign began with some successful cavalry skirmishes and the siege of Utica; but the Carthaginians having been reinforced by Syphax, the ruler of the Massaesylians, with an army of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, Scipio was compelled to raise the siege. He withdrew his forces, and constructed a fortified camp for the winter on a promontory between Utica and Carthage. Scipio then made proposals for peace, but on one and the same night surprised the enemy in their two camps. The Africans being off their guard, the Romans set fire to the reed huts of the Numidians, and when the Carthaginians hastened to their help, their own camp shared the same fate. In this nocturnal surprise, a large number of Numidians and Carthaginians were slain.

At this time, a Macedonian corps, under Sopater, and a contingent of Celtiberian mercenaries arrived, and a great battle was fought on the "Great Plains," five days' march from Utica. Scipio, with his veterans and volunteers, had no great difficulty in dispersing the hastily-collected host of Carthaginians, Numidians, and Celtiberians. An attack on the Roman naval camp was attempted with some success by the Carthaginian fleet, but at this time their ally, Syphax, fell into the hands of the Romans.

After the defeats of the Carthaginians, negotiations for peace were opened; the patriotic party in Carthage, however, were not disposed to give up the struggle so cheaply. They had not lost confidence in their great leader, and while the opposition were allowed to negotiate for peace, orders were sent to Hannibal to return with all speed to Africa. He was at Croton when he received the summons, and lost no time in complying. The transports had been long in readiness in the roadstead; Hannibal caused his horses to be destroyed, had all the Italian soldiers who refused to follow him over the sea put to death, and set off. By the rapidity of his movements and through good fortune he arrived at Leptis without impediment.

After thirty-six years, the noble warrior found himself once more on his native soil; he had left his country when still almost a boy, and had ever since upheld its honour, and gained for himself an enduring reputation as one of the most brilliant captains, a

reputation which, in future ages, he was to share with very few others.

Regardless of the negotiations for peace, the Carthaginians broke the armistice by plundering a Roman transport fleet, which had been driven on to the African coast. Polybius says that what emboldened the Carthaginians to do so was that they had conceived the greatest hopes that, with Hannibal's assistance, they would draw victory to their side.

The ambassadors sent to Carthage to complain of this outrage were escorted back by two Carthaginian triremes; but treachery was intended, for the Carthaginians had hidden three more to pounce upon the Roman quinquereme as soon as the escort left it. After passing the mouth of the River Macar, from whence the Roman camp was visible, the commanders of the escorting triremes, according to their instructions, withdrew. The ship containing the ambassadors held its course alone, and was attacked by the three triremes, which sallied forth. Most of the Romans were killed or wounded, but the ship was steered for the land, where there happened to be a foraging party from the camp, and drawn up on the shore. The ambassadors were preserved, but for this act of treachery the war was resumed with greater violence than before.

Scipio informed Massinissa of the manner in which the Carthaginians had broken the treaty,

and urged him to draw together as large a force as he was able to raise, and to join him with the greatest promptitude.

The Carthaginians, distracted by beholding their cities wasted and destroyed, sent some messengers to Hannibal to entreat him not to delay any longer, but to advance on the enemy, and bring matters to a decision by a battle. To this the general replied that it behoved them to attend to their own business; that it belonged to him alone to choose the time for repose and the time for action.

Scipio had behaved handsomely to some Carthaginian spies, and Hannibal, struck by his magnanimity, conceived a desire to enter into personal communication with him. This was arranged; Scipio encamped in the neighbourhood of Naragara, and the two generals met. Hannibal sought to obtain better conditions, but, after the uncalled-for breach of the armistice, Scipio could not promise better terms. The conference led to no result. The battle of Zama was fought, and it ended the struggle; the Carthaginian army was annihilated, and Hannibal, with a handful of men, fled to Hadrumentum. Scipio granted peace, but no longer on the former terms. Carthage became tributary to Rome, and practically lost her independence.

A military operation which offers a great field of study to the soldier is the concluding period of the

contest between Cæsar and Pompey, when the greatest captain of the age took his legions across the Adriatic to Epirus.

When, at the head of his vanguard, Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, the narrow brook which separated his province from Italy, and thus set at naught the commands of the Senate, the die was cast, and arms were to decide which of the two men, who had hitherto jointly governed Rome, was henceforth to be its sole ruler.

Pompey did not stay to await Cæsar's advance, but on his approach fled to Brundisium, and in the spring of 705 reached the coast of Greece. There he gathered a powerful army, for he had nine legions of Roman citizens, five of which he had brought with him from Italy; one, a veteran legion, he had drawn from Sicily, one from Candia and Macedonia, likewise of veterans, and two from Asia. He expected Scipio to join him with two more. From Crete, Lacedemonia, Pontus, Syria, and other states he got three thousand archers, six cohorts of slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse. Imposing as this force was, it had a serious element of weakness, inasmuch as the greater part consisted of newly-raised troops, which, though animated by an excellent spirit, lacked sufficient training.

Pompey had not only collected
from Asia and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bethynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and

Egypt, but had given orders that many more ships should be built. His fleet is stated to have numbered five hundred vessels, of which one hundred were Roman. The fleet commanded the Adriatic, and especially the harbours of the mainland and islands of the eastern shore.

To feed the war he had exacted large contributions from the rulers and corporations of those provinces of which he himself had the government, and had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter quarters at Dyrrhachium (Durazzo), Apollonia, and other seaports, and to hinder Cæsar from passing the sea, for which purpose he stationed his fleet along the Adriatic coast.

To attack his adversary in Macedonia it was optional with Cæsar to proceed by land, leading his army through Illyria, or to ferry it across the Adriatic from Brundisium. Availing himself, however, of the first alternative, it was possible that Pompey, who had a numerous fleet, might take advantage of his opponent's march through a rugged and poor country to convey the whole of his forces across the sea to Italy. This was a measure for which Pompey had actually been preparing, and could have been successfully and easily carried into effect after Cæsar's defeat at Dyrrhachium. The second alternative demanded a considerable fleet.

Cæsar had given orders for twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him at Brundisium; he had also issued instructions for the collection of vessels of war and transports, and had caused others to be built in the Gallic, Sicilian, and Italian ports. Though these orders had been issued long before, on reaching Brundisium he found, not more than twelve warships, and transports scarcely sufficient to convey over at once the third part of his army. The want of ships threatened to upset all his plans; this, and the fact that his Admiral, Publius Dolabella, had the previous year been defeated by Pompey's fleet at Curieta, gave to his operations a character of venture.

Cæsar boldly faced the difficulty, and, addressing his legionaries, desired that they would patiently submit to leave their slaves and baggage in Italy, so that a greater number of men might be put on board. To this the troops willingly consented.

He chose a bad season of the year for crossing the Adriatic, and on the 5th of November (according to the rectified calendar) set sail from Brundisium for the coast of Epirus. He took with him six legions and six hundred horsemen; these troops were greatly worn by toil and sickness. Only twelve galleys were available to convoy the armament, and on one of these Cæsar himself embarked.

His enterprise was hazardous in the extreme,

and good fortune alone saved him from defeat. His transports were seen both from the harbour of Oricum, where a Pompeian squadron of eighteen ships was lying, and from the headquarters of the hostile fleet at Corcyra. Cæsar's fate was in their hands, but they failed to seize their opportunity. The commanders of both showed a singular want of enterprise ; the first considered himself too weak, the second was not ready to sail.

The coast was reached about the middle of the Acroceraunian (Chimara) cliffs, at the little-frequented roadstead of Paleassa. There Cæsar landed every man of his army in safety, without the loss of a single vessel. These were the same night sent back to Brundisium to bring over the remainder of the army. Cæsar had landed before the news of his approach was bruited on the continent ; he at once set the troops in motion and captured the seaport town of Oricum. Torquatus, the governor appointed by Pompey, wanted to shut the gates and defend the place, but his soldiers refused to fight against the power of Rome. Torquatus had no other choice but to surrender. Having taken Oricum, Cæsar immediately marched on Apollonia. L. Straberius, the governor, wanted to defend the place, but the inhabitants would not hear of it ; they sent deputies to Cæsar, and received him into the town. Many other cities followed this example.

Pompey, having seen what passed at Oricum

and Apollonia, became alarmed for Dyrrhachium, and went thither marching as fast as possible, by day and by night; the troops were greatly harassed, and many desertions followed. As Pompey had reached Dyrrhachium, Cæsar marched more leisurely and encamped near the River Apsus.

Marcus Bibulus, the Pompeian admiral, woke up to his duty, and tried to make up in some way for his negligence in allowing Cæsar to reach land. He captured and burnt about thirty of the transports returning to Italy under Fuvius Calenus, and notwithstanding the inclement season of the year, established a most careful watch along the whole coast occupied by Cæsar, from the island of Sason up to the port of Corcyra.

Calenus in the meanwhile, according to Cæsar's orders, had embarked as many of the legions and cavalry at Brundisium as his transports would hold, and weighed anchor. He had not gone far before he received letters from Cæsar informing him that the Grecian coasts were guarded by the enemy's fleet. On getting this news he recalled his ships and returned to Brundisium.

Bibulus was master of the sea and Cæsar of the coast, and as the first deprived Cæsar of all intercourse by sea, so the latter, by disposing parties along the shore, prevented Bibulus from landing to get wood and fresh water, of which he was often in need. Bibulus was obliged to send to Corcyra for provisions and even for fuel and water.

After the death of Bibulus, Libo, who succeeded him in command of the fleet, leaving the neighbourhood of Oricum with a fleet of fifty ships, went to Brundisium, and seized an island which was opposite to the harbour. He considered that it was better to hold that place which commanded the only outlet to the sea, than to keep all the ports and shores blockaded by a fleet. By his sudden arrival he did some damage, and, rendered bold by success, he wrote to Pompey that if he pleased he might order the rest of the ships to be hauled upon the shore and repaired, for that with his own fleet he could prevent Cæsar receiving any aid and supplies.

Cæsar was in a serious predicament indeed; it was impossible for his officers to convey the second portion of his army across the Adriatic, and he did not succeed in capturing Dyrrhachium, which, as Pompey's chief arsenal, was filled with stores of all sorts, and the weak garrison of which had been strongly reinforced. Whilst he experienced the greatest difficulty in provisioning his army, the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium and masters of the sea, had abundance of everything.

Cæsar's only hope depended on the transport fleet, for his army being half as numerous as that of his adversary he dared not offer battle. It was fortunate for him that Pompey, who was determined to await the arrival of the legions from Pergamus,

had no intention to force on an action. Feeling considerable uneasiness for the want of the rest of his legions, he wrote in severe terms to his officers, and sent positive orders for the fleet to set sail on the occurrence of the first fair wind, even if they were to steer their course to the shores of Apollonia—for these parts were unguarded by the enemy's fleet—and run their ships aground. But any attempt of the fleet to fight its way through the blockade was extremely hazardous. How desperate Cæsar's situation must have appeared to him may be judged by the resolution he had taken —when the fleet came not—to cross the Adriatic himself in a fisherman's boat, in order to fetch it. This idea had to be given up, as no mariner was found bold enough to undertake so daring a voyage.

Plutarch, Appian, Val. Maximus, and Suetonius say that it was on this occasion that Cæsar in disguise went into a boat to cross over, and when the rowers, in consequence of a storm, wished to return, said, "Be bold, fear nothing; you carry Cæsar and his fortunes." The men toiled, but were compelled by the tempest to return, and regained the coast of Greece with much difficulty.

On several occasions, most strikingly in the case of his landing in Epirus, Cæsar acted at variance with the best-founded military principles, and, apparently, became censurable from a military point of view. For all that he was a master of the art

of war, and as such was able to discern when circumstances sanctioned a bolder course of action, however much opposed it might be to the ordinary practice.

Libo's squadron was hindered from procuring water by parties of horse which Antony had posted along the shore. This so distressed his crews that he was compelled to abandon the blockade. Mark Antony and Fuvius Calenus, taking advantage of this favourable opportunity, weighed anchor and led out of Brundisium a transport fleet, on which they had embarked four legions, three of them composed of veterans, and a body of eight hundred cavalry. In this instance also fortune favoured the brave, for a strong south wind carried the Roman fleet past Libo's galleys.

The dangers which encompassed Mark Antony's expedition were many; the wind, which had served him in the first instance, rendered a landing impossible. The fleet was then directed on the coast of Apollonia, and compelled to sail past the camps of Cæsar and of Pompey, and to steer to the north of Dyrrhachium towards Lissus, a town which fortunately adhered to Cæsar. Through the most marvellous good fortune the landing was successful, for when the fleet sailed past the harbour Dyrrhachium, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian galleys, sallied out and started in pursuit, and Antony's ships had hardly entered the port of Lissus when the enemy's squadron appeared before

it. At this critical moment the wind suddenly veered, and the pursuing galleys were driven back on to the open sea.

Antony sent most of the transports back to fetch the rest of the horse and foot, and despatched messengers to Cæsar to inform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and what number of troops he had brought over with him.

Antony and Cæsar were some four days' march from each other, the two forces being separated by Dyrrhachium. Now Cæsar and Pompey quitted their camps, the first to join Antony, the other to prevent their uniting, by the employment either of stratagem or force. Pompey, however, in vain strove to prevent the junction of the two commanders, nor was he able to induce Antony to fight by himself. That chief, by effecting a perilous march round Dyrrhachium by the passes of Graba Balkan, gained his purpose and joined Cæsar, who had gone to meet him on the right bank of the Apsus.

Cæsar marched into Macedonia and pitched his camp not far from his enemy; the following day he offered battle, which Pompey declined. He then suddenly threw himself between Pompey's army and Dyrrhachium, and invested his adversary's camp with a chain of fortified posts sixteen miles long.

Cæsar reflected that once Pompey's cavalry, which was very numerous, were shut up, he would be able to supply his camp with less difficulty.

Another, and a more important reason, prompted him, that was the prestige he would certainly acquire amongst the foreign nations, when it came to be known that Pompey was being besieged by him.

Pompey, on the other hand, was unwilling to leave the sea and abandon Dyrrhachium, because it was his base, where his arms, war engines, and provisions were stored. Nor was he able to stop Cæsar's works without hazarding a battle, which at that time he had determined not to do. Being cut off from Dyrrhachium, he intrenched himself strongly on a rising ground, which was called Petra, where there is a tolerably good haven for ships of small size, in which they could run in and find shelter from the winds. There he built a continuous intrenchment, which included fifteen miles of territory within his lines. Round Pompey's camp there were several high rough hills; these Cæsar occupied at first with guards, then he raised strong forts on them, and connecting one fort with the other drew a line of circumvallation round Pompey. The Cæsarians afterwards added an outer line to this, to protect themselves against attacks from Dyrrhachium, or from any attempt made to turn their position, which the enemy could easily do by the aid of its fleet.

The turn events had taken was of a strange nature, not only on account of the number of castles and other works built to enclose the ground, but

because Cæsar, who besieged, was inferior to his adversary in numbers. Nor was this all, for several ships arrived every day from all parts to supply Pompey's army with what it required, whereas Cæsar's soldiers soon consumed all the provisions found in the country round about.

Continuous skirmishing with no prominent success on either side took place between the two forces; in one day Cæsar had six engagements, three at Dyrrhachium and three at the fortifications. Pompey lost in these actions two thousand men, amongst whom were several men of note; he also lost six standards. The loss in killed on the other side was small, but many Cæsarians were wounded in one of the forts. Its defenders counted to Cæsar about thirty thousand arrows which had been thrown in, and Scaeva, the centurion, by whose exertions the fort was saved, had his shield pierced with two hundred and thirty-eight holes.

Every day after this Cæsar drew up his army and offered battle to Pompey, which he declined. Pompey was incommoded by want of room and of water, for Cæsar had dammed up the streams which discharged themselves into the sea. In his camp there was also a great dearth of forage, which the fleet was unable adequately to remedy, and the horses and cattle were with great difficulty kept alive. The bad smells from dead carcasses lying in such a restricted space infected the camp.

At this time two Celts, Roscillus and Abducillus,

who had been reprimanded by Cæsar for having defrauded their followers of their pay, deserted to Pompey, and informed him where Cæsar's works were strong, and where they were weakest. Acting on this information, Pompey determined to sally out. He selected for point of attack that portion of Cæsar's works which extended towards the sea, and were furthest from his greater camp. To this point he sent ships freighted with fascines and light-armed troops, likewise all the warships that lay at Dyrrhachium.

Pompey attacked suddenly at break of day, and his onset was quite a surprise for Cæsar's men. At the place attacked there were lines facing Pompey's intrenchments, and lines facing outwards six hundred feet beyond, thrown up so that in case an attack should be made on both sides the investing troops should have the means of protecting themselves; but the beach between the two intrenchments was open. Pompey knew that the outer lines were not complete. While the inner line was attacked by the legions in camp, and the outer by men who had been landed beyond the enemy's intrenchments, a third division was landed in the space between the two lines. The defenders, attacked in flank and in rear, were beaten off and put to flight. Whatever troops were sent to retrieve the disaster were infected with the fear of the rest, neither could they rally the fugitives, nor themselves sustain the charge. Pompey thus broke the line of investment.

At about the same time his elder son Gnæus burnt and partly carried off the few Cæsarian warships lying beached in the port of Oricum, which were being guarded by only three cohorts. Shortly after Gnæus having set fire to thirty transports which Antony had left at Lissus, endeavoured to take the town; but the defence of the Roman citizens was so spirited that after three days he was compelled to desist.

After these defeats Cæsar commenced his retreat to Apollonia. Pompey followed him; but, though the road was difficult and crossed by several rivers, the marching powers of Cæsar's soldiers, combined with his dexterous leading, prevailed, so that after four days Pompey had to relinquish the pursuit.

Having paid his soldiers, and placed his wounded in safety, Cæsar quitted Apollonia and marched into Thessaly, both with a view of getting beyond reach of the enemy's fleet, and to more easily effect a junction with the corps of Calvinus and the two legions which Cornificius was bringing from Italy by way of Illyria. Pompey and his party, elated by their opponents' defeat at Dyrrhachium, and by his subsequent retreat, followed him into Thessaly, resolved to fight him at any cost.

The great battle came off at Pharsalus, a town to the south of Larissa on the River Enipeus. It was fought on the 9th of August, B.C. 48. Pompey had assembled his entire army, eleven legions, numbering forty-seven thousand men and seven

thousand horse. Cæsar, on the other hand, had not yet been joined by the legions under Quintus Fuvius Calenus and Cornificius; he had only eight legions, with a total of twenty-two thousand men. Pompey's army consequently was more than double that of Cæsar's in infantry, and seven times as numerous in cavalry.

Notwithstanding the disparity in numbers, Pompey's army was not merely defeated, but annihilated; fifteen thousand men lay dead or wounded on the battle-field, and on the morning after the battle twenty thousand men lay down their arms: the rest sought refuge in the mountains. The defeat was decisive, and soon all the kings, peoples, and cities who had embraced Pompey's cause went over to the victor.

Of the many difficulties a commander has to contend with in every campaign, the subsistence of his army is always the greatest. This was singularly illustrated in this instance. After Mark Antony's arrival from Italy, Cæsar had despatched strong detachments to Ætolia, and to Thessaly to procure provisions for his army, and notwithstanding that strong detachments scoured the country lying behind it, its subsistence became difficult and precarious. With all the exertions of the general to bring about an organized system of conveyance, and thereby a regular supply, there was more than scarcity.

Cæsar's defeat before Pompey's camp had

released the numerous Pompeian cavalry, and by spreading over the adjacent country, this threatened to render his provisioning utterly impossible. As he moved into Thessaly and effected a junction with Calvinus, he found supplies in the region about the Peneius, but none too ample. The conditions of the two armies in this respect were very dissimilar when they fronted each other at Pharsalus. Pompey had a numerous cavalry to collect supplies, had well-stocked magazines, and provisions in abundance; Cæsar's troops, on the other hand, had difficulty in keeping themselves alive, and could only look forward to the approaching corn harvest for better circumstances. But the latter were more fortunate than their adversaries, being led by a general who, with the certainty of divination, found proper means for every end.

Cæsar's acts are difficult to judge by the ordinary standard, for he in a singular degree disregarded routine and tradition. Few commanders have shared with him the gift of knowing always how to find out the mode of warfare by which in the given case the enemy could be conquered. Victory with him was generally due, not to the massiveness of his forces, but to the celerity of his movements; by rapid and bold action, even with inadequate means, he often mastered his opponent.

CHAPTER XV.

REVOLUTION OF 1688: CROSSING OF THE PRINCE OF ORANGE.

The Prince of Orange is invited to England—His declaration—Troops mobilized for the enterprise—James II. is sufficiently strong to defeat the attempt—Preparations in Holland—Composition and command of the Prince's fleet—Selection of a place for the disembarkation—Consideration of the probable action of the English fleet—A council of war determines that the ships shall remain at the Gunfleet—First start of the expedition—Driven back by foul weather—It puts to sea a second time—The fleet tacks and makes for the west—Fear of having to contend with the English fleet—Torbay is selected as the place of disembarkation—The expedition gets there safely, and the landing is effected—Attitude of the people of Devonshire—James gathers his troops about Salisbury—Desertions to the Prince—Feversham disbands the royal army.

In the crossing of the Prince of Orange to England and in his landing in Torbay, are to be found many of those incidents which, generally speaking, have a marked influence on the result of all military expeditions beyond the seas. This part of the history of our country lends itself in a singular manner to illustrate the subject of which we are treating, and

we consider it, therefore, to be worthy of special attention.

In February of the year 1685, King Charles II. died, and was followed on the throne by his brother the Duke of York. In a brief space of time the new monarch had succeeded in alienating the hearts of every class of his subjects by violating their laws, confiscating their estates, and persecuting their religion. Public indignation was nearly at its highest when the King brought over Irish Papist troops to England for the purpose of coercing the people. In their distress the hopes of the people of England rested on William Prince of Orange, the son of Mary, eldest daughter of Charles I., and husband of Princess Mary, eldest daughter of James II. The Prince was easily persuaded by promises of support from powerful and eminent men, to appear in England at the head of a strong body of troops.

The undertaking cannot be looked upon in the light of an invasion. It would be absurd to call it so, when a large majority of the people of England were anxiously expecting the Prince to come over. As Burnet writes: "Sidney brought over letters from the persons formerly mentioned, both inviting the Prince to come over to save and rescue the nation from ruin, and assuring him that they wrote that which was the universal sense of all the wise and good men of the nation." * His motto, "The liberties of England and the Protestant religion,"

* "Burnet," vol. iii. p. 302.

shows that he came as a deliverer, and not as an assailant.

In his declaration the Prince reproaches King James with having broken the law, and by certain acts endangered the peace and well-being of a kingdom with which he was closely related by blood and by marriage. Whilst complying with the expressed desire of the people of England, he abjured all thought of conquest, and pledged himself to abide by the decision of Parliament, to whom he left all questions, both public and private.

The troops collected to accompany the Prince to England, and to take part in the enterprise were—one troop of Life Guards, one regiment of Horse Guards, five regiments of horse, eight of dragoons, one of Foot Guards, and fifteen battalions of the line, of which six were British regiments in the Dutch service. In all, about three thousand six hundred cavalry, and ten thousand six hundred infantry. Echard states that seventy-eight field officers, nearly one thousand inferior officers, and about fifteen thousand men were landed. Many officers who had been driven out of France by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and others, who had left or had been turned out of James's army, accompanied the expedition.

The smallness of the force shows what confidence the Prince must have had in the general welcome which he had been assured awaited him on his setting foot in England. It is too evident that it

would have been foolhardy to think of conquering a country like England with such a small following, for James had naval and military forces sufficient to make the attempt more than hazardous. The King "estimated the force with which he should be able to meet the invaders at nearly forty thousand troops, exclusive of the militia." * Nevertheless William knew that circumstances sanctioned his braving any risks, for, as the loyalty of the navy and army was doubtful, these risks were more apparent than real.

The Prince had to think of his preparations, and to concert his measures in such a way as to keep them from coming to the knowledge of his adversary. In some of the former chapters we have endeavoured to draw attention to the need for preparations and secrecy, and here we borrow from Macaulay's narrative an example of what a foreseeing prince thought necessary to do in this direction. The historian writes: "He could not make a descent on England without the sanction of the United Provinces. If he asked for that sanction before his design was ripe for execution, his intention might possibly be thwarted by the faction hostile to his house, and would certainly be divulged to the whole world. He therefore determined to make his preparations with all speed, and, when they were complete, to seize some favourable moment for requesting the consent of the federation. It

* "The History of England," by Lord Macaulay, vol. i. chap. ix.

was observed by the agents of France that he was more busy than they had ever known him. Not a day passed on which he was not seen spurring from his villa to the Hague. He was perpetually closeted with his most distinguished adherents. Twenty-four ships of war were fitted for sea, in addition to the ordinary force which the commonwealth maintained. There was, as it chanced, an excellent pretence for making this addition to the marine; for some Algerine corsairs had recently dared to show themselves in the German Ocean. A camp was formed near Nimeguen. Many thousands of troops were assembled there. In order to strengthen this army, the garrisons were withdrawn from the strongholds in Dutch Brabant. Even the renowned fortress of Bergopzoom was left almost defenceless. Field-pieces, bombs, and tumbrils from all the magazines of the United Provinces were collected at headquarters. All the bakers of Rotterdam toiled day and night to make biscuit. All the gun-makers of Utrecht were found too few to execute the orders for pistols and muskets. All the saddlers of Amsterdam were hard at work on harness and holsters. Six thousand sailors were added to the establishment. Seven thousand new soldiers were raised. They could not, indeed, be formally enlisted without the sanction of the federation; but they were drilled and kept in such a state of discipline that they might, without difficulty, be distributed into regiments within twenty-four hours after that

sanction should be obtained. These preparations required ready money; but William had, by strict economy, laid up against a great emergency a treasure amounting to about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. What more was wanting was supplied by the zeal of partisans. Great quantities of gold, not less, it was said, than a hundred thousand guineas, came to him from England. The Huguenots, who had carried with them into exile large quantities of the precious metals, were eager to lend him all that they possessed; for they fondly hoped that, if he succeeded, they should be restored to the country of their birth; and they feared that, if he failed, they should scarcely be safe even in the country of their adoption."

William's fleet consisted of fifty men-of-war, twenty-five frigates, and twenty-five fire-ships. Herbert, with the rank of Lieutenant-Admiral-General, was the Commander-in-Chief, but the ships were commanded by Dutch officers, and it was indeed with the greatest difficulty that they were persuaded to serve under an alien. The principal chroniclers admire the secrecy and rapidity which were observed in the preparations. Echard writes, "The preparations for the Fleet and army, as they had been carry'd on with extraordinary Secrecy, were now compleated with admirable Dispatch; on the 19th Old Stile. About 500 Transport Ships were hir'd within the Space of three

Days; so that never was so great a Design executed in so short a Time." *

The troops were put on board in the Zuider-Zee, where the transports lay more than ten days before they could get out of the Texel.

When it came to the selection of a place for a landing, William was advised to disembark in Bridlington Bay, or a little below Hull. It was pointed out to him in support of this that Yorkshire abounded in horses, that the gentry there were well affected, and the country was plenteous. A landing in the western counties of England was not recommended, the miscarriage of Monmouth's expedition, and the terrible retribution which followed it, were all too recent.

There was, however, a more important matter to consider, namely, what attitude the British fleet might possibly take; for as long as the King had a powerful fleet ready for sea, the Prince's undertaking was exposed to considerable risk. As Duke of York, James II. had been at the head of the Navy, as Lord High Admiral of England, and there were many in the fleet who still remembered with love and admiration the Prince who had led them to victory in other days. As future events proved, this feeling was not so easily stamped out; some four years later, as William's fleet was about to engage the French near Cape La Hogue,

* "The History of the Revolution and the Establishment of England in the year 1688."—Lawrence Echard, book ii. chap. ii.

Admiral Russell visited most of the English ships, to encourage the combatants by a few stirring words; indirectly referring to such officers as were known to have Jacobite sympathies, in addressing the crews he said, "If any of your officers play false, overboard with him, and with myself amongst the first."

Possibly in 1688 King James regretted, when it was too late, that after the naval engagement off Lowestoft he had not pursued Van Tromp, and thus destroyed the last remains of the Dutch navy.

Herbert had learnt from an English vessel that Lord Dartmouth, with a fleet of sixty-one vessels, thirty-eight of which were line-of-battle ships, was anchored at the Gunfleet. His force consequently was sufficiently large to have competed with the Prince's squadron, or to have played havoc amongst his huge fleet of transports. According to Echard some of the naval officers proposed that the King's fleet should stand along the coast of Holland, there to attend the Dutch fleet as it came out. This plan might have been adopted had the Flag and other officers been thoroughly faithful to their King; but they were not all loyal, and at a council of war it was determined by a large majority to remain at the Gunfleet to intercept the Dutch there.

By this decision one of the most serious obstacles to the enterprise was removed. If we turn and look at the elements we shall see what a prominent part they played in the result. In naval operations

certain meteorological influences very often come in aid of one party at the right moment, and, if turned wisely to advantage, determine the successful issue of the enterprise.

It has been related of Nelson that he was always very attentive in studying the least signs which portended any atmospheric perturbation. He had the greatest faith in the indications of the barometer, and his diary contains on this point some interesting observations, which he put down with his own hand every day.

The correspondent of the *Times* in 1854 makes some remarks on the loss of the s.s. *Prince* in the great storm of the 14th of November, when that vessel was lost with a cargo of most needed stores. He narrates how the English had a forewarning of what might be expected. On Friday, the 10th of November, only four days before the catastrophe, it came on to blow, a gale set right into the bay of Balaclava and raised a high wild sea, and both the *Jason* and the *Prince* had to steam gently ahead against the wind to ease the strain on the cable. Of the other vessels there were few that did not drag their anchors and draw towards the coast. Sir Edmund Lyons did not like his berth, and took the *Agamemnon* round to Kamiesh, but the transports were ordered to stand outside Balaclava.

To return to the events of 1688, Macaulay describes the departure of the expedition from Holland in the following words: "The Prince had

not been many hours on board when the wind became fair. On the 19th the armament put to sea. and traversed before a strong breeze, about half the distance between the Dutch and English coasts. Then the wind changed, blew hard from the west, and swelled into a violent tempest. The ships, scattered and in great distress, regained the shore of Holland as best they might . . . In two or three days the fleet reassembled. One vessel only had been cast away. Not a single soldier or sailor was missing. Some horses had perished; but this loss the Prince, with great expedition, repaired; and before the *London Gazette* had spread the news of the mishap he was again ready to sail."

Echard and Burnet set down the number of horses lost in this tempest at five hundred. As the latter states that they died from want of air, it is most probable that they were suffocated by the ships being battened down.

The mishap was much exaggerated by rumour, and it was thought in England that the landing of the Prince had been tided over for a year.

The general impatience for the arrival of the Dutch was great. "Crowds," Macaulay states, "stood in Cheapside, gazing intently at the weathercock on the graceful steeple of Bow Church, and praying for a Protestant wind." Their supplications were heard.

It was on the evening of Thursday, the 1st of November, that the Prince put to sea for the second

time. "The wind blew fresh from the east. The armament, during the twelve hours, held a course towards the north-west. The light vessels sent out by the English Admiral for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, brought back news which confirmed the prevailing opinion that the enemy would try to land in Yorkshire. All at once, on a signal from the Prince's ship, the whole fleet tacked, and made for the British Channel. The same breeze which favoured the voyage of the invaders prevented Dartmouth from coming out of the Thames. His ships were forced to strike yards and topmasts; and two of his frigates, which had gained the open sea, where shattered by the violence of the weather and driven back into the river.

"The Dutch fleet ran fast before the gale, and reached the Straits at about ten in the morning of Saturday, the 3rd of November, William himself, in the *Brill*, led the way. More than six hundred vessels, with canvas spread to a favourable wind, followed in his train. The transports were in the centre, the men-of-war, more than fifty in number, formed an outer rampart."

The prospect of being pursued and overtaken by Dartmouth's fleet was not lost sight of, and with that object Herbert's post was in the rear. Whatever discontent and zeal for the Protestant faith may have been prevalent in the King's fleet, the Dutch and the English were old antagonists, and the remembrance of the engagements of 1665 and

1666 might have soon caused the dormant animosity to break forth. Every reason counselled prudence, for a conflict, in whatever manner it might have terminated, would have marred the undertaking.

Possibly the Prince may have kept his design to himself, or may have been guided by the information he had received in the selection of the place for landing; for James, expecting that Yorkshire would have been the Prince's destination, had sent several regiments northward to oppose him, should he have appeared there. When the fleet tacked, on the 2nd of November, and went down the Channel the die was cast, much to the disappointment of his friends in the north who had made arrangements for a rising.

"Torbay was the place where the Prince intended to land. But the morning of Monday, the 5th of November, was hazy. The pilot of the *Brill* could not discover the sea marks, and carried the fleet too far to the west. The danger was great. To return in the face of the wind was impossible. Plymouth was the next port. But at Plymouth a garrison had been posted under the Earl of Bath. The landing might be opposed; and a check might produce serious consequences. There could be little doubt, moreover, that by this time the royal fleet had got out of the Thames and was hastening down the Channel.

"At that moment the wind changed; a soft

breeze sprung up from the south, and under the mild light of an autumnal noon the fleet turned back, passed round the lofty cape of Berry Head, and rodè safe in the harbour of Torbay."

The principal danger was over. Dartmouth's fleet, after laying two days near Beachy Head for want of wind, proceeded on its course, passed the Isle of Wight, and even sighted the Dutch ships in Torbay. At this moment a fierce gale from the west compelled his vessels to turn back and make for the harbour of Portsmouth.

No sooner had the Prince anchored than the disembarkation commenced, "Mackay was sent on shore first with the British regiments . . . There was some difficulty about landing the horses; and it seemed probable that this operation would occupy several days. But on the following morning the prospect cleared. The wind was gentle. The water in the bay was as smooth as glass. Some fishermen pointed out a place where the ships could be brought within sixty feet of the beach. This was done, and in three hours many hundred horses swam safely to shore."

The place for landing them was a quarter of a mile below the village. The artillery and the heavy baggage were left on board, and the ships were ordered round to Topsham, the seaport of Exeter.

The narratives of the Crimean War havè made us familiar with the miseries of the first bivouac, and

the special correspondent of the *Times* drew a harrowing picture of the troops drenched by torrents of rain on the night of the 14th of September. Similar was the experience of the Prince's followers more than a century and half before. "During the first day the troops who had gone on shore had many discomforts to endure. The earth was soaked with rain. The baggage was still on board of the ships. Officers of high rank were compelled to sleep in wet clothes on the wet ground; the Prince had no better quarters than a hut afforded."

What favoured the Prince of Orange in his descent was not only that there was no force to contest the landing, but that he and his followers were welcomed by the majority of the people. Whatever timidity the inhabitants of Devonshire may have shown at first in coming forward to offer their services was but natural; the recollection of the cruel revenge and little mercy shown to Monmouth's followers was too fresh. It needed more than three years to efface the cruelties perpetrated by the inhuman Jeffreys, the wretch who exulted over the misery of poor misguided rustics, and who rejoiced over the sentence he pronounced. It must be said also in favour of the country people that they had no opportunity of realizing the extent of the nation's hostility to King James, and that they were ignorant of the engagements of the most powerful lords and gentlemen to assist the Prince.

As the Dutch fleet sailed down the Channel past

Dover, couriers were sent in all haste to London to warn the King. James had become sensible of his danger through a despatch he received from Albeville, and, on hearing that the Dutch fleet had passed the Straits and was steering westward, lost not a moment in making his preparations for confronting the enemy. The troops were much scattered, still expresses went in all directions and with all possible speed to recall the corps which were on the march, and to direct all to hasten to Salisbury, which city was appointed as the general rendezvous of the royal forces.

The King was eager to fight, for a battle might have injured the Prince's popularity. Fully aware of this, William determined to avoid an action as long as possible; what made him linger in the west country, his army inactive, was that he fully realized that the longer he remained idle the more likely was the King's cause to collapse. And so it happened, for James's regiments fell to pieces and his followers deserted him.

Whilst William was at Exeter and James's army lay encamped round Salisbury, a dark conspiracy began spreading through the ranks of the royal army, on which the fate of the King so entirely depended. Viscount Cornbury led the way, but his attempt to take over three regiments of cavalry to the Prince miscarried, and he stole away to the Dutch camp with a few followers. A crowd of deserters soon flocked to Exeter, and the Earl of

Bath placed Plymouth and its garrison at William's disposal.

The King was advised to have Churchill and Grafton arrested and sent to Portsmouth, but having confidence in their professions of fidelity he rejected the advice. Churchill imagined that he was distrusted and fled with Grafton to the Prince's headquarters.

He left behind him a letter of explanation. Macaulay states, "It was written with the decorum which he never failed to preserve in the midst of guilt and dishonour. He acknowledged that he owed everything to the royal favour. Interest, he said, and gratitude impelled him in the same direction. Under no other government could he hope to be so great and prosperous as he had been; but all such considerations must yield to a paramount duty. He was a Protestant, and he could not conscientiously draw his sword against the Protestant cause. As to the rest, he would ever be ready to hazard life and fortune in defence of the sacred person and of the lawful rights of his gracious master."

It is not a pleasant task to have to condemn a man who was one of England's most renowned captains. Religious scruples were here made an excuse for base ingratitude, but even under the sovereign who came to uphold the Protestant religion, Churchill's loyalty was a quality to be doubted. There is a very wide difference between

drawing the sword against a cause that one has at heart, and throwing the weight of one's power and ability at a critical moment on the side of the antagonist.

To no one more than to a soldier should loyalty to his sovereign be dear. In the events of 1688 many of the highest and bravest in the land were shamefully ignorant of the word honour. Their bad example, notwithstanding all their false protestations of fidelity and attachment, destroyed the moral strength of the royal army and made the final accomplishment of the Prince's undertaking much easier.

With the exception of a few casualties in the skirmish at Wincanton, the Revolution was effected without bloodshed, for Feversham, in compliance with the King's orders, disbanded his forces.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE TWO CAPTURES OF LOUISBOURG.

Julius Cæsar disembarks in the face of the enemy—Some peculiarities of those days continue to hold good—Risk connected with the operation—The French raid in Nova Scotia and surprise Canseau—William Shirley proposes to attack Louisbourg—New England forces—William Pepperell appointed to command them—Description of the defences and harbour of Louisbourg—Landing of the New England forces—The siege proceeds slowly—Commodore Warren's fleet intercepts the communications—Duchambon surrenders—Louisbourg restored to France under the treaty of Aix la Chapelle—Renewal of the war in 1756—Pitt intrusts to Amherst the operations for the capture of Louisbourg—Amount of the British and French forces—Vice-Admiral the Hon. E. Boscawen—The weather prevents a landing for some days—Wolfe reaches the shore and attacks the French—His opinion of the enterprise—Amherst's character—Siege of Louisbourg—Drucourt capitulates—Losses of the French and British forces.

WHEN we search for examples of a considerable landing effected in the face of the enemy, we are surprised to see how few there are. This scarcity of antecedents would of itself tend to prove that at all times it was a maxim in landing operations that the adversary should, if possible, be taken unawares.

Where the greatest difficulty lies is in effecting



A. *Flat Point Cove where the materials and stores were landed.* B. *Landing place in the expedition of 1745.* C. *French Settlements.* D. *Royal Battery.* E. *Besiegers' Battery and Trenches.* F. *Tidcomb's Battery.* G. *Island Battery.* H. *Lighthouse Battery.* I. *Dauphin's Battery.* K. *Fishery Steps.*

a disembarkation and in making it good, notwithstanding the opposition encountered. Many small landings have, no doubt, been resisted with variable success, but these were minor operations, and mostly conducted against a rude enemy. Of contested operations on a large scale, such as can only form a guide for a large disembarkation, there are, as we have said, very few instances on record.

In our country we have Cæsar's two invasions; and, though the conditions have greatly altered in the many centuries which have followed, still there are points which hold good now just as much as they did at the period when the Romans were masters of the world.

When, in the year 699 of Rome, Julius Cæsar determined to attempt the invasion of Britain, he ordered many ships from the neighbouring ports to attend him; in this manner he got together about eighty transports, which he deemed would be sufficient to carry his two legions across the Channel. Eighteen transports were detained by contrary winds in a port eight miles to the east; these he appointed to carry the cavalry. C. Volusenus was despatched to reconnoitre the British coast and gather information.

The wind springing up fair, Cæsar weighed anchor at about one in the morning; the cavalry were ordered to embark at the other port and to follow him. P. Sulpicius Rufus was left in charge of the harbour from whence the legions sailed, and to him was given a strong garrison to maintain it.

It was about ten in the morning when Cæsar reached the neighbourhood of the British coast. The Britons lined the approaches, and the appearance of the place was not such as the Roman leader desired, for it was bound by high cliffs. Cæsar therefore lay there until, at about three in the afternoon, he was joined by the rest of the fleet. Then, finding the wind and tide favourable, he made sign to weigh anchor, and after having sailed about eight miles came to an open shore, which skirted a plain, where he stopped.

The Britons penetrating his design, and being determined to oppose the landing, followed with their forces, their cavalry and chariots leading. Cæsar's difficulties were great, for many of the transports being large could not be brought close in shore, whilst the soldiers encumbered by their armour could not leap from the decks.* The British horsemen and war-chariots, by dashing boldly at the legionaries, prevented their forming up in regular array;† and the Romans, who were strange to their mode of fighting, were seriously embarrassed. Seeing this, Cæsar, ordered the war-galleys,

* Cæsar mentions, as a noteworthy circumstance, that some of the large ships could only approach the shore to such a point that the soldiers in disembarking were breast-high in the water.

† The British war-chariots represent the first example of mounted infantry in England, for the warriors were trained to leap down from their chariots and fight on foot. The Burgess cavalry of the earliest Rome was a still older example of mounted infantry.

a description of craft more easily put in motion and governed, to advance towards the shore to take post on the flanks of his line of transport vessels, and from the war-engines mounted on the forecastle, to hurl darts and stones at the enemy. The Britons suffered heavily from the missiles discharged by the Roman war-galleys, lost heart, and began to retire from the beach. In leaping from the ships the Romans got into some confusion, but when the foremost of them had got a firm footing, they were followed by the rest, and falling briskly upon the enemy put them to rout.

Coming down nearer to our own times we have two instances of a disembarkation effected in the face of the enemy. These are the landing of the British forces at Cape Breton Island, under General Amherst, on the 8th of June, 1758, and at Aboukir, under General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, on the 8th of March, 1801.

It is remarkable that in both these cases the transports carrying the troops anchored on the second of the month, and the landing was not attempted till the eighth, owing to the swell and heavy surf. Both landings have also been stigmatized as rash, and as having succeeded only by the greatest good fortune.

In all disembarkations in which the enemy is on the alert, and can dispose of a goodly force to meet the invaders, there must obviously be a certain amount of risk, which a resolute commander must be prepared to incur. Though prudence will always

counsel putting the troops ashore without interference on the part of the enemy, cases may, nevertheless, occur in which their vigilance cannot be evaded, and, as the saying goes, it becomes necessary to take the bull by the horns.

Within the short space of thirteen years Louisbourg was destined to endure two sieges, but from forces differently constituted. In the month of May, 1744, the French commander at Louisbourg, on hearing that war had been declared, before the news could reach Boston, despatched an armed force of nine hundred men to Nova Scotia, and surprised the small garrison of Canso (*Canseau*). The fort and buildings were destroyed, and eighty men were carried as prisoners-of-war to Louisbourg. After having passed the summer there in captivity, the officers and men taken at Canso were sent to Boston on parole.

In the following year from the reports of the condition of the fortress of Louisbourg, and of the discontent and bad discipline of the garrison, furnished by the released prisoners, William Shirley,* the Governor of Massachusetts, proposed an enterprise for its reduction. He was stirred into action as Louisbourg had been a constant menace to New England's commerce, and the French cruisers did immense injury to its fishermen. Shirley requested the members of the General

* William Shirley was a lawyer, and had been appointed to the office of Governor of Massachusetts in 1740.

Court to take an oath of secrecy on the proposition he was about to make; this, after much discussion, the Legislature of Massachusetts on the 26th of January, 1745, agreed to entertain. The motion was carried by a majority of a single vote.

Captain Ryal, who had been a prisoner at Louisbourg, was selected by Shirley to proceed to London, and to solicit the Government for a naval force to be sent to aid the enterprise. Ryal was picked out for this mission because he could give all the necessary explanations with regard to the fortress. The result of this demand was that early in the following January the Government directed Commodore Warren to proceed to New England in the spring, to confer and co-operate with Governor Shirley.

Massachusetts acted with wonderful vigour in carrying out the preparations. Vaughan, of New Hampshire, a man of sanguine temperament and daring enterprise, assisted in collecting information, and urged forward the expedition.

New England alone furnished the men. Connecticut raised 516, New Hampshire 304, Massachusetts over 3000, Rhode Island 300.* Clinton, the Governor of New York, sent two thousand pounds' worth of provisions, ten 18-pounder guns with their carriages, and, at his own expense, a supply of powder, clothing, and bedding. Pennsylvania contributed a small amount of provisions.

* These arrived too late to take part in the siege.

Nine regiments were organized and equipped in the short space of fifty days. These were the regiments of Burr, Pepperell, Willard, Moulton, Moore, Richmond, Hale, Gorham, and Waldo.

The rank and file were all volunteers—mechanics, lumberers, husbandmen, and fishermen—with officers selected from among themselves; all men, nevertheless, accustomed to danger, and expert in the use of firearms from practice acquired in hunting large game. In many instances during the siege most valuable aid was obtained from this singular constitution of the force.

Many of our present volunteer battalions have in their ranks talented men, skilled mechanics, and artificers, who, like the volunteers of New England, could at a pinch render most useful service in the field.

In the month of March, 1745, the volunteers of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, with William Pepperell, who had been appointed to command the expedition, were ready to embark. The force left Boston on the 24th of that month, and reached Canso on the 4th of April.

William Pepperell, of Kittery, was born on the 27th of June, 1696. The Pepperells, who originally hailed from Devonshire, had settled in America, and for some years were the largest merchants in New England; the firm dealt in lumber, naval stores, fish, and provisions. Pepperell was well known, wealthy, and popular; he had held the

highest office in the gift of the people, that of president of the Governor's council. When offered the command of the expedition he hesitated about accepting it, but was ultimately persuaded to do so by Shirley. Mr. Walcott was second in command, and Mr. Waldo a brigadier.

The provincial fleet was composed as follows :—

From	Connecticut	2	ships of	16	guns ..	32
„	Hampshire	2	„	14	„ ..	28
„	Rhode Island	1	„	20	„ ..	20
„	Massachusetts	3	„	20	„ ..	60
„	„	2	„	16	„ ..	32
„	„	1	„	12	„ ..	12
„	„	2	„	6	„ ..	12
				Total	guns ..	196

On the 23rd of April, Commodore Warren, with a squadron of four line-of-battle and other ships, arrived from Antigua, and the following day nine vessels brought the Connecticut contingent. In cruising about Cape Breton, Warren was joined by six more ships, three from England and three from Newfoundland. This brought his fleet to four vessels of sixty guns, one of fifty, and five of forty.

On Sunday, the 29th, the expedition sailed from Canso, and on the last day of April, an hour after sunrise, the armament, in a hundred vessels of New England, entered the Bay of Chapeaurouge, or of Gabarus, as it was called by the English. The ships anchored at a point about a couple of miles

from Flat Point Cove, which lay about three miles from the walls of Louisbourg.

Shortly after the death of Louis XIV. the isle of Cape Breton, called by the French Isle Royale, had been annexed by the French. Fully recognizing the importance of its position at the entrance of St. Lawrence, and for communications between Canada and her West Indian possessions, France had spent thirty millions of francs and employed some of her best engineers in building and strengthening the fortifications of Louisbourg. This was the principal town of the island, with a population of four thousand souls. It was built on a point at the south side of the harbour; the country around was a desolate wilderness.

The circuit of the fortifications has been variously stated to have measured a mile and a half and two miles and a quarter. The land front was about four thousand feet in extent, and had four bastions—the Princess's, the Queen's, the King's, and the Dauphin's. In the centre, connected with the King's bastion, was the citadel. The walls, which were forty feet thick at the base, and from twenty to thirty feet high, were surrounded by a ditch eighty feet wide. Approach to the line of fortifications on the land side was only possible over marshy ground.

Entick gives the following description of the fortress at the time that Pepperell's force appeared before it. "The greatest extent of the city is from

the citadel to the eastern gate, called after the Duke de Penthièvre, which is more than half a mile; and to walk round all the ramparts, mounted with heavy cannon, was at least two miles and a quarter. The road from the town to the country is by the western gate, over a drawbridge, where was a circular battery of sixteen guns, 24-pounders, seated on and commanding the upper part of the harbour. Between this and the eastern gate was the Iron battery, mounting thirty guns. Opposite to this was the Grand battery, of thirty-five 42-pounders, which commanded both the entry and all the bay; and at the mouth of the harbour was the Island battery, of thirty-four 42-pounders. The walls, ramparts, and bastions of the city had a hundred and forty-eight embrasures, though only sixty-four cannon were mounted; but there were ten mortars, of 13-inch bore, and six of 9-inch; and the garrison consisted of twelve hundred regular soldiers, under the command of M. Chambon.* But the fortifications on the land side were not entirely finished at the time of the siege, there being no outworks, glacis, or covered way. Besides, though the bastions and curtains were of masonry to the summit, which was thirty-six feet above the field,

* According to Bancroft, the walls were furnished with one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six swivels, and six mortars; the garrison consisted of more than sixteen hundred men. "History of the United States," by George Bancroft, chap. xxiv. p. 459. Another source puts the garrison down at six hundred French and Swiss, with eight hundred militia.

yet these, and the quoins and embrasures, were cemented with such indifferent mortar, that they were unable to resist the fury of a strong and continual battery."

The harbour of Louisbourg, about a league distant by sea from the pine-clad shores of the Bay of Gabarus, is an almost land-locked basin of some seven or eight miles in circumference. It is one of the best in North America, and within it great fleets could ride safely at anchor, for the anchorage is good, with seven fathoms of water in every part. The distance between Rocheford Point on the town side, and Lighthouse Cliff on the opposite shore, is somewhat less than a mile; in the centre of the channel are two small islands which command the entrance to the harbour; one of these at that time was strongly fortified. The distance between Goat Island and Lighthouse Point is not more than eight hundred and fifty yards.

Shirley's instructions were that the transports should arrive together at a precise hour; that, heedless of the surf, the men were to land in the dark on the rocky shore, to march forthwith through thicket and bog to the city and beyond it, and to capture the fort and the royal battery on the further side before daybreak. Though many Massachusetts mariners had made frequent voyages to Cape Breton, and had acquired a fair knowledge of the harbour of Louisbourg and its approaches, yet compliance with these orders was hardly possible.

The arrival of a fleet of a hundred sail at a precise hour in an unexplored bay, the landing on a strange coast in the dark, to say nothing of fogs, tides, rocks, etc., was a serious operation. Immediately the armament was descried from the walls of Louisbourg the alarm was given, the bells were set ringing and guns were fired from the fortress.

Pepperell lost no time, the whale-boats were let down, and the combatants were speedily rowed ashore. A feint was made as if the intention had been to land at Flat Point Cove, but the disembarkation was effected a mile and a half west of that spot. A party of a hundred and fifty French came down to contest the landing, but they were put to flight and driven into the woods. During the day two thousand men were safely disembarked.

The New England forces moved to Fresh Water Cove, and pitched their camp on both banks of the Fresh Water brook. The men, being destitute of tents, raised shelters with turf and brush; the weather was fair, and during the siege singularly dry.

The royal battery was a powerful and well-armed work, with moat and bastions all so perfect that it was thought that two hundred men might have defended it against five thousand. It was armed with thirty cannons—twenty-eight 42-pounders and two 18-pounders. On the 1st of May, a detachment of four hundred New England men took

post near the north-east harbour. The burning of the warehouses and other buildings led to a panic, and during the night the French, who held the royal battery, spiked the guns and abandoned it. When boats came from the city the following morning, to recover it, Vaughan, who commanded the New Hampshire regiment, with thirteen of his men, stood on the beach and kept the French from landing till a reinforcement came to his aid.

The guns had been little injured, and Seth Pomeroy, a gunsmith from Northampton, serving then as Major in one of the Massachusetts regiments, with twenty smiths was set to drill them. The pieces were soon in a state to return the fire of the city and island batteries.

The landing of the artillery and stores was difficult and dangerous from the surf rolling on the beach. There was no wharf, and the men had to wade through the sea to bring the guns and stores to shore.

As was natural with a hastily-raised body of volunteers, the siege proceeded in a random manner; if the men knew little of strict discipline and martial observances, the officers knew even less regarding the manner of approaching and destroying the enemy's works. Pepperell was simply a merchant, and the reduction of a fortified city, the work of specialists, was a new experience for him. On the other hand, the feebleness of the garrison, which comprised only six hundred regular soldiers, militated

against sorties being made to destroy the approaches and other siege works.

The besiegers had only eighteen cannon and three mortars. The difficulty of dragging these over boggy morass and ground otherwise impassable for wheels, was overcome by a New Hampshire Colonel, Meserve by name. Being a carpenter by trade, he caused a number of wooden sleds to be made, sixteen feet long and five feet wide, of balks a foot thick, by means of which he was able to drag the cannon over the morass. The men drew them with straps over their shoulders.

Several batteries were erected to the west and south-west of the city; the one commanded by Tidcombe was most effective, and was of great service in destroying the circular battery. Another was erected on the 16th of May, and was armed with some of the guns captured in the royal battery; this was designed to play on the north-west gate and on the flanks of the citadel.

Four attempts to carry the island battery, which commanded the entrance of the harbour, failed. On the 26th of May a fresh attempt was made at night, but, the assailant's boats being discovered, a murderous fire was brought to bear on the adventurous party. After a long conflict, the assailants had to withdraw, with a loss of sixty killed, and one hundred and sixteen taken prisoners.

After this check, a battery was constructed, with much toil, by Gridley, of Boston, near the north

cape of the harbour, on the Lighthouse Cliff, to annoy the gunners on the island. A large mortar was placed in this battery, and so destructive was its fire that the French were compelled to withdraw from their guns.

Commodore Warren's fleet guarded the approaches to the harbour, and effectively closed all the sea communications of the place. On the 18th of May, the *Vigilante*, a French ship, of seventy-four guns, with a crew of five hundred and sixty men, commanded by the Marquis de la Maison Forte, laden with a rich freight of military stores for the garrison, was met by the *Mermaid*. The latter feigned to escape from the larger ship, and cunningly led her pursuer amongst the rest of the British fleet. After an engagement of some hours, the *Vigilante* was captured in sight of the beleaguered town.

Trenches had been thrown up within two hundred yards of the city, in front of the Dauphin's bastion, but as yet no breach had been effected. It was, however, arranged that the fleet would force its way into the harbour and bombard the city, while the land forces would make an attempt to carry the works by storm. This was rendered unnecessary, for the besieged were running short of powder, the guns of the circular battery had been dismounted, and the west of the King's bastion had been destroyed. Notwithstanding the strength of the works, the

garrison was discontented, and its commander, Duchambon, was desponding. On the 15th of June, despairing of being able to hold the place any longer, he sent out a flag of truce with an offer to capitulate, and on the 17th the city, the fort, and the batteries were surrendered.

The siege had lasted forty-seven days, with a loss to the garrison of three hundred killed. The besiegers lost a hundred and one killed, and thirty from sickness. That the place was strong is attested by the words of its captors: "God has gone out of the way of His common providence in a remarkable and almost miraculous manner, to incline the hearts of the French to give up and deliver this strong city into our hands."

Bancroft concludes his account of these operations in the following words, "Thus did the strongest fortress of North America capitulate to an army of undisciplined New England mechanics, and farmers, and fishermen. It was the greatest success achieved by England during the war." *

The treaty of Aix la Chapelle put an end to the war of the Austrian succession, and, by an article of that treaty, Louisbourg was restored to France in exchange for Madras, captured in 1746, which Dupleix, Governor of Pondichery, had refused to surrender.

It would be difficult to show what was gained

* "History of the United States," by George Bancroft, chap. xxiv. p. 463.

by that war, and as none of the higher questions which involved the interests of civilization were adjusted at its conclusion, it was not possible for peace to be of long duration. France determined to attack England through her King, George II., in his personal property of Hanover. This led to the Seven Years' War, in which Great Britain found an ally in Prussia.* Austria, on the other hand, joined issue with France, hoping that, with the help of such a powerful military nation, she might recover the lost province of Silesia. In this war the singular occurrence was seen of Russia, Sweden, and Poland, all open enemies of France and of each other, taking her side in the struggle.

Pitt, who was then in power, conceived the plan of striking a vigorous blow at France in Canada, seizing Quebec, and driving the French out of North America.

In the year 1757 an attack on Louisbourg had been designed. On the 11th of July, Lord Loudoun reached Halifax from New York, with six thousand regulars, and was there met by George Viscount Howe, with five thousand troops just arrived from England. Admiral Holbourn commanded a squadron of sixteen ships-of-the-line and eight frigates. Lord Loudoun was renowned for indecision, and had given on previous occasions proofs of incapacity. On hearing that

* England formally declared war on the 18th of May, 1756.

Louisbourg was garrisoned by three thousand regulars exclusive of militia, and was defended by eighteen line-of-battle ships and six frigates, he proceeded with the Admiral to New York, and put off the enterprise to the following year. For doing which his lordship was promptly disgraced by William Pitt, and recalled.

That famous minister had no intention of doing things by half, his plan was to drive the French completely out of Canada, and to this end he set on foot three expeditions. Ticonderoga, Du Quesne, and Louisbourg were to be captured. The last was the most important business, being a joint naval and military expedition.

In the following year, 1758, he intrusted the operations against Cape Breton to General Jeffrey Amherst.* On the 2nd and 3rd of June a fleet consisting of twenty-three ships-of-the-line, eighteen frigates, and a hundred and sixteen transports and smaller vessels, under Vice-admiral the Honourable Edward Boscawen, dropped their anchors in the Bay of Gabarus to the west of Louisbourg. Warburton, in his "Conquest of Canada," states that

* In all that relates to the second capture of Louisbourg, as well as to the scaling of the heights of Abraham, in Chapter XVIII., we have closely followed Parkman's narrative contained in his work, "Montcalm and Wolfe." His is the best narrative of all we have seen, and in a note (vol. ii. p. 81), the historian shows the diaries, correspondence, and authorities he has consulted. His work has been done so thoroughly that little would be gained by a re-perusal of all these documents, besides which some are not easy to find.

Pitt gave Boscawen the unusual commission of command over the land forces till the arrival of General Amherst; this did not last long, for on the 28th of May, when the fleet was still close to Halifax, it was joined by the *Dublin* with Amherst on board.

The transports conveyed fourteen battalions of infantry with artillery and engineers; in all a force of about 11,600 men. The troops were divided into three brigades of nearly equal strength. The Royal Artillery train comprised 17 officers, 52 non-commissioned officers, 63 gunners, and 163 matrosses.* The guns were: *Brass*, twenty-six 4-pounders, eighteen 12-pounders, six 6-pounders, two 13-inch mortars, two 10-inch, seven 8-inch, ten $5\frac{1}{2}$-inch, thirty $4\frac{2}{5}$-inch. *Iron*, eight 32-pounders, twenty-five 24-pounders, four 6-pounders, and one 13-inch mortar. There were besides two 8-inch and four $5\frac{1}{2}$-inch howitzers.

Chevalier de Drucour, who commanded the French forces, had for garrisoning the fortress the battalions of Artois, Bourgogne, and Cambise, of the regular forces, a battalion of Volontaires Étrangers, two companies of artillery, and twenty-four companies of the Canadian marine force, regularly disciplined; the total strength may be set

* Matrosses were soldiers in a train of artillery, who came next to the gunners, and assisted them in loading, firing, and sponging the guns. They carried firelocks, and marched with the store waggons as guards and assistants.

down at three thousand eight hundred men. The ordnance comprised two hundred and twenty-two cannon and fifteen mortars. In the harbour there were five ships-of-the-line and seven frigates, mounting five hundred and forty-four guns, and manned by three thousand sailors. Drucour describes the fortifications as being in ruins, nothing had been done to repair them since Cape Breton had been restored to France by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle.

On arrival at Gabarus the British found themselves facing a wild coast line, a dangerous shore covered with barbed rocks, and commanded by lofty, perpendicular cliffs, the summit of which had been rendered still more difficult of access by the French, who, having long foreseen an invasion, had covered every possible place where a landing could be effected with earthworks, concealed batteries and abatis. The almost upright precipices alone were judged by them to be beyond the attempt of men under arms. In addition to the artificial obstacles a dense fog often shrouded the rocky shore, and a prodigious swell which rolled in from the Atlantic and broke in impassable surf upon the beach, made any landing in boats a very risky undertaking.

As soon as the fleet had come to anchor, Amherst, Boscawen, Wolfe, and a number of naval officers proceeded to reconnoitre the shore in boats, and eagerly scanned the cliffs and coves, striving to find a suitable landing-place. The prospect was

not encouraging, what with a rough sea, a coast thickly set with dangerous reefs, which the waves lashed with great violence, and very few points where a body of armed men could be put safely ashore, and all these strongly fortified and held. Things must have looked bad indeed to make the ever-ready Boscawen hesitate. However, he followed the advice of Ferguson, a blunt old naval officer, who urged him to attempt the enterprise at any risk. Entick states that Boscawen entertained a great opinion of Captain Ferguson, of the *Prince of Orange,* who had seen much service, and that the captain reminded him how fatal a council of war had been at Minorca, at Rochefort, and even at Halifax. Ferguson would in no way recognize that the impracticability of an enterprise was to be assumed on account of the danger attending it. On his advice, the Admiral resolved not to appeal for opinion to any council of war, but to abide by the instructions he had received, to land the troops on the island of Cape Breton, ready to cover their retreat should circumstances compel them to re-embark.

It was arranged to make an attempt to land at daybreak on the 3rd, but the weather was unfavourable; high winds, fogs, and a raging surf prevented anything being done for several days: the orders had to be repeatedly countermanded. The French were not idle, and took advantage of this delay to further strengthen their positions; all chance of a

surprise, so valuable in disembarking on a hostile shore, was hopeless, for no possible landing-place for several miles southward of the town had been overlooked, every one was strongly fortified. Two thousand regulars and about a thousand militia and Indians had been told off to contest the landing and to watch without intermission. St. Julien was at La Cormorandière with 985 men, Marain at Flat Point with 620, and Danthonnay at White Point with 250 men. These posts were kept in communication by means of pickets, and a force had been detailed to remain in reserve ready to proceed to the point attacked. From the 2nd to the 7th the batteries on shore kept cannonading the British ships.

On the evening of the 7th the sea abated, and at midnight the British troops began getting into the boats. Three of the British ships had been selected as the rendezvous for the different attacking parties. The boats of the first were to gather round the *Violet*, which was to show three lights; those of the second round the *St. George*, which was to display two lights; those of the third round the *Neptune*, which was to show a single light. The troops embarked in boats belonging to the men-of-war and transports; the former were commanded by a lieutenant or midshipman, the latter were under the direction of the senior officer of the troops in each boat. The men-of-war's boats had been ordered to be sent to their respective transports by one in the morning, and the troops were to be in their boats

by two o'clock exactly. The leaders of each attacking party were to be in the centre of the line, and to hoist a special flag; this was to be red in Wolfe's boat, white in Whitmore's, blue in Lawrence's.

The *Kennington* frigate had been brought close to the westernmost defences, at Fresh Water Cove. It was the place where the New England forces had landed in 1745, and, from this attack of the frigate, received the name of Kennington Cove. The French called it La Cormorandière. The *Halifax* joined the *Kennington;* the *Sutherland* and *Squirrel* engaged the attention of the defenders of Flat Point; the *Diana* and *Shannon* took post in front of White Point. At dawn, on the 8th, the guns of these ships opened, and attempted to silence the enemy's batteries and clear the coast. This fire was only continued for a quarter of an hour, when the troops were started for the shore. The surf still broke on the rocks and leaped up the face of the cliffs, so much so that the landing appeared a very dubious operation; Commodore Durell had, however, examined the coast, and declared that the landing was now practicable on the left.

Amherst had divided the attacking force into three parts, and decided to divert the enemy's attention from the spot where he intended to effect the landing. This is shown by the following order he issued from the *Namur* on the 4th of June. "As the surf is so great that the dispositions for

landing in three divisions cannot take place, and as the men-of-war cannot be carried near enough to the shore of the bay within the White Point to cover the landing there; the General (not to lose a moment's time) has thought proper to order that an attack be made upon the little intrenchments within the Fresh Water Cove, with four companies of grenadiers, followed by the light infantry and irregulars, who are to be supported by the Highland regiment, and those by the remaining eight companies of grenadiers, that no body of men, regular or irregular, may dare to stand a moment before them: these detachments are to be commanded by Brigadier-General Wolfe. The detachments of the left wing, under Brigadier-General Lawrence, are to draw up, as was before ordered, behind the frigates of the centre attack, in readiness, if the weather permits, to run ashore upon the opposite beach; or, if not, to follow the grenadiers, when it is judged necessary. The right wing to draw up to the right, as in the orders of yesterday, opposite to the bay, that is, on this side of the White Point, to fix the enemy's attention, or to follow the troops of the left wing, when they shall receive orders for that purpose. The boats of this division are to keep out at a mile and a half or two miles' distance from the land, extending in considerable length of line."

Fresh Water Cove lies about four miles southwest of Louisbourg. At this spot a re-entering

bend in the cliffs enclosed a beach a quarter of a mile long, with rocks on either flank. Possibly it was because the spot lent itself most to a disembarkation, and had served for this purpose before, that great pains had been taken to put it in a thorough state of defence. Lieut.-Colonel de Saint-Julien commanded there, and his force was covered by intrenchments, the trees in front of which had been felled so as to form an abatis and entanglement. The beach and its approaches were swept by eight cannon and swivels, which were hidden from view and masked by evergreens stuck in the ground before them.

On the right Brigadier Whitmore with five battalions steered for White Point, the central division under Brigadier Lawrence headed for Flat Point. The left division, the division to whom the real attack had been assigned, was commanded by Wolfe; it comprised four companies of grenadiers, Scott's light infantry—a picked body of five hundred and fifty marksmen taken from different regiments—and a company of New England Rangers; followed and supported by eight more companies of grenadiers and Frazer's Highlanders.

The French stood firm, and held their fire till the assailants had got close inshore; then, as the boats rose on the dangerous surf, they poured a rattling volley from every gun and musket that could be brought to bear. A deadly fire of grape, red-hot shot, and round shot, and a sharp fusillade,

were directed upon the boats. It has been said that the French would have caused greater execution had they not unmasked their batteries somewhat before the proper time.

Despairing to make the shore, Wolfe signalled to the boats to sheer off; however, the troops, who were more exasperated than discouraged by the enemy's fire, were determined to defy all opposition, and to land wherever there appeared a probability of any degree of success. Having noticed that three boats of the light infantry had got ashore at a spot at some distance from his right, where a small projecting cliff had concealed the movement and sheltered the party from the enemy's fire, Wolfe promptly seized the opportunity and improved on it, by giving orders to the rest to support their comrades on shore. Scott, who with the light infantry and rangers had been heading in the same direction, came up next, and held his position before superior forces of the enemy till others came to his aid. Nothing was able to stay the soldiers eagerness, though exposed to a furious fire from a battery of three guns, which sometimes took them in front, and sometimes in flank, and to the continual discharge of musketry within twenty yards of them. All strove who should first get on shore.

The rest of the boats now neared the beach; wading in the surf to their waist, the leader and his soldiers climbed the slippery crags and succeeded in reaching the land. Wolfe encouraged

the men about him to press forward, formed them as they came ashore, and led them against the force opposed to them; it was a detachment of the grenadiers of Artois, which was speedily routed. The nearest French battery, a few rods distant, was carried with the bayonet. The successful landing and surmounting of such difficulties had so terrified the astonished foe, that it made the subsequent attack easy. The feat was a surprise for the French, for they considered its attainment impossible.

The central division, having altered its course, with trifling opposition made its landing good at the opposite end of the cove, where it was joined by General Amherst. Attacked on both flanks, and fearing that their retreat might be cut off, the French abandoned their cannon and fled into the woods.

This bold onset cost the British a loss of a hundred and eleven men killed, wounded, and drowned,* and a hundred boats. The enemy were driven in succession from their other posts, and retired under and within the walls of Louisbourg, leaving in the hands of the assailants thirty-five guns and mortars, as trophies of the day. The French loss in dead and wounded amounted to a hundred and twenty men.

* Killed—officers, 3; sergeants, 4; corporal, 1; privates, 38. Of these eight were shot, the rest were drowned in getting ashore. Wounded, regulars—lieutenants, 5; sergeants, 2; corporal, 1; privates, 51. Of the rangers killed—officer, 1; privates, 3. Wounded—private, 1. Missing—private, 1.

Wolfe, himself one of the most intrepid and enterprising of our officers, whose daring conduct in the subsequent operations gained him the well-merited title of the Hero of Louisbourg, states, in a letter written on the 25th of June, 1758: "In general it may be said that we made a rash and ill-advised attempt to land, and by the greatest good fortune imaginable we succeeded." Apparently there was no alternative, but the very fact that Amherst had been especially selected by Pitt, and preferred above many senior officers to command the expedition, may have suggested to him the necessity for attempting a daring feat, such as attacking the enemy under very difficult and unpromising circumstances.

To thoroughly understand this, it is necessary to bear in mind how the officers of both services in those days had been worked up to the performance of great actions by Pitt. Of this eminent statesman Macaulay writes: "In one respect, however, he deserved all the praise that he has received. The success of our arms was, perhaps, owing less to the skill of his dispositions than to the national resources and the national spirit. But that the national spirit rose to the emergency, that the national resources were contributed with unexampled cheerfulness, this was undoubtedly his work. This ardour of his soul had set the kingdom on fire. It inflamed every soldier who dragged the cannon up the heights of Quebec, and every sailor who

boarded the French ships among the rocks of Brittany. The Minister, before he had been long in office, had imparted to the commanders whom he employed his own impetuous, adventurous, and defying character. They, like him, were disposed to risk everything, to play double or quits to the last, to think nothing done while anything remained undone, to fail rather than not to attempt." *

Amherst was chiefly distinguished for self-control; that rashness was no part of his character can be gathered from Walpole's estimate of his military qualities. "He was," says Walpole, "a man of indomitable perseverance and courage, but slow and methodical in his movements. Provident, conciliating and cool, Amherst disposed his plans, adopted his measures, reconciled jarring interests, and pursued his operations with steadiness, neither precipitating nor delaying beyond the due point, and comprehending the whole under a due authority which he knew how to assume." †

Wright quotes the following testimony from a letter by a Scotch officer: "General Amherst goes on carefully, and will not lose any lives he can save by carrying on approaches." ‡ Bancroft calls him circumspect and impenetrable, a man of solid judgment and respectable ability in action.

* "Macaulay's Essays," p. 321.

† "Walpole's Memoirs," vol. ii. p. 493.

‡ The more enterprising Wolfe thought a campaign up the St. Lawrence during the running summer possible, but the slow progress of the siege forbade it.

Amherst had by his side Vice-admiral the Honourable E. Boscawen—or "Old Dreadnought," as his sailors were wont to call him—a man who was not deterred by most difficulties. It has been related how even his bold nature was not entirely proof against the dangerous look of the venture. But if he considered that the risk should be incurred, the General was certain to follow his advice.

There is a remarkable similarity in Pepperell's and Amherst's operations. Their troops landed nearly at the same spot, and encamped in about the same locality. Amherst pitched his tents only on the right bank of the Fresh Water brook, and covered his front left and rear by erecting redoubts and block-houses on the surrounding knolls. As in the former instance, the French called in all the outposts, abandoned the royal battery on the west of the harbour—after having destroyed the guns—and burnt all the buildings beyond the fortifications. They also deserted the Lighthouse battery, leaving behind five guns which had been spiked.

On the 12th, Wolfe, with twelve hundred men, marched round to the northern end of the harbour to erect a battery at Lighthouse Point for silencing the French guns on the island battery. The weather was bad, and this considerably retarded the work.

Flat Point Cove was selected as the landing-place for the ordnance, materials, stores, and provisions; these were sent ashore as fast as the surf

would permit, but the weather remained unfavourable, and the surf made their landing a work of danger. The difficulty of landing heavy articles was so great that for the first ten days none of the siege guns could be brought ashore.

The siege of Louisbourg followed. Amherst reconnoitred the ground; this rose in front of the town on the left towards the harbour, and was high enough to offer a good position for the besieging works. Advantage of this conformation of the ground was taken in both sieges; in the second, nevertheless, the operations of the besiegers were for a time impeded by the fire of the *Aréthuse*, which had been moored in a small creek known as the "Barachois" at the west end of the harbour, about half a mile beyond the town. This little frigate swept with her guns the ground in front of the works.*

On the 20th the Lighthouse battery opened, and on the 25th the island battery was silenced. The absence of roads suitable for the transport of heavy artillery caused much trouble. The guns had to be carried across morasses and the roughest ground. Notwithstanding the labour involved, two batteries had been constructed on the Martissan heights to the west of the town, and Louisbourg soon began to suffer greatly from the fire of their guns.

An elevation of ground, though not so marked as that on the left, existed on the right towards

* The action of the fleet will be found in Chapter XXIV.

the sea, in front of the Princess's bastion. This was seized by Wolfe, and an intrenchment thrown up. It was here that the French on the night of the 9th of July surprised in the trenches a company of Highlanders under the command of Lord Dundonald, who was killed. The besieged had marked the formidable nature of this position, and had determined to make every endeavour to destroy the works. A desperate fight ensued in the dark, but after severe losses on both sides the besieged were driven back. This was the fiercest struggle during the siege, and both French and English suffered heavily. A week later, early in the evening, a party led by Wolfe drove off a band of French volunteers on the left attack, seized a rising ground named Hauteur-de-la-Potence (Gallows Hill), and began intrenching themselves scarcely five hundred yards from the Dauphin's bastion. By daylight they had made their position secure.

The siege progressed steadily; on the 19th of July the Dauphin's bastion ceased to reply, and on the 22nd two batteries constructed in the vicinity of Cape Noir, one armed with thirteen 24-pounders, the other with nine mortars, opened on the citadel. The bombardment went on uninterruptedly day and night, and the barracks in the town were set on fire. There was no shelter from the besiegers' cannon in Louisbourg, and the garrison was driven to find refuge wherever it could be obtained. It was busily employed in attempting to repair the

crumbling defences, and was kept ready to turn out at a moment's notice.

On the 24th another battery was opened against the King's bastion, and from daybreak on the 25th a continuous heavy fire was directed against the fortress. The four pieces in the battery on Gallows Hill were turned on the Dauphin's bastion, and the effect of their fire was most damaging. The bastions were in ruins, most of the guns had been silenced; the hospital was full of wounded, and the garrison worn out with fatigue. By the 26th of July, of fifty-four pieces on the ramparts, forty-two had been dismounted; the masonry of the works was so inferior that, beside the breach made by the British batteries, there were at least ten large gaps in the walls through which the enemy might have penetrated into the town.*

Everything concurring to discountenance a longer resistance—there being no hope of relief from Europe nor any further aid coming from Canada—as Amherst was preparing to deliver the assault, Drucour offered to capitulate to spare the people and the garrison. In reply, he was informed that he would only be allowed to surrender at discretion. The brave officer scorned such terms, and set to select the spot where the last stand was to be made; he only yielded on the earnest appeal of the citizens—as contained in a memorial presented by Mons.

* Letter from Mons. Drucour, "Records of the Depôt de la Guerre," No. 74.

Prévost, the intendant—to save the people from rough usage and the town from complete ruin.

On the 27th of July, Major Farquhar, with three companies of Grenadiers, took possession of the west gate. The loss of the garrison was reckoned at about 1500 lives; at the time of the surrender there were 1200 soldiers and sailors wounded and sick in tents and in the hospital. The British lost 21 commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 146 privates, 1 gunner, and 3 matrosses killed; 30 commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 2 drummers, 315 privates, 1 corporal, 1 gunner, and 3 matrosses wounded. The French—numbering 5637 regulars, seamen, and marines—were conveyed to England as prisoners of war. Pajol states that the English, to show their appreciation of the gallant defence, allowed the garrison the honours of war. The two battalions of regulars were taken to France in English ships, and released on condition that they were not to serve for the rest of the war.* There is no mention of this fact in any of the English accounts. In one particular the writer errs, for three regular battalions, and not two, surrendered at Louisbourg.†

* Pajol, "Les Guerres sous Louis XV.," tom vi. p. 227.

† Knox gives a return of the garrison when it surrendered—Regiment d'Artois, 466; Regiment de Bourgogne, 414; Regiment de Cambise, 608; Volontaires Étrangers, 526; twenty-four companies of marines, and two of artillery, 1017; inhabitants, of both sexes, 4000; seamen, etc., 2606; total strength, 9637.

Besides a large amount of stores, 11 stands of colours, 237 pieces of ordnance, and 15,000 stands of arms fell into the hands of the victors.

The capture of Louisbourg—the so-called *Dunkerque de l'Amerique*—was of immense consequence; it left Canada without any defence on the side of the sea, it opened the St. Lawrence, and placed in the hands of the British the highway to Quebec.

Both sieges were a combined military and naval operation, both lasted nearly the same number of days, and in neither did the French governors receive the assistance they expected from over the sea. In 1745 the fleet destined to sail from Brest to relieve Louisbourg was detained by Vice-admiral Martin, who lay before that port with a more powerful squadron. In 1758 Hawke was sent with seven sail-of-the-line and three frigates to Aix Roads, for the purpose of destroying the reliefs which De Drucour was so eagerly looking for. The British commander drove five sail-of-the-line on shore, and forced the French to throw their guns and stores overboard, in order to escape him.



PENINSULA OF ABOUKIR

SHOWING WHERE THE

BRITISH TROOPS LANDED IN 1801.

Taken from the journal of the late campaign in Egypt by Thomas Walsh, Captain in His Majesty's 93rd Regiment, A.D.C. to Major General Sir Eyre Coote, 1803.

CHAPTER XVII.

LANDING OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN EGYPT IN 1801.

A combined attack from the Mediterranean and Red Seas—Composition of Abercrombie's force—Marmorice Bay—Manœuvres which took place there—Difficulty of procuring horses for the cavalry—Sailing formation on quitting Marmorice—Failure of the negotiations for the French to quit Egypt—Aboukir the only possible place for a landing—Want of information—Reconnoitring officers killed and captured—The expedition anchors—Description of the bay—French force in the north of Egypt—Disembarkation delayed by weather—Landing force—Arrangement of the boats—Time taken in forming up—Troops received with a heavy fire—The enemy attacked and driven back in disorder—British and French losses—The magnitude of the object sanctions some loss of life—Lord Lyons' warning to Lord Raglan of probable losses by a prolonged siege—The charge of caution which is said to have followed the landing not proved—Sir Sidney Smith's suggested flank attack—British attacked with a great superiority of combatants—Battle of Alexandria—Subsequent operations—General Baird's movements—Anglo-Indian force arrives at Aboumandour—Gantheaume's attempt to throw reinforcements into Egypt—He fails and returns to Toulon.

A NOTABLE instance in which the landing was disputed, and in which the enterprise was crowned with success, was Abercrombie's landing at Aboukir in 1801.

In the previous year a body of British troops had been for some months trying to effect something on the coast of Spain; these attempts, however, had ended in a failure.* The British Government, at last alarmed by the presence of the French in Egypt, which constituted a standing menace against the British possessions in India, determined to employ a portion of these forces in expelling the Republican army from the banks of the Nile.

The command of the expedition detailed for this purpose was entrusted to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, an officer who had always acquitted himself with credit. In the two expeditions to Holland in 1793 and in 1799, notwithstanding their unfortunate and discreditable results, Abercrombie had gained a well-earned reputation, whilst his expedition to the West Indies was conducted with distinguished success. He was the best of all the generals employed in the early days of the war with France; he had shown the greatest ability, and had contrived to secure the love of his troops by kindness and unremitting attention to their welfare. Abercrombie was clear-sighted and cool in deliberation, prompt in acting, and daring even to hardihood; all qualities which made him a fit leader for such a difficult enterprise.

* These operations will be found described in Chapter I. On the 24th of October, 1800, this force was divided; Sir Ralph Abercrombie retained the largest part of the troops under his command, the remainder were confided to Sir James Pultney.

While the gallant Scotchman was to effect a landing on the shores of the Mediterranean, one of his countrymen from over the border, General Baird, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Seringapatam, was directed to operate on the side of the Red Sea with an Anglo-Indian force, and a small contingent of troops drawn from the Cape.*

According to Lieutenant Aeneas Anderson,† the following was the composition of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's army on its departure from Malta—

GUARDS.

Hon. Major-General Ludlow.

1st Battalion Coldstream	399
1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment	939
	1338

FIRST BRIGADE.

Major-General Coote.

Royals, 2nd Battalion	705
54th, 1st Battalion	598
54th, 2nd Battalion	597
92nd Regiment	686
	2586

* Sir Arthur Wellesley was named second in command of this force, but illness prevented his embarking.

† "Account of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's operations in the Mediterranean and Egypt," by Lieutenant Aeneas Anderson, of the 40th Regiment.

SECOND BRIGADE.

Major-General Craddock.

8th Regiment	490
13th Regiment	737
18th Regiment *	495
90th Regiment	775
	2497

THIRD BRIGADE.

Major-General Earl of Cavan.

50th Regiment	529
79th Regiment	741
Marines of the Fleet	700
	1970

FOURTH BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General Doyle.

Queen's Regiment	557
30th Regiment	432
44th Regiment	290
89th Regiment	402
	1681

FIFTH BRIGADE.

Major-General Stuart.

Minorca Regiment	967
De Rolle's Regiment	543
Dillon's Regiment	557
	2067

* Sir R. Wilson places the 18th in the 4th Brigade, and the Queen's in the 3rd.

CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General Finch.

12th Regiment, Dragoons	...	...	500
26th Regiment, Dragoons	...	...	500
			1000

RESERVE.

Major-General Moore.

11th Light Dragoons ...	...	...	52
Hompesch Light Dragoons	...	...	141
23rd Regiment of Foot	...	...	558
28th Regiment of Foot...	...	...	630
40th Flank Companies...	...	...	240
42nd Regiment ...	...	...	943
58th Regiment ...	...	...	511
Corsican Rangers ...	...	...	208
			3283
Artillery ...	...	...	447
Staff Corps ...	...	...	90
Seamen ...	...	...	500
			1037
	Grand Total	...	17,459
A Battalion of Maltese Pioneers		...	800

The expeditionary corps quitted Malta on the 20th and 21st of December, 1800. The first portion of it anchored in the Bay of Marmorice on the 29th of the same month, and the second on the 1st of January, 1801.

The Bay of Marmorice, on the coast of Karamania, in Asia Minor (Lat. 36·52 N.; Long. 28·31 E.), opposite to Rhodes, is, without exception, one of the

finest in the world. It is nearly twenty miles in circumference, and so completely sheltered that the water is always unruffled, though a gale be blowing outside. It has an anchorage of three thousand five hundred acres, and by its nature is pre-eminently adapted as a rendezvous for a large number of ships.

During the stay of the British force at Marmorice, the final arrangements were made, and the delay which occurred whilst waiting for the arrival of the Turkish contingent was turned to account. In view of the coming operations, the regiments were exercised in such manœuvres as they would be called upon to perform when landing in the presence of an enemy. These manœuvres and other experiments were repeated until it was found that six thousand men could be landed in the most perfect order and ready for immediate action in twenty-three minutes. By these exercises it became possible to ascertain the exact number of men the boats of the fleet could hold.

A deficiency of officers educated in the scientific part of their profession had been felt in the past operations, but now the benefit of the military school at Marlow began to make itself evident. The general orders issued at that period show that the most minute details were not overlooked.

On the 12th of January, the 12th and 26th Regiments of Dragoons arrived from Lisbon, but they only brought the officers' chargers. Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting horses for

this small number of cavalry; the four or five hundred which were received from Constantinople were weak and bad, with feet and backs in a very bad state. Finally, out of the whole, only two hundred were retained for the cavalry, and about fifty for the artillery; the remainder were shot or sold for a dollar apiece. Other horses were purchased in the neighbourhood with better results, but the local purchases, unfortunately, were set going too late.

The British fleet and transports which left Marmorice Bay amounted to one hundred and seventy-five sails. James reckons that the line-of-battle ships, frigates, and sloops amounted to between sixty and seventy,* so that there must have been something between one hundred and five and one hundred and fifteen transports of various sorts. From the plan of the order of sailing, it would appear that a considerable number of troops were conveyed in men-of-war.

The troops embarked on the 20th of February, but the ships did not commence quitting the bay till the 22nd. The next day, taking advantage of a fair breeze from the north, the whole set sail and steered for the Egyptian coast in the following formation.†

* James's "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 98.

† Lieutenant Aeneas Anderson, p. 198.

FORM OF SAILING FROM MARMORICE.



This return shows the strength of the army on its embarkation for Egypt.

Marmorice Bay, February 21st, 1801.

	Commissioned Officers.						Rank and File.				
	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Staff.	Sergeants.	Drummers.	Present fit for Duty.	Sick. Present.	Sick. Absent.	Total.	Horses.
Cavalry ...	5	7	27	10	70	20	1,034	29		1,063	532
Artillery...	1	8	20	7	10	9	557	24	5	586	173
Infantry ...	60	142	441	105	987	409	13,304	750	896	14,950	
Total ...	66	157	488	122	1067	438	14,895	803	901	16,599	705

Sir Robert Wilson states that the troops at Sir

Ralph Abercrombie's disposal amounted "to 15,330 men, including 999 sick, 500 Maltese, and all kinds and description of people attached to an army except officers. Its effective force in the field could not be, therefore, at the highest computation, above twelve thousand; and indeed that number, within two hundred, was the return given to the Commander-in-Chief." *

On the 25th the wind changed suddenly, and on the 27th turned into a gale. This scattered the smaller vessels, and the 28th was spent in collecting those ships which had not kept up with the men-of-war and English transports.

Though there was no likelihood of Abercrombie having to encounter a hostile fleet, and being exposed to the same risks as Bonaparte in 1798, still Alexandria was known to be held by a considerable garrison, and the French soldiers, trained in war and accustomed to victory, were not likely to let British troops land in Egypt unmolested.

General Kebler, whose sound judgment had convinced him that it was impossible to hold the country, had opened up negotiations with the Grand Vizier for the evacuation of Egypt, stipulating that the French troops should be allowed to return to France. Sir Sidney Smith, impelled by worthy motives, had also been working to this end, but the Admiralty gave Lord Keith orders

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 8.

not to accept any capitulation unless the French troops surrendered as prisoners-of-war.

General Menou, who on Kebler's assassination succeeded to the command, though brave and honest, had no great military capacity. He was of a fantastical disposition; he turned Mussulman, assumed the name of Abdallah, and married a woman of the country. Menou, however, had an excessive belief in Bonaparte, and was about the only superior officer who accorded entire approval to all the latter had done in Egypt. Consequently he was too well aware of the importance the First Consul attached to the retention of that country.

Menou did not quite hit it off with some of his officers, and on the night of the 3rd of May, 1801, he had Generals Reynier and Damas, the *Ordonnateur-en-chef* Daure, and some more officers of rank seized by force in their houses at Alexandria, conducted on board two vessels in the harbour, and shipped off. General Reynier, in the *Lodi*, eluded the vigilance of the cruisers, but the others, in the *Good Union*, were taken near Candia.

In the spring of 1801, from various causes, the number of French able to take the field had been considerably reduced; there were not more than from twelve to fifteen thousand men. This was quite an insufficient number to hold Cairo, whose population had twice revolted in three years, to occupy Belbeis, with the object of watching the

Turkish army then known to be concentrating in Syria, and to provide strong garrisons for Alexandria, Damietta, and other vulnerable points on the coast of the Mediterranean.

There were few points on the coast where a disembarkation was practicable. Wilson remarks: "Aboukir Bay was the only port where the disembarkation could have been made on the Egyptian coast, for there only could the shipping remain in safety; and it was absolutely necessary that the communication with the fleet, even daily, should be preserved, for on it the army not only was to depend for provisions, stores, etc., but, as it was first supposed, for water." * A landing in the Bay of Jaffa might have been effected without any obstruction from the enemy. In that case, however, the troops would have been exposed to a march across the desert, a trying experience for troops unaccustomed to the climate.

Sir Ralph had no information on the strength and disposition of the enemy; he had no reliable maps of the country, nor of the coast. "The greatest misfortune" (says Sir R. Wilson) "was the total want of information respecting Egypt. Not a map to be depended upon could be procured, and the best draught from which information could be formed, and which was distributed to the generals, proved ridiculously incorrect." It is a well-authenticated fact that when Nelson was

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," p. 17.

preparing to attack Brueys' fleet in the Bay of Aboukir, the only chart at hand was a rough sketch taken from a captured vessel.

Of two officers of Engineers sent from Marmorice to reconnoitre the Bay of Aboukir, one —the commanding engineer of the expedition— was killed, and the other taken prisoner. Major McKerras, the former, had been advised not to enter too much in the *cul de sac* of the bay; he, however, landed; and, as his boat was returning to the *Petrel* sloop-of-war, it was intercepted by a French gunboat, which issued in pursuit out of the lake of Aboukir (called Lake Mahadie by the French). McKerras was shot dead, and the other officer, Major Fletcher, was carried as prisoner to Alexandria, and transferred thence to Cairo. The French were well acquainted with the few points where a disembarkation was practicable, and this incautious reconnaissance must have had the effect of revealing to them the locality where the British commander contemplated putting his forces ashore.

Sir Robert Wilson relates how a French frigate, the *Régénérée*, unexpectedly finding herself in the midst of the British fleet, pursued her course with it for a whole day, answering the various signals made and not arousing any suspicion as to her nationality till the morning of the 2nd of March, when she was seen making for Alexandria with the French colours flying. The *Régénérée* left Rochefort on the 13th of February, 1801, passed

the Straits of Gibraltar on the 18th of February, and entered the harbour of Alexandria as stated above, bringing a reinforcement of four hundred men and munitions of war.

Referring to the arrival at Alexandria of this frigate, James writes: "A contemporary states that the *Régénérée* kept company with the British fleet during a whole day, answering every signal that was made; but we doubt the assertion, no mention being made of it in the French accounts."* James most probably was right, for the French are not given to let such a daring feat pass entirely unrecorded.

The blockade of Alexandria does not appear to have been rigidly maintained. Captain Walsh, aide-de-camp to Sir Eyre Coote, relates that about the middle of February, 1801, two frigates, the *Egyptienne* and the *Justice*, stated to have on board large quantities of military stores and eight hundred artillerymen, entered the harbour of Alexandria. Also that the *Régénérée*, with two hundred men of the 55th demi-brigade, six hundred gunners, and a large amount of military stores, entered that port on the 1st of March, followed by the brig *Lodi*, bringing news that Gantheaume's fleet was approaching with a reinforcement of five thousand men.†

* James, "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 99.

† "Journal of the late Campaign in Egypt," by Captain Thomas Walsh, pp. 68–70.

Abercrombie had fixed on Aboukir as the most promising place for a landing, and at about ten o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of March the fleet and transports anchored in the bay.

The Bay of Aboukir commences about twenty miles to the east-north-east of Alexandria, and from the castle of Aboukir extends in a semi-circular direction to the westernmost, or Rosetta, mouth of the Nile. The distance between Aboukir point and the western shore of the Rosetta Nile measures 16·5 miles. After receding some distance from the point, the shore turns south-east, and continues in that direction in a long narrow tongue of land, behind which lies the shallow lake of Aboukir. The shores are low, with a few standing elevations, interspersed with clumps of date trees; the highest of these rises to about a hundred and eighty feet.

There is no depth of water for line-of-battle ships nearer than three miles from the shore. A small island is situated about two miles from the point, and but for a small passage practicable for small crafts, is connected with it by a chain of sand-banks and rocks. On the point stood a castle, surrounded by a deep ditch. When it surrendered on the 18th of March, it was held by a garrison of one hundred and ninety men, with ten guns and two mortars. The return attached to the capitulation mentions only ten officers and one hundred and forty non-commissioned officers and men; but Sir

R. Wilson states that there was some error in the numbers.*

From the time of the Romans, none of the many expeditions carried out on the coast of Africa have failed to effect a landing. The prudence, however, of landing in front of a position occupied by the three arms, and flanked by the castle of Aboukir, has been questioned. The operation was performed in broad daylight, in face of a forewarned enemy, who, owing to the boisterous state of the weather and the surf on the beach, had several days in which to make its preparations. Moreover, the fleet, on account of the shallowness of the water close inshore and the short range of the ship's guns, could not effectively cover the landing with its fire. The French could hardly believe that such a daring enterprise was really about to be attempted.

The French, numbering about two thousand men, with twelve pieces of artillery, were posted on the sand-hills, forming the concave arc of a circle, on a front of about a mile (in the centre of which was a nearly perpendicular height of 180 feet, apparently inaccessible).† This hill commanded the whole ground of disembarkation.‡

Captain Walsh gives Friant two battalions and

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 29.

† Ibid., p. 14.

‡ This is about where Fort Rame now stands; it is the highest point of the cliffs above the sea.

the grenadiers of the 61st demi-brigade, two battalions of the 75th, one of the 51st, and one of the 25th demi-brigades, the 18th and 20th dragoons, and about one hundred and twenty gunners, and computes the force at his disposal at two thousand five hundred men, with sixteen pieces of cannon. Sir Robert Wilson's estimate is more correct, as General Reynier states the strength of the force to have been as follows :—

Two Battalions and the Grenadiers of the 61st	700
Two Battalions of the 71st	600
Half a Battalion of the 51st and a detachment of the 25th	250
The 18th Dragoons	100
A detachment of the 20th Dragoons ...	80
	1730

When we add to these the staff, with the gunners and drivers for the ten guns, which the General states to have been in the field, we come pretty near to the two thousand men given by Sir R. Wilson. General Reynier apparently omitted the garrison of Aboukir Castle, which Captain Walsh states was furnished by the 55th demi-brigade.

On arrival on the 2nd of March, orders were issued to get ready to land, but the wind blew fresh on the shore, and the sea ran so high that the disembarkation had to be countermanded.

On the 7th, the weather having improved, Sir Ralph Abercrombie proceeded in a boat to reconnoitre the shore, and orders were given for the

disembarkation to be effected on the following day. At three o'clock a.m., on the 8th of March, the signal was made for the boats to rendezvous near the brig-sloop *Mondovi*. The landing-party consisted of the reserve, under the orders of Major-General Moore, of the brigade of Guards and of a portion of the 1st brigade; the whole, amounting to about five thousand five hundred men, with ten guns, under the command of Major-General Coote. In addition to the land forces, there were one thousand seamen under the orders of Sir William Sidney Smith; these men were told off to drag the field-guns up the heights.

Captain Cochrane, of the *Ajax*, had the marshalling and directing of the boats; these were divided into divisions, each division under a naval officer. The boats, one hundred and fifty in number, were formed in three lines; in the first line were the flat boats and launches, with artillery, towed by cutters; the second line was composed of cutters, to attend on the flat boats and afford them immediate relief; the third line consisted of cutters, with launches in tow. The flat boats were ordered to keep at a distance of fifty feet from each other, so as to allow sufficient space for the cutters and launches in the rear to land between the flat boats. These were also to haul off the moment the troops had landed. The boats were formed on a front about a mile in extent, with armed cutters and gun-vessels on each flank, and, to support the first landing, part of

the 1st and 2nd brigades were put in ships close to the shore.

Each boat held about fifty men, besides the sailors at the oars. Captain Walsh, who was in one of the boats, states that the soldiers were ordered to sit down, and to hold their muskets between their legs. Sir R. Wilson, full of indignation at some disparaging remarks made by a French officer on this point, writes: "General Reynier asserts that the infantry laid down in the bottom of the boats, whilst the sailors, indifferent to the French artillery, rowed with vigour to the shore. What kind of boats must those flat boats have been which would have allowed of such an extension? Is it possible that any one can be ignorant of the necessity of troops in all debarkations, wedging as close as possible together in an upright position, or how could fifty men be carried in each boat? Malignity should always thus defeat itself." *

Let us consider the fatigue endured by men who were in the boats for seven hours—from three to ten a.m.—in an upright position, wedged as close as possible; was it likely that, stiff as they were, they could have rushed up a steep hill, rendered difficult to climb by the loose nature of the soil? Notwithstanding Sir R. Wilson's disclaimer, the instructions for captains commanding divisions on landing the troops, issued on the 24th of January, and quoted

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 16.

in full on page 205 of his book, contain, amongst others, the following paragraph: "The officers commanding the boats must take particular care that none of the troops stand up, as, on many occasions, it may endanger the safety of the boat."

Notwithstanding all the exercises performed at Marmorice and the efficiency attained in embarking in a very brief space of time, it took six hours—from three to nine a.m.—to complete the array. In his official despatch Sir Ralph Abercrombie attributes this to the boats having had to row five or six miles.

At nine a.m. the signal was made for the boats to advance, and though it is stated that the *Mondovi*, about which ship the troops had to rendezvous, was only about gun-shot distance from the shore, it was nearly ten o'clock when they got to land. The boats reached the shore in most excellent order and nearly at the same moment.

Captain Walsh declares that the covering fire of the *Tartarus* and *Fury* bomb vessels, and other ships moored with their broadsides to the shore, had no sensible effect. At first no enemy was to be seen on the beach or on the heights; later on, by his account, some of our men were bayoneted by the French, who had come to the beach to meet them.

The French poured all the fire which their artillery on the heights and in the castle of Aboukir could discharge. In his account of the landing,

Wilson states: "The quantity of shot and shells, and, as the boats approached, the shower of grape and musketry, seemed so to plough the surface of the water, that nothing on it could live." According to Aeneas Anderson, the fire of the French artillery —ball, bomb, and grape from the fort, block-house, and lines—had little effect. Three boats only were sunk, and the greatest part of the men were picked up by the cutters of the fleet kept ready for the purpose. When the troops, however, arrived within three hundred yards of the shore, the enemy opened a most tremendous fire of small arms which did great mischief.

The 42nd, which had 31 rank and file killed, and 8 officers, 7 sergeants, 4 drummers, and 140 rank and file wounded, sustained most of this loss while in the boats and ascending the heights; when they closed with the French and attacked them with the bayonet, no loss worth mentioning was experienced.

General Moore, seeing that the landing would fail unless a post situated on a high sand-hill, from which the fire was most destructive, was silenced, sent Lieut.-Colonel Spencer against it with the flank companies of the 40th and 23rd. These troops scaled the heights never firing a shot, but, charging with the bayonet, drove back the 61st demi-brigade in disorder and captured two guns.

The 28th and 42nd attacked the enemy in front; the latter corps had no sooner gained the heights

than two hundred French dragoons bore down upon them, but were quickly repulsed. "The boats of the guards had scarce felt the beach, and the men begun to jump out, before the same body of cavalry, who had rallied behind the sand-hills, charged suddenly upon them. This unexpected attack caused a momentary disorder, but the 50th regiment, formed already on their right, by their fire checked the enemy, and gave time for the guards to present a front, when the cavalry again retired with considerable loss. The 54th and royals, from being in transport boats, did not reach the shore so soon as the others, but landed at the instant a column of six hundred infantry was advancing, with fixed bayonets, through a hollow against the left flank of the guards. The French, on seeing them, hesitated; then, firing a volley, retreated.

"The French finding the British in full possession of the heights, and General Coote advancing with the guards and his brigade, ran from all points of their position, but in the rear sand-hills maintained for about an hour and a half a scattered fire, when they were finally obliged to retreat." *

The actual fighting lasted about twenty minutes.

This success was not achieved without considerable losses. In a postscript to the official account written to the Secretary of State on the 16th of

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 15.

March, Sir Ralph gives a detailed statement of these losses. They amounted to 4 officers, 4 sergeants, and 94 rank and file killed; 26 officers, 34 sergeants, 5 drummers, and 450 rank and file wounded; and 1 officer, 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, and 32 rank and file missing. To these should be added 22 seamen killed; 7 officers, and 63 seamen wounded, and 3 seamen missing;* making a grand total of 124 killed, 585 wounded, and 38 missing.

The French admit having lost on that day four hundred men in killed and wounded.† They left on the field eight pieces of artillery and a number of horses.

A French writer observes: "To fully realize what war is, to contemplate it in all its horrors, to form a just idea of all its cruelties intentional and often profitless, military writers are not the authors one should consult. For these men, honourable and convinced, the end always justifies the means; and apart from a technicality very often tiresome, by their very calling, they have a profound contempt for all that is most precious in the world, for the life of man."‡ In a battle we must not look at the losses so much as to the importance of the object attained. What did the landing at Aboukir represent but the first step towards the

* James, "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 101.

† Sir Robert Wilson, estimates their loss at three hundred men, "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," p. 15.

‡ "Orient et Italie," by Maxime Du Camp.

expulsion of the French from Egypt? It was a step worth making some sacrifice for, and the loss of some six hundred gallant men was not too high a price to pay for it. Chary as a general must be of the lives and blood of his soldiers, he must not be deterred by the prospect of having to incur heavy losses when the nature of the undertaking sanctions it. No one showed more solicitude for the welfare of his soldiers than Abercrombie; but, as an able leader, he cast all tenderness aside when the question was how to overcome the enemy and secure a footing for his army in Egypt.

We may here quote an instance in which the fear of incurring some loss deterred the allies from an early capture of Sebastopol. Sir Edmund Lyons, immediately after the occupation of Balaclava, urged Lord Raglan to deliver an assault on the partially-open south side of the town. This was strongly opposed by Sir John Burgoyne, on the ground that it would cost the Allies a loss of five hundred men.* Was this too dear a price to pay for bringing the undertaking to an end? Timidity prevailed, and future events demonstrated the correctness of Sir Edmund's warning that, "if this were not done, the place would not be taken except

* At that time the Flagstaff and the Malakoff towers were the principal works for the protection of the south side. The latter, the principal point for the Allies to secure, was not as strongly fortified as it was later on. It was nevertheless feared that the attacking party would have to encounter a very powerful artillery fire.

after grievous loss; that the men who now composed the army would never live to do it." *

After the first landing, the boats returned for the other brigades, and, as Abercrombie states in his official report, "The disembarkation of the army continued that and the following day.† The troops which landed on the 8th advanced three miles the same day, and on the 12th the whole army moved forward, and came in sight of the enemy."

Major Elmslie observes, "It is noteworthy that both in the case of Aboukir and Cape Breton, the dashing and successful landing seems to have been succeeded by a period of somewhat extreme caution on the part of the commander. Perhaps, in both cases, they felt in their inmost hearts that their enterprises had been somewhat venturesome." ‡ Where this extreme caution was in the case of Sir Ralph Abercrombie is not very apparent. His troops on the day of landing advanced some miles beyond the battlefield. The position of the enemy was reconnoitred on the 10th, and on the 12th the army moved to Mandora Tower—the advanced guard skirmishing the whole way with a body of French cavalry—preparatory to an attack of the French on the following day. In disembarking

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii. p. 491.

† Captain Walsh writes: "On the 9th of March, there being a violent wind, it became impracticable to land warlike stores and provisions."

‡ Gold Medal Prize Essay. *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. 207, p. 474.

an army anywhere, but more so on an open shore, a certain time is needed to complete the landing of the stores and provisions, to form depôts, to establish a hospital, etc. In the Crimea, where the Allies did not encounter any opposition in landing or suffer the loss of a single man, or establish hospitals or depôts, they did not gain any ground for four days.

A far more pertinent question is, could this venturesome enterprise have been abandoned when the position was found to be strongly occupied by the French? The impossibility of finding any other suitable place for putting the troops ashore left the General no option. He had either to attack or to abandon the undertaking. As Sir Robert Wilson puts it, "But the order was positive, the object urgent, and the character of the British army rested on the attempt." *

When a direct attack was fraught with risks, it was open to the General to assail the French in flank. In the following words Sir Robert Wilson shows that such an alternative was open to Abercrombie, and also the reasons which prompted him to reject it. "Sir Sidney Smith, who had landed and reconnoitred the ground the year before, proposed that the battery at the entrance of Lake Mahadie should be maintained, when carried on the evening of the 7th, or its assault combined at all events with the operation of landing. Such a

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 17.

manœuvre would certainly have been masterly, as in either case its advantages must have been decisively great. If fifteen hundred men had passed into the lake and made for the narrow neck of the isthmus, about half a mile in breadth, and to which our advanced posts were pushed on the evening of the 8th, the French must have abandoned the position at Aboukir, or exposed themselves to be taken in rear, and have their retreat cut off; had only gunboats forced in on the morning of the landing, the French would have suffered most severely from their fire in crossing the plain, a good mile in extent, immediately in rear of the position. Sir Ralph Abercrombie was aware of this reasoning, but feared to divide his force, not knowing the numbers of the enemy which might oppose the landing at Aboukir, and the boats not being sufficiently numerous to admit of his detaching any from the principal service."

Possibly Abercrombie's daring attack may have been prompted by his fiery spirit and strong determination, which made him close his eyes to the very risky nature of the enterprise. He may have either been impelled by the confidence he had in his troops, or the recollection of the humiliating results of the two recent attempts on Ferrol and Cadiz may have induced him to believe—like Sir John Jervis before the battle of Cape St. Vincent—that England stood much in need of a victory.

The French are admitted to have behaved with spirit and resolution; their defence was strictly good. General Friant brought on the ground all the troops he could spare, nevertheless he was out-numbered by his British opponents in the proportion of three to one; nor had he sufficient troops with which to occupy adequately a position said to have been about a mile in extent. Without wishing to disparage the thoroughness of the preparations, or to lessen in the very least the brilliant courage and persevering determination displayed by the British seamen and soldiers in this landing, it is impossible to overlook the fact that their numerical superiority over the French contributed largely to the success of the onset.

In most of our military operations we have had no reason to be proud of our transport arrangements. Our land carriage has generally been far below our requirements; and when, on the other hand, as in the case of our Indian wars, it has been on a large scale, the enormous number of pack animals and followers employed have added to the ordinary commissariat difficulties, and have been a great impediment to rapid movements. In this expedition the land transport was so feeble that the moment for action would probably have been lost pending the arrival of the provisions. What could two or three hundred miserable horses have accomplished in that heavy sandy soil? The lake of Aboukir, however, being navigable for boats and small craft,

enabled all the provisions, ammunition, guns, and stores of every description to be brought up to the army with the greatest facility.

On the 13th the army marched to attack the French, who, having been reinforced by a regiment of cavalry and two half-brigades of infantry, were posted on a ridge of heights not far from Mandora Tower. The enemy were forced to quit their position, and retreated into their own lines in front of Alexandria, which Abercrombie did not consider he was strong enough to carry. On the 21st General Menou tried to surprise the British forces in the early morning, but, as usual, they had turned out, and were under arms at three o'clock. A fierce contest ensued, which ended in the total defeat of the French. In this memorable battle of Alexandria the French lost a number of their principal officers, amongst others Generals Lannusse, Bodet, and Roiz (who commanded the cavalry), and the British were deprived of their gallant leader, Abercrombie, who, struck by a musket-ball in the thigh, died from the effects of his wounds on board of the *Foudroyant* on the 28th of March.

Important as this victory was, it did not decide the fate of Egypt. General Hutchinson, on whom the command of the British force devolved, having been reinforced by the Turks, successively recaptured Rosetta, El-Aft, and Cairo. He then turned his attention on Alexandria. The place was invested, the first parallel was begun on the 17th of

August, and Menou capitulated on the 1st of September. The garrison, like that of Cairo, was conveyed to France at the expense of the allied powers, and with the capture of Alexandria the object of the British expedition was fulfilled.

It was intended, as we have shown in the beginning of this chapter, that General Baird should co-operate with Abercrombie's army, and the Government hoped that he might, by effecting a landing at Suez, divert the attention of the French. The monsoon which had commenced before Baird entered the Red Sea, made it, however, impossible for him to gain that destination. At that time the navigation of the Red Sea was little understood, and the charts were very incorrect. The armament proceeded in small divisions, as the intricate and dangerous navigation would have made it perilous for all the ships to sail together; as it was, seventeen sail out of the whole were lost.

We have seen in Chapter VI. how a detachment of the 86th had sailed up the Red Sea to Suez. This detachment (two hundred strong), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd, landed from the *Leopard* at Suez on the 14th of May, and in obedience to the orders received from General Hutchinson started on the 7th of June to march across the desert to Cairo. Lloyd with his men reached the Grand Vizier's army at Chobra on the 10th in a most pitiable condition; the men had suffered terribly from want of water, and from the

intolerable heat. They had tasted no food since leaving Suez, and their uniforms had been burnt owing to the plague.

Having heard at Jedda from Rear-admiral Blanket of the favourable results of the battle of Alexandria, Baird determined to land his forces at Kosseir, to cross the desert to Keneh, and by descending the Nile to come to the aid of General Hutchinson's army. It was with difficulty that the ships reached Kosseir.

His force consisted of a total of 7546 officers and men, of which total, however, 1153 were servants and followers. The artillery was drawn by bullocks brought from India. To the above must be added a contingent which sailed from the Cape on the 28th of February and 30th of March, 1801, escorted by Sir Home Popham with the *Romney* and *Sensible*. This contingent was composed of a troop of the 8th Light Dragoons (dismounted), one company of artillery, and the 61st regiment; in all about twelve hundred men. The first detachment of Baird's force, consisting of a portion of the 10th foot, arrived at Kossier on the 17th of May, and landed on the 21st; other detachments arrived daily.

Baird arrived at Kosseir on the 8th of June, where he found Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, the adjutant-general, who had preceded him, and landed with a very small advance-guard on the 14th of May. Finding that his troops had not arrived, he set out for Keneh to settle about the

posts at the different wells, and arrange for the march of his troops.

Commencing on the 21st of June, these marched by detachments, the whole distance between the sea and the Nile having been divided into eight stages. By the end of July the greater portion of the Anglo-Indian contingent had reached Keneh, but this was not accomplished without great sufferings from scarcity of water and drowsiness. On the march twelve men died, mostly from sunstroke, and the 8th Light Dragoons lost fifteen horses from want of water. It was noticed in this march that the sepoys suffered more from insufficiency of water and from the intense heat of the weather than the Europeans. This fact was also remarked in 1885, when a company of the Egyptian army which crossed the Bayuda desert with Sir Herbert Stewart's column soon became demoralized by the same causes.

At Keneh some difficulty was found in getting a sufficient number of *dgerms* to convey the troops down the Nile to Cairo—a distance of five hundred miles, which ordinarily was not accomplished under ten days. Baird's force reached Gizeh on the 7th of August and the following day began to land, being encamped on the Island of Rhoda. There it remained till the 28th of August, when it re-embarked for Rosetta.

This force was singularly unfortunate, inasmuch as it had no opportunity of sharing in any of

the combats. The capitulation of Cairo was ratified on the 27th of June before it reached that city, and Alexandria capitulated on the 1st of September, the day after the Anglo-Indian troops went into camp at Aboumandour.

On the 16th of July, Lieutenant Budgin had arrived at Cairo with the intelligence that Baird had reached Keneh with a division of his army. As it was then reported that Admiral Gantheaume was making strong efforts to throw reinforcements into Alexandria, General Hutchinson deemed it desirable to add to his forces; Lieutenant Budgin was consequently sent back with instructions for the Anglo-Indian contingent to descend the Nile.

In connection with the operations in Egypt a few words must be said with regard to the news carried to Alexandria by the brig *Lodi*. On two occasions, on the 5th of April and on the 9th of August, 1779, the blockade of Alexandria was suspended, as the British ships had to repair to Cyprus, presumably for water. In both cases the French took prompt advantage of this. In the first, Admiral Perrée left for Jaffa, where he landed guns and ammunition; in the second, Gantheaume's two frigates, with Bonaparte on board, sailed for France.

On quitting Egypt Bonaparte had promised to send reinforcements from France, but the naval power of Great Britain in the Mediterranean was too great. When, later on, he learnt the real destination of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's army, he

became more eager to augment the forces in that country. Owing to the untiring watchfulness of the British naval officers, Rear-admiral Gantheaume for some months had been unable to get out of Brest, and could only do so when a severe gale had driven off the blockading fleet. Taking advantage of a storm, he put to sea on the night of the 23rd of January, 1801, with seven ships-of-the-line and some smaller vessels, carrying five thousand soldiers and a large supply of military stores. As Thiers justly remarks, "It was a case either never to go out, or to do so in a tempest which should remove the British fleet." Gantheaume chose the latter course at the price of considerable damage to his fleet.

Bonaparte, who never neglected to use any opportunity of leading the enemy into error, gave out that the destination of the Admiral was St. Domingo.

When Gantheaume had passed Gibraltar and entered the Mediterranean, he learnt from the officers of a captured ship that Lord Keith was already on the coast of Egypt with a considerable force (which was not exactly true, as the British fleet had not yet sailed from the Bay of Marmorice), and fearing to be overtaken by Rear-admiral Sir John Warren, he decided to make for the port of Toulon.

Bonaparte subsequently sent him two orders to sail from that port; in compliance with these commands, Gantheaume first put to sea on the 19th of

March, but, chased by Sir John Warren, he retraced his steps and returned to Toulon. A second attempt was made on the 27th of April; this time he reached a point about seventy leagues to the westward of Alexandria on the 7th of June, from which he despatched the corvette *Héliopolis* to ascertain the exact position of the British fleet. The Admiral had been directed to land the troops at Derne, a small port on the coast of Tripoli, several marches distant from Alexandria.*

As the *Héliopolis* did not return (she had just managed to slip safely into Alexandria), Gantheaume looked for some place on the coast west of Alexandria, where, in obedience to the First Consul's orders, he could put his troops ashore. He anchored off Bengazi, but could not overcome the opposition of the population. As some British ships hove in sight, he cut his cables and quitted the coast under all sail. On the 22nd of July his fleet re-entered Toulon.† The officers entreated to be put ashore with their men on the coast, but the Admiral feared he had not sufficient time to do so, and dreaded having his ships destroyed.

According to Walsh, the French squadron under Gantheaume consisted of four sail-of-the-line, one frigate, one corvette, and five small transports.

* The place was badly chosen, for the road led through a waterless desert.

† James, "Naval History—Cruise of Admiral Gantheaume," vol. iii. p. 89.

This fleet had been off the coast for some days, and had anchored, by mistake, in Lacusta Bay, greatly to the westward of Alexandria. The five transports, under the protection of the *Héliopolis*, quitted the fleet and made for Alexandria, but were captured on the 7th of June and taken to Aboukir; only the *Héliopolis* escaped. The transports held no troops, and their masters stated that they had parted with the fleet at a distance of nearly eighty leagues from Alexandria.

Rear-admiral Sir Richard Bickerton with three sail-of-the-line and a Turkish man-of-war was thereupon sent in pursuit of Gantheaume. On the 13th of June, Bickerton rejoined the fleet off Alexandria, having seen or heard nothing of the French squadron.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FRENCH EXPEDITION TO ALGERIA.

Many punishing expeditions undertaken against Algiers—Charles X. determines to subdue it—Meets with much opposition at home—Vice-admiral Duperré expresses himself against it—Strength of the expeditionary force—Auxiliary services—Sailing formation of the armada—Boutin's reconnaissance of Algiers—Landing in the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch—The peninsula turned into an intrenched camp—Stormy weather follows the first landing—Advance and capitulation of Algiers—The occupation of the country gives rise to a long series of contests.

In his work, "The Nation in Arms," Baron v. d. Goltz observes: "England alone can, in consequence of her wealth, her geographical position, and the great number of ships of the largest tonnage belonging both to the State and to private owners, perform anything of real importance in the way of transporting and supplying troops by sea." This statement is not borne out by history, which shows that, since the days of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, France has sent her troops across the sea in 1830 for the conquest of Algeria, in 1849 for the suppression of the Roman Republic, in 1854 for


MAP OF
ALGIERS
to illustrate
THE FRENCH EXPEDITION
OF 1830.
Scale of English Miles
MEDITERRANEAN
Cape Caxine
Ras Acconater
Oued Tyrkah
EASTERN BAY
WESTERN BAY
Sidi Ferruch
Algerian Batteries
Algerian Batteries
Algerian Batteries
Oued el Bourgas
19th June
Staoueli
Camp
Redoubt
Redoubt
Redoubt
ROAD FOLLOWED BY THE FRENCH ARMY
Sidi Kalef
Redoubt
Redoubt
Dely Ibrahim
ROAD FROM ALGIERS TO
Fort of the English
Battery
Battery of
Fort of the Marine
ALGIERS
ROAD
Fort Bab Azzoun
Battery

S

E

STEAD OF ALGIERS

A

ion of General O'Reilly. 1775



the expedition to the Crimea, in 1859 for the war in Lombardy, in 1860 for the expedition to China. Her troops have besides landed in Syria, Mexico, Tunis, Tonquin, Dahomey and Madagascar. The Baron should therefore have accorded the same faculty to France, since the above record shows that during this century she had sent her troops by sea to the four quarters of the world.

The Algerians were always incorrigible pirates, and for centuries had given much trouble. No chastizing measures seemed strong enough to repress their insolence at sea. Many nations suffered from their ravages, and many expeditions were undertaken to punish them for acts of piracy. Barbarians, who only understand force, are always in need of severe punishment, and the angry sound of the retributive gun was often heard on the north coast of Africa.

From 1682 to 1687 Algiers was bombarded three times by the French;* it was attacked by the English under Blake in 1655; by the combined English and Dutch fleets in 1669, and again in the following year. The Spaniards sent several expeditions against Algiers with no favourable result; the last, in 1775, consisted of forty-four ships of war and three hundred and forty transports, bearing twenty-three thousand troops. This one was

* In 1681 Renaud was the first who constructed ketches for throwing shells; these were first used by the French in the bombardment of Algiers.

singularly mismanaged, and the troops found themselves compelled to reimbark in haste, leaving behind the whole of their artillery and eighteen hundred wounded. In 1815 the Americans defeated the Algerian fleet off Carthagena, and the next year Sir Edward Pellew (Lord Exmouth) with a British and Dutch fleet attacked and bombarded the city of Algiers.

At last, during the reign of Charles X., the French resolved to free Europe from this scourge. A portion of the supplies for Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt had been drawn from Algeria, and the non-payment of what was still due for these was one of the principal causes of quarrel between the Dey of Algiers and France. An insult inflicted by Dey Hussein on Mons. Deval, the French consul, on his reception on the eve of the Bairam festival, the 30th of April, 1827, and the fire opened on the 3rd of August, 1829, on the line-of-battle ship *Provence*, which was sailing out of the bay of Algiers under cover of a flag of truce, ultimately led to a rupture, which ended in the conquest of Algeria. A state reason, however, has also been assigned as the cause of the expedition, viz. the desire of Charles X. to regain the favour of his people.

The expedition was one of the largest which have occurred in this century, and contains many useful lessons. Few, if any, were more judiciously arranged or more carefully prepared. Every

measure was taken that could insure success. As a first step, an accomplished and energetic officer was placed in charge of the administrative services, and accorded the confidence of the War Minister. Notwithstanding his wide experience, Baron Denniée diligently sought out a staff of active and zealous assistants, and both chief and subordinates worked indefatigably at the details of the administrative arrangements. These afford good examples for any future expedition.

The preparations comprised three distinct operations: (*a*) the assembly on the shores of the Mediterranean of a sufficient land and sea force, (*b*) the collection of the war materials, provisions and forage necessary for a large undertaking, (*c*) the concentration of a very considerable number of warships and transports to convey the men, horses, ammunition, materials, provisions, etc., across the sea from France to the African coast.

All that required to be worked out in connection with these and similar points had been relegated to a committee composed of distinguished officers; but, notwithstanding that they had studied the subject for some while, the undertaking met with serious opposition from the press, from the Chamber, and from several of the leading members of the Government. To us, accustomed as we are to credit naval officers with a burning desire for active service and daring attempts, it appears strange to find the French navy raising objections. The naval officers,

however brave, did not appear to relish the responsibilities involved in a difficult enterprise. Napoleon himself, at the time of the contemplated invasion of England, bitterly complained to Admiral Decrès of the lack of adventure on the part of the imperial navy, a fact which was mainly due to the state of inferiority to which the French navy had been brought by the Revolution. In this instance most of the credit for the prosecution of the operations against Algiers was due to the determination, administrative ability, and energy of Baron de Haussez, Minister of Marine.

It was computed that adequate preparations for an expedition to Algeria would require six months, and there were officers who estimated that they could not be completed under eight months. Vice-admiral Duperré—nominated to the command of the naval part of the expedition—expressed himself greatly against it, and strongly urged its postponement until the following year. The preparations, he stated, were begun too late to have everything ready in time to take advantage of the most propitious season of the year. This brings to our mind Pitt's threat to impeach the First Lord of the Admiralty if the fleet destined to take part in the projected expedition against Rochefort was not ready by the time specified. In this case the King of France sanctioned the undertaking in the end of January, 1830, and his Minister of Marine promised

that everything should be ready by the 15th of May.

If Nelson had a horror of the Gulf of Lyons and the coasts about Toulon, French naval officers dreaded the northern shores of Africa. The ports in northern Africa are few and small, and, aware that the neighbourhood of the coast is much more subject to sudden gusts of wind than the open sea, they were tormented by the thought that the gales which are of such frequent recurrence on the coast of Barbary, even in the middle of summer, could disperse all the transports, and drive them on shore, exposing the army to frightful privations and misery.

It must be acknowledged, however, that once the Government had resolved to carry out the operations in that year, all the officers and all the heads of departments put their shoulders to the wheel and displayed unusual activity; every one tried to surpass his fellow in zeal. The work in the ports of Toulon and Marseilles was carried out by day and by night, and an addition was made to the salary of the workmen.

By the end of April the troops detailed to take part in the expedition were concentrated near the coast. They were divided into three divisions. The first, commanded by Lieutenant-General Baron Berthezéne, was cantoned at Toulon, Hyères, Cuers, Solliès, and Ollioules, with headquarters at Toulon. The second, commanded by Lieutenant-

General Count de Loverdo, was at Marseilles, Aubagne, Auriol, Tretz, and Barjols, with headquarters at Marseilles. The third, commanded by Lieutenant-General Duke de Cars, occupied Aix, Saint-Chamas, Salon, Lambesq, and Orgon, with its headquarters at Aix.

The Count de Bourmont was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with Lieutenant-General Deprés as chief of the staff, General Viscount de Lahitte commanding the Artillery, General Baron Valazé commanding the Engineers, and Baron Denniée chief of the *Intendance.*

The ships collected for the expedition comprised:

Warships	103
Transports	357
Bateaux Catalan de l'Ile *	124
Chalands †	55
Flat-bottomed boats	30
	669

Every endeavour was made to give a good impression of the maritime possibilities of France. This was the first occasion in which steamers were employed in a military expedition. There were seven of them; the *Coureur, Nageur, Pelican, Rapide, Souffleur, Ville-du-Hâvre,* and *Sphinx.*

* One-masted boats used for transporting animals, to be employed in landing the troops.

† Constructed purposely at Toulon; thirty to hold a hundred and forty men each, twelve for disembarking the field artillery, thirteen for the siege artillery. The latter were also able to hold a hundred and fifty men with arms and baggage.

Two soon got out of order, and were sent back from the Bay of Palma.

The force embarked was made up as follows:—

	Officers and men.	Horses.
Staff	110	246
Infantry	30,410	219
Cavalry	539	493
Artillery	2,815	1,246
Engineers	1,345	117
Military train	882	1,302
Artificers	688	—
Police	113	31
Administrative services ...	429	354
	37,331*	4,008

With this force was an artillery park of eighty-two heavy pieces and nine mortars.

The embarkation of the troops commenced on the 11th of May, and, though retarded by inclement weather, was completed by the 17th; on the following day the staff went on board. With what efficiency the embarkation was performed is shown by Mons. Alfred Nettement, who states that the second division began embarking at daybreak on the 13th of May, and that all were on board by ten o'clock the same morning.†

Baron Denniée, who had the direction of the *Intendance*, was guided by the often-repeated advice of Admiral de Rigny, "Recollect, if you ever make

* Baron Denniée computes that the military and naval *personnel* amounted to a total of sixty-four thousand souls.

† "Histoire de la Conquête d'Alger," par M. Alfred Nettement, Livre Cinquième, p. 312.

such an expedition, that this barren coast will not even afford litter for your horses, and that the sea, so capricious in those localities, will ingulf more than once your small craft." He brought all his knowledge, experience, and energetic ability to his task, and made most ample arrangements. It was decided that a two months' supply of provisions should accompany the troops, and that an equal quantity should follow in a few days. Bearing in mind the necessity for completing the preparations as speedily as possible, the Minister of War sanctioned a departure from the ordinary system, and adopted a new one, of purchase on commission (achat à commission). To this effect a contract was made with the mercantile house of Seillière by which the latter engaged itself, on a stipulated commission, to deliver at cost price to the administrative officers all the supplies demanded in the given quantity at the time and place indicated.

On the 1st of May, 78,645 sacks, casks, barrels, chests or bales, containing provisions for two months, had been delivered and shipped at Marseilles.* The chests, sacks, and bales were all packed with

* 11,194 of flour, 7300 of biscuit, 1200 of ditto on Mon. Darcet's process, 2467 of rice, pulse and salt, 2870 of salted meat, 4772 of wine and eau-de-vie, 10,500 of coals, 25,117 of forage, 95 of sheet iron, with 180,000 bricks for twelve ovens, 112 of tools and utensils, 2,578 iron bedsteads, 4000 bottles of chlorine, 7 kil. of quinine, and hospital furniture for 1500 beds, 10,400 of tents, blankets, utensils, tools and camping articles for 40,000 men, 40 of flannel belts; total, 78,645.

a double waterproof wrapping. The intention was to cast the articles into the sea, should bad weather compel the transports to quit their anchorage before they had discharged their cargo. It was believed, and this was proved in the storm of the 16th of June, that the current which sets in towards the shore would have helped to transmit the necessary supplies to the army.

Baron de Haussez asserts that the dispositions were so well taken that everything was transferred from the carriages direct to the ships ready to receive them, and seldom were left to encumber the wharves. The French were fortunate in having two good ports, Marseilles and Toulon, so close to one another. The armament was divided into three distinct sections, the fleet, the disembarkation flotilla, and the convoy; to eliminate all possible encumberment and confusion, the fleet was mobilized at Toulon, whilst the flotilla and convoy were organized at Marseilles.

Nor was the land carriage overlooked. The uncertain nature of the ground made it desirable to have a transport in which the animals might be used for draught in the most practicable paths and as pack animals on the most difficult. With this object, in the horse and mule harness, the saddle was fitted on each side with two strong hooks, on which, when needed, could be hung two wooden cradles to support loads. As light carriages were more easily drawn through the heavy sand, a two-

wheeled cart was purposely designed, and of these 128 were constructed in less than twenty days. The military train had 128 four-wheeled waggons and the above 128 carts, with 654 draught horses—all between the ages of six and eight—and 626 mules.

The importance of having somewhere between the African and the French coast an intermediate establishment, to which the sick and wounded could be easily transferred, was such that an officer was sent to remove any objections Spain might raise to the establishment of a military hospital at Mahon in the island of Minorca. A hospital with beds for two thousand sick was formed there, and three merchant ships, the *Léonidas*, *Metternich*, and *Immaculata Saint Michel*, were sent across from Marseilles with the required medical staff, appliances, furniture and medicaments. The wisdom of this measure was appreciated later on. In a report to the Marshal, commanding-in-chief, dated 29th of July, 1830, Baron Denniée writes that already, in a month and a half, more than four thousand sick and wounded had been sent to Mahon and to France.

By an equally wise precaution of the French *Intendance*, a certain quantity of provisions and forage had been collected at Palma to replenish what had been consumed on the voyage thereto.

The disembarkation flotilla quitted Toulon on the 18th of May, and cast anchor a few days after in the Bay of Palma, in the island of Majorca. Some

of the horse transports and provision ships were to start on the 26th and 27th of May and proceed direct to the rendezvous on the coast of Africa. The fleet and convoy sailed on the 25th of May, when a favourable wind sprung up, and by a few minutes after four o'clock p.m. all the ships were under way.

The armada put to sea in the following order: In the centre, divided into two squadrons sailing in parallel lines, came the army. On the left came the first squadron led by Duperré's flagship, the *Provence*. On the right the second, headed by the *Trident*, on which ship Rear-admiral Rosamel had hoisted his flag. Each squadron had in attendance a division of four ships. In the rear of the two squadrons came six steamers. The men-of-war held the greater part of the troops; 24,041, of all ranks, were embarked in commissioned ships.

At a distance of four miles to the left of the combatants sailed, in two columns, the convoy. This formed a single unit under the direction of Commander Hugon; the *personnel* was in front, followed by ships laden with stores and provisions. To the right of the two squadrons, also with an interval of four miles, sailed the reserve, which was in charge of Captain Lemoine, of the *Thetis*.

Two miles in the rear of the whole, with a distance of two miles between them, came two powder ships escorted by the *Hussard*.

The armada covered a great space; the wind

was fair; but, not to derange the order of march, the rate of sailing was very slow.

In 1802, and again in 1808, Napoleon had entertained the idea of sending a military expedition to Algeria. With this object Admiral Decrès commissioned Commandant Boutin to make a reconnaissance of Algiers, of its defences and neighbourhood. The brig in which Boutin embarked in returning from Africa had the misfortune of being captured on its way to Toulon by a British frigate near Spezzia, but he had time to throw overboard most of his drawings and important papers. Boutin was carried off as a prisoner to Malta, from which place he contrived to escape disguised as a sailor, went to Constantinople, and thence made his way back to France. There, by the aid of a good memory, and a few sketches and notes he had been able to save, he compiled a summary of his reconnaissance, which was found amongst the records of the War Office, and came in useful in 1830.* The gallant officer of Engineers had not only marked out the most favourable place for a disembarkation, but had sketched the march of the army, and clearly indicated which was the weakest side of the city of Algiers.†

* Reconnaissance Générale de la ville, des forts et batteries, d'Alger par le chef de bataillon du Génie Boutin. *Faite en consequence des ordres et des instructions de S. Ex. Mgr. Decrès, ministre dela Marine et des Colonies, en date des 1èr et 2nd Mars pour servir au project de descente et d'établissement définitif dans ce pays.*

† Boutin was intrusted with a mission to Egypt and Syria in

"At daybreak on the 31st the fleet came in view of Cape Caxine, then, at the most, five or six leagues off. Bad weather, however, scattered the ships, and prudence counselled Admiral Duperré to direct the whole to make for the bay of Palma. It was only on the 10th of June that a final start was made from the island of Majorca. On the 12th the coast of Africa was again in sight, but strong winds drove the ships to the north. Towards noon the sea had subsided, and by four p.m. the coast was again visible. The following day the sea was calm, the breeze moderate, and the sky clear. Under a favourable wind the French fleet advanced in splendid array towards the city of Algiers; when a few leagues off, it altered its course and sailed west, led by the *Bellone*, defiled majestically before the city batteries, rounded the point of Pescada, and at seven in the evening anchored in the bay of Sidi-Ferruch. In the night preparations were made for landing.

Boutin had indicated the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch, situated about six leagues from Algiers, as the place most adapted for a landing. This promontory, jutting out into the sea in a north-westerly direction between two bays, is about a kilomètre (1100 yards) in length, with a mean width of 500 mètres (550 yards). These bays were equally well adapted for a disembarkation, the choice being made to depend on the direction of the wind, against

November, 1810; he was assassinated in July or August, 1815, near the village of El-Blatta, in Syria.

which the cape offered a certain degree of protection. When the wind blows from the east, with certain peculiarities well known to seamen who have navigated in the Mediterranean, the sea is perfectly calm in the western bay of Sidi-Ferruch.

The country which borders the shore has hardly any command; in some parts there is a small chain of sand-banks from fifteen to twenty-five feet high, but the landing is everywhere easy. Boutin had reported that there were no fortifications worthy of the name. The main one, the tower of Sidi-Ferruch, was old and not fit to withstand a cannonade. The work was square, each face measured from ten to sixteen feet, and was armed with an inferior piece of cannon of small calibre. The tower stood from fifty to sixty-five feet above the level of the sea.

The French followed the advice of their reconnoitring officer, who was of opinion that, as all the attempts in the bay of Algiers had failed, it was prudent to try elsewhere. It was consequently determined to land at Sidi-Ferruch.

Speaking of the invaders, the Turks said, "To capture them, it is well to let them land." Where it was, therefore, expected to find the coast covered with batteries, and every preparation made for a vigorous resistance, no movement of the enemy was visible; the stillness seemed to betoken an ambush. The Algerians had contented themselves by placing some of their artillery in a battery on a rising ground beyond the promontory.

Preparations were made for landing on the 14th; the day was propitious, for it was the anniversary of Marengo and Friedland. Orders were issued for the troops to carry five days' provisions, great-coats to be worn *en banderole*, with the pouch over the great-coats to prevent the ammunition getting wet in wading ashore. No muskets were to be loaded, so that firing should not commence by hazard, or before the troops had been able to get into formation.

The brigs *Sphinx* and *Nageur* were to attack the enemy's battery in front, whilst the *Bayonnaise*, *Badine*, and *Actéon*, anchored in the eastern bay, were to take it in reverse.

At break of day on the 14th a part of the first division headed for the shore. This landing-party was composed of the three first battalions of Poret de Morvan's and Achard's brigades.

The first brigade was disposed as follows:—1st battalion of the 3rd on the right, 1st battalion of the 4th in the centre, 1st battalion of the 2nd (light) on the left. Each battalion occupied eight barges, each one of which was towed by a boat propelled by twelve oars, under the command of a naval officer. A senior naval officer superintended the alignment of the towing-boats. The three first battalions of the 2nd brigade were formed in the same manner. Other barges carried a company of engineers, two field batteries, and the staff.

Mons. Camille Rousset states, "But on approaching the shore the alignment, which up to that time

had been well maintained by the towing-party" is broken; it becomes a contest of speed between the crews to the encouragement and applause of the soldiers that they had in tow."

Arrived at a certain distance from land, some sailors were made to take the water to ascertain its depth, and, as it got below their waist, the officers ordered their men to quit the barges.

The enemy did not contest the landing. By 4.30 o'clock the first division of the French with eight guns had safely reached the shore and got into formation; there it remained waiting for orders. At five a.m. General Berthezéne set part of the two brigades in motion towards the gorge of the peninsula; the Turks fired a few shots from behind some bushes and disappeared. After a short while they opened fire from some heavy guns which they had posted on a hillock beyond the peninsula, to which the French replied with twelve field-pieces drawn by their gunners. At five a.m. the second division with its field artillery began to land, and its last companies got ashore by 6.30 a.m.

General Berthezéne, whose instructions were not to advance too far beyond the landing-place, had halted his troops under cover. He was subsequently ordered to move on the Turkish battery, as soon as the other half of his division, having landed, formed a sufficient reserve. At about seven a.m., as this movement was being carried out, the assailants were threatened by five or

six hundred of the enemy's horsemen, who, however, beat a hasty retreat before the fire of the French skirmishers. As the main body neared the battery the Turkish gunners abandoned their pieces—thirteen guns and two mortars—and fled to the plateau of Staouëli.

In this brief action the French loss amounted to one officer slightly wounded and thirty-two men killed and wounded.

The recollection of the collapse of all former expeditions made General de Bourmont anxious to establish his communications with the sea as strongly as practicable, and with regard to the provisions and ammunition, to leave nothing to chance. The troops were immediately employed in fortifying the land side of the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch, to secure a firm hold of the ground they had gained. The gorge was closed by a bastioned front, and the peninsula was turned into an intrenched camp and a general depôt for provisions, materials and munitions. The third division was told off for its defence, the other two took post about a league beyond the landing-place.

The time taken at Marseilles in shipping and making ready for the expedition had been wisely turned to account in determining precisely the work which the various branches of the administrative machinery would have to carry out.

It was laid down that the hospitals detailed for the first aid to the wounded, and shipped in the

Couronne, *Iphigénie*, and *Rhône*, were to be landed on the coast at the same time as the troops. Immediately following the disembarkation of the infantry, it had been arranged to land a part of the artillery and four hundred and fifty horses and mules, with a proportion of the two-wheeled carts. Baron Denniée reports that the advantages possessed by that description of carriage were fully established when the army moved on; and that, notwithstanding the difficulty of the road, in the transport of provisions these light conveyances were found eminently adapted to the country.*

Simultaneously with the first landing, a section of the cattle-boats was to put ashore four hundred thousand rations of all kinds, and immediately after the disembarkation of the second division, a section of eight merchant ships was to put ashore four hundred thousand rations more.

The senior administrative officer on board of each freight ship was to take a list of all the stores which had been consigned to the master of the vessel. At the time of landing, having made certain that everything was clear of the ship, he was to proceed at once to the chief intendant, or the under-intendant, under whose supervision the articles would come, and take his orders from them, with regard to the locality in which they were to be collected.

Distinguishing flags by day and coloured lanterns

* "Précis Historique et Administratif de la campagne d'Afrique," par le Baron Denniée, p. 29.

by night were to show the localities in which the different classes of stores and provisions were to be deposited on shore.

The instructions issued by Baron Denniée were most complete. It was laid down where the *personnel* of the different administrative services, under the direction of their respective chiefs, was to form up and remain. There the officers, as they landed, were to receive their orders with regard to the work they were to attend to. If there was a want it was in the rank and file of the administrative departments. This had to be made up from the combatants; the engineers had to lend skilled men for setting up the portable iron ovens, and the third division a fatigue-party of three hundred men to help in the disembarkation of the supplies, stores, and war material. The supply arrangements worked well; fresh bread was issued on the 16th, and the regular distribution of provisions commenced on the 17th.

The weather, which had been favourable since the commencement of the disembarkation, changed during the night of the 15th of June, and by eight on the following morning became stormy. The French were dismayed, and well they might be, for victory, and possibly the safety of the army, depended on the fleet. The wind bore on the coast; the largest ships dragged their anchors, and the smaller commercial transports, less able to contend against the fury of the waves, appeared

menaced with imminent destruction. Only fifteen days' provisions had been landed, and two hundred and fifty rounds per gun ; the mass of the provisions and munitions, as also the draught horses and siege materials, were still on board. Fortunately the wind shifted from north-east to east, and, with this change of wind, the sea became calmer.

It had been arranged at Marseilles to cover all boxes, bales, and other packages with a second waterproof casing, with the object of casting them in the sea, should rough weather call for a suspension of the disembarkation. The wisdom of such a precaution was amply seen in this storm, for boxes of biscuit, barrels of spirits, of flour, of pulse, bales of hay, sacks of oats and barley were, with incredible speed, thrown overboard, and, impelled by the waves, came rolling on the shore.

Where many other expeditions had failed to make an impression, this one gained its object at little cost of life, and with remarkable despatch. There being no stubborn resistance to overcome, there was no field for much display of tactical skill, the chief merit of the undertaking lay in the thoroughness of the measures taken. As Baron Denniée wrote in his report of the 26th of June : "This campaign will be creditable to the administration. It will justify new theories, and will prove what is the outcome of sage previsions when their execution is confided to administrative officers, all animated by a sense of their duties."

The first bivouacs were rough. In the first nights, the infantry, formed up in squares, remained under arms. One rank standing, one sitting on the knapsack, one lying down: of each three men, only one slept. The enemy showed some four thousand infantry and six thousand horsemen, all armed with muskets; these troops were expert in skirmishing, and principally redoubtable in ambuscades and surprises. The Arabs gave no quarter, and every soldier who strayed was never after seen alive; his comrades found his mutilated body, the head having been taken to the Dey, who had offered for each one a reward of from two hundred to two hundred and fifty francs. On the 15th of June, all the field artillery having landed, their fire was brought to bear on the Arabs, who, by crawling up close to the bivouacs, and firing at random, caused the loss of a certain number of men. The enemy's fire was incessant; the Arabs, at other times, rushed on the out-posts with all the speed of their horses, bowed down on their neck to present a smaller mark; when at a short distance drew reins and fired, then wheeled round and regained their people at a rapid gallop. They never left a dead or wounded man on the battlefield; a rope, attached to the saddle, was used to drag away such as fell dead or wounded. It was said that they preferred to have their dead than to leave them in Christian hands.

Some Bedouin chiefs, who had come on the 18th

of June to stipulate for terms for their tribes, reported that considerable forces had arrived at the camp of Staouëli. The Aga—the Dey's father-in-law—was there, with the best troops of the regency, the Janissary infantry. The beys of Titery and Constantine, with their contingents, had joined him; his forces were reckoned at fifty thousand men. There were many indications of fresh arrivals in the enemy's camp, and General Berthezène had been informed of an impending attack on the 19th.

At daybreak the Turks, with the bey of Titery's contingent, attacked; their object was to overcome the French left, and cut their army from the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch. General Clouet, instead of being surprised, was ready for the enemy, received him at close quarters with canister, charged him with the bayonet, and put him to flight. More severe fighting occurred on the extreme left, where the 28th regiment, attacked in front and in flank, gave way. General d'Arcines, who commanded the reserve, brought forward the 29th regiment to its support, the 28th rallied, and the two corps drove back the Turks at the point of the bayonet. The French assumed the offensive, and Captain Dupetit-Thouars, with the guns of his brig, the *Griffon*, inflicted serious injury on the enemy, and helped signally in putting them to rout. The contingent from Oran was easily driven back by the French centre, and that from Constantine was defeated

more easily still. By six a.m., the enemy had been driven back all along the line.

De Bourmont had simply thought of repelling the attack, for he was determined not to be enticed forward towards Algiers before he had the means for opening the siege. The ships, with the battering train, were not even in sight, and it was necessary to unite the position that had been occupied with the shore: this was the work of most moment. Finding the enemy driven back, and one of his divisions engaged in an offensive movement, he resolved to push on and occupy the enemy's camp.

Having commanded the chief engineer, General Valazé, to open forthwith a road to Staouëli, and Baron Denniée to collect all his means of transport and send provisions thereto by this new road, he sent orders for the army to assume the offensive. The enemy gave way at the first shock and took to flight; the whole of their camp fell into the hands of the French. This second phase of the battle was not remarkable, for the Algerians made very little resistance. The loss on this day was fifty-seven dead and four hundred and seventy-five wounded on the side of the French; that of their opponents was estimated as ten times as large.

In five days the French had overcome the difficulties of the disembarkation, had repelled a general attack of the Algerian forces, had driven them back in disorder, and captured the whole of their camp. At two o'clock the fugitives brought

the news of the defeat to Algiers. The imaums, by their preaching, soon roused the population of the city from the dejection which this news had caused. During the night Fort Emperor (called by the Algerians Soultan Kalassi), on the south of the city, was armed and put in a state of defence, and a garrison of two thousand men was allotted to it. Some eighteen thousand or twenty thousand men under Mustapha, Bey of Titery, covered Algiers. This able chieftain determined to avoid a pitched battle, and satisfied himself by harassing the invaders by day and by night. The delay of the French after the battle of Staouëli reanimated the defenders.

General de Bourmont would not move forward till the siege ran no risk of being interrupted by a want of ammunition, and provisions for thirty days had been collected. He could not take full advantage of the victory of the 19th and follow the defeated troops to Algiers, because through the over-cautious action of Admiral Duperré the much-longed-for ships had first been kept back at Palma, and then been delayed by calms.

On the 24th of June the Algerians advanced in force along the whole front, but at the French headquarters it had been determined to assume the offensive, as soon as the attack had been defeated, and to make the enemy lose some miles of ground. That evening found the French in position on the Plateau Chapelle et Fontaine, so called on account

of the Mausoleum of Sidi-Abderrahman-Bou-Nega which lies in front of it. The Plateau overlooks the Oued-el-Call. It was at the conclusion of this fight that General de Bournmont was apprised that the convoy from Palma was in sight. Welcome was the news, and the following day the disembarkation commenced.

As the French advanced and got further away from the sea it became necessary to pay special attention to the lines of communication, for the wily Arab horsemen infested the rear of the army and strove to overpower small detachments and cut off convoys. The road from Sidi-Ferruch to Fort Emperor was one of the best in the country, and where it had been neglected it could be easily put into good order by a party of engineers. The distance from the landing-place to the Plateau Chapelle et Fontaine was not much more than thirteen miles, and, to afford all due protection along this route, notwithstanding that the convoys were strongly escorted, it became necessary to stud it with redoubts and block-houses; these were raised in succession, with an interval of one thousand mètres, and were armed with cannon taken from the enemy. Sidi-Kalef in rear of the two divisions formed a first point of support, Staouëli, further in rear, where the army headquarters were, formed a second point of support, and was occupied by a brigade and one regiment. One line regiment and fourteen hundred sailors held the base.

On the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th the French were exposed to an incessant fire and constant partial attacks; nothing, however, could be done until the disembarkation of the siege materials was completed. This only would enable them to assume the offensive.

No time was lost, the navy displayed great energy and unheard-of zeal. Every day from two o'clock in the morning till eight at night the boats towed heavily-ladened barges and deposited their contents on the beach, whose approaches were none too easy. The two last divisions of the convoy from Palma arrived in the bay of Sidi-Ferruch on the morning of the 25th of June; the landing of the horses on which the transport of the heavy siege-pieces depended commenced the same day. The swell from the west, a sign of the evening storm, rendered this operation very difficult. The navy appreciated so fully the necessity for hastening the operation that it went out to sea to meet the ships bearing the horses. All, fourteen hundred, were disembarked during the day; each barge brought twenty-five ashore. The swell increased every moment and made the towing extremely dangerous; for, beating as it did towards the coast, it drove the barges on to the boats that had them in tow. At five in the evening navigation was no longer possible, and the last barge with twenty-five horses on board had to be sacrificed as the only way of saving the rowers from certain death. At

seven that evening the wind suddenly veered to the west, and blew with great violence for three hours; the damage caused, nevertheless, was not so great as was expected.

On the two following days the disembarkation and transport from Sidi-Ferruch to Sidi-Kalef continued, and on the latter day Generals Valazé and Lahette were able to announce to the Commander-in-Chief that the artillery and engineers would be ready on the 28th.

At about 2.30 o'clock on the morning of the 29th the French moved from their camps; the Turks did not expect an attack. By five o'clock the enemy were flying in every direction, and the three French divisions occupied the positions originally assigned to them. An hour later by orders and counter orders the movements got confused; this arose from not knowing the exact position of Fort Emperor, though, as events proved, Boutin had located it in the right spot. The divisions on the flanks changed places, and this must have been a dangerous manœuvre. At last the Fort was approached, and that night the trenches were opened at six hundred metres from the enemy's works. The following day the batteries were constructed; there were five principal ones which were not completed under four days. In these four days the continual musketry fire of the Turks and Arabs caused the French two hundred casualties. The attacks of the Turks were principally directed on

the Saint Louis battery, the nearest one to the fort; they charged sabre in hand. On the 3rd of July the works were nearly completed.

Admiral Duperré had been invited to attack the Algerian batteries on the sea front. He at first demurred to let the fleet engage in a false attack, adducing that the war-ships were armed on a peace footing; nevertheless on the 1st of July Rear-admiral de Rosamel defiled before the Algerian batteries, returning their fire. Fire, however, was opened at too great a distance, and few shots hit the mark. This was repeated on the 3rd with no better result. The only casualties in the fleet were caused by the bursting of a 36-pounder, by which ten men were killed and fourteen wounded. This naval demonstration, for it never partook of the nature of an attack, did more harm than good, for its impotency emboldened the enemy. Possibly it was the slight damage done, and the silence the siege batteries had maintained up to that time, that led to a serious onset on the Dauphin battery on the night of the 3rd–4th of July.

At four a.m. on the 4th the batteries were unmasked, and ten 24-pounders, six 16-pounders, four 10-inch mortars, and six 8-inch howitzers, opened fire on Fort Emperor. The Turks replied with courage, and the fire continued on both sides for three hours. By eight a.m., the fire of the besieged having ceased, the French began making a breach. At ten o'clock a frightful explosion laid part of the

fort in ruins; the Turks had evacuated the place and fired the magazine. Prompt advantage was taken of this, three companies of the French rushed across the intervening ground and, entering by the breach, took possession of the fort.

At this moment the Arabs in large numbers fell upon the rear of the French army, and tried to sever the lines of communication. They also attacked the artillery and engineer depôts, and the bivouac of the 3rd division. It was a last effort, and, when the Arab horsemen beheld Soultan Kalassi in possession of their enemies, they rode away with loose reins.

At two p.m., Mustapha, the chief secretary of the Dey, presented himself to the Commander-in-Chief and asked for terms. The brave interpreter Bracevitz took them to the Dey, who in the course of the evening agreed to accept them. On the following forenoon the capitulation was signed, and the French occupied the forts. The Turkish troops marched out of the town, and fifteen hundred guns, seventeen ships-of-war, and a sum of 48,684,524 francs, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

By this expedition France acquired a colony not far from her shores, which now has an area of about two hundred and fifty thousand square miles; she moreover secured the safety of the trade in the Mediterranean. Though the preparations for this undertaking had been made with considerable care, the Government had miscalculated the amount of

resistance it was likely to meet with. After the Turks had been driven out of the country, the Kabyles and Bedouins considering themselves no longer under subjection, took up arms against the new rulers. Then commenced a series of petty struggles which continued down to the very close of Louis Philippe's reign.

The injudicious substitution of French laws and institutions for the Turkish regulations, some unjust confiscation of property, the desecration of mosques and burial grounds, irritated the population. The intense fanaticism of the tribes gave the war a religious character; Emir Abd-el-Kader, who ruled the Arabs in the province of Oran, and who, with a reputation for piety, possessed military talents of no mean order, gained an extraordinary ascendency over the various tribes, and for thirteen years boldly withstood the invaders. During this period France was compelled to increase her forces in Algeria, until at one time they reached a total of one hundred thousand men.

Algeria gave France some very distinguished soldiers, and at one time used to be considered a good training ground for her troops. General Trochu was, however, of opinion that this training was not consistent with the greater operations of war.* To fight when you have almost a moral certitude of beating the enemy must tend to dishearten the soldier when he has subsequently to

* "L'armée Française," en 1867, p. 204.

deal with a stubborn foe. Kinglake wrote, "The Arabs and Kabyles of Algeria, though men of a fierce and brave nature, and prone to petty strife, are so wanting in the power of making war with effect, that, as far as concerns the art of fighting, they can scarcely be said to have given much schooling to the bold and skilful soldiery of France." *

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 270.

CHAPTER XIX.

SCALING OF THE HEIGHTS ABOVE QUEBEC BY WOLFE.

Wolfe specially selected by Pitt to command—The Marquis of Montcalm—His services—Pitt's plan of operations—Amherst unable to effect a junction with Wolfe—France neglects to send reinforcements to Canada—Marshal de Belle Isle's letter to Montcalm—Wolfe's force—Montcalm's force—Wolfe's difficulties—He reconnoitres the heights of St. Michel—His former reconnaissance from the Isle of Aix—Evacuation of the camp at Montmorenci—Montcalm's dispositions—The plateau of Abraham—Vergor's carelessness—The British squadron made to drift up and down with the tide—Naval demonstration against Quebec—The troops take to the boats—Wolfe's last general order—He determines to take advantage of a convoy of provisions going from Cap Rouge to Quebec—Bougainville ceases to follow Holme's vessels—The forlorn hope surprises Vergor's post—The rest of the troops follow—Battle of the 13th of September—Death of Wolfe and Montcalm.

HISTORY affords many instances in which an artful commander was able to tire out his opponent, until, by taking advantage of a moment when his vigilance had somewhat relaxed, he was in a position to effect his purpose. A striking illustration of this occurred in the contest between Great Britain and France in Canada in 1759. Wolfe's plan for the capture of Quebec, embracing demonstrations by the fleet to distract the enemy's


DEFENCES OF QUEBEC
Batteries | Cannon. | Morts.
A. The Citadel ..... 9. 0.
B. The Clergy ou Barbette ..... 28. 5.
C. Sailors Leap ..... 7. 0.
D. The Hospital ..... 2. 0.
E. A New Battery over the Jetty pointed through Pickets ..... 2. 0.
F. Queen's Battery no Guns mounted 0. 0.
G. New Battery at the upper part of ye King's Yard ..... 3. 0.
H. New Battery at ye lower part of ye King's Yard ..... 2. 0.
I. Royal Battery ..... 20. 0.
K. Dauphin Battery ..... 20. 0.
L. M. } New Batteries ..... 13. 0.
Part of the Upper River of St Laurence.
British Leagues
A View of the ACTION gained by the ENGLISH near QUEBEC Sept 13 1759.
ENGLISH ENCAMPMENT
ARMY
St LAURENCE RIVER
FRENCH INCAMPMENT
Beauport
Les Ruines de Beauport a Shoal dry at Low Water
THE LITTLE R.
THE BASON
ADMIRAL SAUNDERS
FRIGATES
NORTH CHANNEL
ADMIRAL HOLMES DIVISION
RIVER St LAURENCE
DIVISION
MAJOR BARRE'S CAMP
ISLE OF ORLEANS
Part of the Transports at Anchor
An Authentic PLAN of the RIVER St LAURENCE, from Sillery to the Fall of Montmorenci; with the Operations of the SIEGE of QUEBEC, under the Command of Vice Adm.l Saunders & Major Gen.l Wolfe. 1759.
British Miles

attention, and a landing in boats, was a joint naval and military undertaking, and shows how with talent and determination the greatest difficulties can be overcome.

Wolfe, who had been specially selected by Pitt to command the British force advancing from Louisbourg, was not contending against a savage despot or a rude and inexperienced chief; he was opposed to a more worthy antagonist, the Marquis of Montcalm, an officer who possessed genius, activity, and singular powers of administration.

Louis Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm-Gozon de Saint Véran was born at the Chateau of Candiac, near Nîmes, on the 29th of February, 1712. At fifteen he joined the army in the regiment of Hainaut, with which he served for seventeen years as ensign, lieutenant, and captain. As colonel of the infantry regiment of Auxerrois he took part in the battle of Piacenza in 1746, in which he received three wounds and was made prisoner. Released on parole, he withdrew to Montpellier for his recovery; learning, after having been exchanged, that his regiment was advancing into Piedmont with de Belle-Isle, he quitted that town and hurried to place himself at the head of his corps. At the Col de l'Assiette he fought bravely and received two fresh wounds. Sent to Canada to replace Dieskau, who had been wounded and taken prisoner by Johnson at the battle of Lake George, he had quite recently given ample proofs of military talent in the

operations for the reduction of Fort William Henry, and, more so, in Abercrombie's repulse at Ticonderoga (*Fort Carillon*). Montcalm had a taste for books, and all his life cherished the ambition of becoming a member of the *Académie.*

The plan of operations drawn up by Pitt contemplated the advance of General Amherst—who had replaced the incapable Abercrombie—at the head of twelve thousand men, to the St. Lawrence, by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. Having attained the St. Lawrence, Amherst's forces were to unite with an army that Wolfe was bringing up the river from Louisbourg.* General Prideaux, with the troops which had captured Fort Duquesne, was to advance towards the lakes, occupy Niagara, descend the Ontario and the St. Lawrence, and join the two other armies at Montreal, where it was hoped to hem in and destroy the stubborn handful of French.

It was expected that the two principal forces would have been able to effect their junction about the month of August, after which they were to undertake operations against Quebec. Wolfe, however, received a message from Amherst, whose movements were hindered by Bourlamaque, who

* The first paragraph of Wolfe's Orders and Regulations reads as follows: "The object of the campaign is to complete the conquest of Canada, and to finish the war in America, the army under the commander-in-chief will enter into the colony on the side of Montreal, while the fleet and army attack the governor-general and his forces."

with two thousand six hundred men had been posted on Lake George and Lake Champlain, stating that, as circumstances prevented his carrying out the campaign agreed upon, he would have to rely entirely on his own resources. Alacrity was not one of Amherst's good qualities, and his want of enterprise in not coming to Wolfe's aid nearly caused the collapse of the operations. He was not opposed by a large force; and, had his nature so impelled him, he might have appeared on the St. Lawrence, as settled in the plan of campaign. His dilatoriness may be set down to a rooted determination not to leave anything to chance, and, certainly, looking at the difficult country he had to cross, he was not much to blame in this.

Whilst Pitt was making adequate preparations for driving the French out of Canada, the government of Louis XV. was so absorbed in the war with Germany that neither the Cabinet nor public opinion took any interest in the safety of New France. In the previous year, the colonists being constantly under arms, serving in the ranks of the militia, a considerable portion of the land was left untilled, and the rest was badly cultivated; the harvest had failed, and the prices of all articles had risen to an enormous extent.

Vaudreuil and Montcalm wrote and sent a special envoy to acquaint the Minister of War of the deplorable state of the colony, which was prone to succumb if France did not send help in the way

of soldiers and provisions. On the 19th of February, 1759, Marshal de Belle-Isle, the Minister of War, wrote to his friend, the Marquis of Montcalm, "I am very sorry to inform you that you must not expect to receive any additional troops. Besides that, these would increase the scarcity of provisions which you have already sadly experienced; it is to be feared that they would be intercepted by the English during transit, and as the king could never send you help proportionate to the forces which the English are able to oppose to you, the efforts that could be made here to provide them for you would have no other effect than to induce the cabinet of London to make others more considerable for maintaining the superiority which it has already acquired in that part of the continent." The Marshal was not far wrong, for early in May of that year Admiral Durell was sent with ten ships to the St. Lawrence, to intercept any reinforcements or supplies that might be coming from France.

Notwithstanding all that Canada had cost to France, it was carelessly left to itself. The governor and the general vainly begged for reinforcements, for provisions, for money; no help came from France. How true were Wolfe's words in his address to the Canadians, "France, in her weakness, leaves you to your fate." Famine was on the increase, misery reigned on every side, and the inhabitants of Quebec were reduced to siege rations. Montcalm's warning that, in default of some

unexpected stroke of good fortune, Canada would be lost in the campaign of 1759 remained unheeded.

Colonel de Bougainville, who had been despatched to France to explain to the government the real state of the colony, was back on the 10th of May with only three hundred and twenty-six recruits and eighteen ships loaded with provisions.* With this poor help he was the bearer of bad news, for he was just in time to warn Montcalm that the English expedition destined for the capture of Quebec was already on its way.

In a letter written from Louisbourg on the 19th of May, 1759, Wolfe gives a summary of his forces. "We are ordered to attack Quebec—a very nice operation. The fleet consists of twenty-two sail-of-the-line and many frigates, the army of nine thousand men, in England it is called twelve thousand."

The force was divided into three brigades, as follows:—

Brigadier-General Monckton.

Amherst	... ...	or 15th Foot
Kennedy	... ...	„ 43rd „
Anstruther	... ...	„ 58th „
Fraser	... ...	„ 78th Highlanders

Brigadier-General, the Hon. George Townshend.

Bragg	... ...	or 28th Foot
Lascelles	... ...	„ 47th „
Monckton	... ...	„ 2/60th „

* This small fleet, commanded by an officer named Kanon, was just able to evade Admiral Durell's intercepting squadron.

Brigadier-General Murray.

Otway	... ...	or 48th Foot
Webb	... ...	„ 35th „
Lawrence	... .	„ 3/60th „

Three companies of Louisbourg Grenadiers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Murray; three companies of Light Infantry, under Major Dalling; six companies of Rangers under Major Scott.

An excellent battalion commander as Wolfe had proved himself to be, could not fail to look after all the details of his army. The sickly men were ordered to be weeded out, the arms and clothing to be placed in the best state of repair, and none of those trifling matters which so affect the well-being and the efficiency of the troops were neglected. His little army, in fact, was good, and the battalions tried, so he sailed from Halifax with the comforting knowledge that he could thoroughly rely on his officers and men. To Pitt he wrote, "If valour can make amends for the want of numbers, we shall probably succeed."

The fleet was to sail from Louisbourg in three divisions.

The	first	brigade	in	the	white division
„	second	„	„	red	„
„	third	„	„	blue	„

In the orders issued at Halifax on the 30th of April was the following: "As the navigation in the river St. Lawrence may, in some places, be difficult, the troops are to be as useful as possible in working

the ships, obedient to the admiral's command, and attentive to all signals."

Parkman states that the force numbered somewhat less than nine thousand men. Knox sets it down at eight thousand six hundred men, all told inclusive of marines.

Ten battalions	6400 men
Grenadiers of Louisbourg	300 ,,
Artillery...	300 ,,
Rangers	400 ,,
Light Infantry	200 ,,
Marines	1000 ,,
	8600

Entick gives the effective men at seven thousand. Fraser shows the force to have been made up as follows :—

15th Amherst's	1500 men
28th Bragg's	550 ,,
35th Otway's	800 ,,
43rd Kennedy's	650 ,,
47th Lascelles'	500 ,,
48th Webb's	800 ,,
58th Anstruther's...	500 ,,
60th { 2nd Battalion / 3rd Battalion }	1000 ,
63rd Fraser's	1100 ,,
Grenadiers of the 22nd, 40th, and 45th regiments from Louisbourg ...	300 ,,
Artillery	300 ,,
Rangers	400 ,,
Light Infantry	200 ,,
Marines	1000 ,,
In gross supposed at most	8600 men

The actual strength of the battalions varied from five hundred to eleven hundred men. In his orders, issued on board the *Richmond* frigate, Wolfe speaks of Otway's, Webb's, and the Highland regiment, which are each in numbers equal to two battalions. With reference to the marines mentioned by Knox and Fraser, it does not appear from any of the principal narratives of the war that they were employed in any of the principal attacks on land. When spoken of in general orders they are shown as separate companies.

For the defence of the Canadian capital, Montcalm had collected five weak battalions of regular troops, every Canadian who could bear arms, and several tribes of Indians, in all 13,718 men. The number of troops at his disposal has generally been given at about 16,200 men, but the French official returns run thus: 1600 *hommes de troupes de terre*, 600 *hommes de troupes de la colonie*, 10,400 *Canadiens*, 918 *sauvages*, 200 *hommes de cavalerie;* total 13,718.

The Marquis of Montcalm sailed from Brest on the 3rd of April, 1756, in the *Licorne;* with him went a battalion of La Sarre and one of Royal Rossillon, in all 1189 men.* The convoy consisted of three ships-of-the-line, the *Léopard*, the *Héros*, and the *Illustre*, fitted out as transports; the frigates

* Baron Dieskau sailed for Quebec on the 3rd of May, 1755, with an expeditionary corps composed of the second battalions of Languedoc, Guyenne, Béarn, La Reine, Bourgogne, and Artois. The two latter were landed in the Isle Royale (Cape Breton) to undertake the defence of Louisbourg.

Licorne, *Sauvage*, and *Sirène*. At the opening of the war in 1756 the regular troops numbered as follows: La Reine, 327 men; La Sarre, 515; Royal Roussillon, 520; Guyenne, 492; Béarn, 498; Languédoc, 326; volunteers, 156; recruits, 918; total, 3752 men. With these there were 200 marines, some Canadian militia, and Indians.

The second battalion of the regiment of Berry left Lorient on the 25th of April, and reached Quebec on the 22nd of July, 1756.

When we try to arrive at the comparative value of the two forces, we are bound to admit that the advantage rested on the side of the British. The defenders were in greater numbers, but the largest portion of them were zealous patriots, not bound by the same discipline as obtains in regular forces, and easily disheartened by a long protracted defence. Montcalm having inferior troops, placed them under the shelter of earthworks. But if he had the superiority which a strong position confers, Wolfe had a better disciplined force—consisting almost entirely of regulars—and a fine fleet, mounting 1886 guns.

Whilst Montcalm had to hold fast to his position, the river was Wolfe's, and the option of operating above or below Quebec was an enormous pull. Wolfe had the mastery of the right shore, and by the aid of the fleet was able to occupy Montcalm's attention to harass him, and to deliver an attack on any part of his extended front.

The French had, under Captain Vauquelin of the *Atalanta*, a fleet of ten frigates and six armed vessels, with about a dozen trading ships of little importance, mounting in all three hundred guns. The destruction of the fleet in the harbour of Louisbourg was so recent that these ships had been sent up the river to be out of harm's way, a portion of the crews—about a thousand—nevertheless, had been landed to help in working the guns in the town batteries.

Whilst complete accord reigned between Wolfe and the British admirals, the civil and military chiefs in Canada did not agree. De Vaudreuil was Canadian born, and distrusted old France and all that came out of it; he was also disappointed, inasmuch as he had hoped to command the troops himself. An open rupture had occurred, and Montcalm, who was most upright in all his dealings, and could not abide de Vaudreuil's corrupt government, begged his recall. Nothing but a sense of duty made him remain at his post.

In Quebec every gate but one was closed and barricaded, and one hundred and six guns bristled on the ramparts. Chevalier de Ramezay commanded the garrison, which consisted of between twelve hundred and two thousand men. Protected on two sides by water, the city appeared in no danger; indeed, Bougainville, who had examined the position, had reported that by the help of intrenchments, easily and quickly made, and defended

by three or four thousand men it might be considered safe.

The ground above Quebec, a line of cliffs and steeps, seemed an almost impregnable barrier, where a few men could hold their ground against any odds. The country on the lower side of the city offered more facilities for a landing. Montcalm principally directed his attention to the line of wooded heights which stretch for nearly eight miles parallel to the shores of the St. Lawrence, from the St. Charles to the Montmorenci. The position had been made as strong as time and energy could make it, and fourteen thousand men occupied a long line of intrenchments, redoubts and batteries. This had been the work of four weeks. Some works of the same nature had been thrown up above the town as far as Cap Rouge, along the base of the cliffs.

To attack a position so strongly protected with half the number that defended it, was a difficult task; the original plan, however, contemplated the joint action of Amherst and Wolfe.

The opinion prevailed that no English ships without competent pilots would attempt to ascend the St. Lawrence. Quebec, therefore, might be considered unassailable by water. Admiral Durell, with ten ships, had been purposely sent in advance to the river in the month of May to prevent the construction of fortifications at the *Ile aux Coudes*, eighty miles below Quebec. Had the French fortified this locality it would have made the ascent

of the St. Lawrence even more difficult. The difficulty of pilots was overcome by displaying French colours. This ruse made the local navigators come on board the British ships with alacrity. Knox gives a description of the pilotage of the river, which, though dangerous, was not so dangerous as to deter British seamen.*

It was on the 26th of June that Saunders' ships anchored near the island of Orleans; the next day a storm swept over the river and did considerable damage to the shipping. Fortunately the tempest was of short duration. These first days of the operations revealed the great diversity of opinion which existed between Montcalm and the governor. The more sanguine Vaudreuil was all in favour of attacking the invaders on their landing; Montcalm, endowed with more prudence, was determined not to risk a battle, and to protract the defence, till approaching winter would force the enemy to withdraw.

The British had no sooner set foot on the isle of Orleans, than the French on the night of the 28th sent a fleet of fire-ships down the St. Lawrence, with the object of destroying their fleet and doing what the storm had not accomplished. Some of the largest of Kanon's ships were used in this enterprise, the direction of which was assigned to Mons. Delouche, a naval officer. Montcalm put no trust in this formidable engine of destruction,

* Captain Knox, "Campaigns in America," vol. i. p. 289.

which had cost a million of livres; but Vaudreuil strongly urged the attempt. It was made in a moonless and dark night, Delouche setting out at ten p.m. The governor was doomed to be disappointed, for the attempt failed; the ships were set on fire too soon, and their strength was spent before they could reach the British vessels.

The St. Lawrence in the vicinity of Quebec narrows, and is less than a mile from shore to shore; opposite the city are the heights of Point Levi. Wolfe determined to seize this position, which would give him the command of the basin of Quebec, and from which he could open fire on the city. The place was occupied on the 29th and 30th by Monckton's brigade. Montcalm, who had not overlooked the importance of the place as commanding the entrance to the upper waters of the river, wished to assign an adequate number of troops for its protection; Vaudreuil, however, scorned the idea that the British could plant batteries there to injure Quebec. Events soon showed who was right, for Wolfe had no sooner completed his batteries, than the citizens, alarmed for their homes, begged the governor to allow them to cross the river to surprise the British garrison. A party of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred armed burghers, Canadians, and volunteers from the regular troops, under Dumas, an experienced officer, crossed at Sillery above the town on the night of the 12th of July; but, when yet some

miles from the enemy, they became nervous, fired on each other, and, seized by a panic, made for their canoes in great haste and confusion, and retired to Quebec. The British batteries opened fire, the gunners soon got the range and destroyed most of the lower town. The bombardment, which lasted sixty-three days, must have been very severe, for in the King's maps at the British Museum there are a number of views of the town of Quebec, taken after the siege, which show the churches, public and private buildings, in a complete state of ruin.

At a later date, one of the reasons for desiring to capitulate was to "preserve the little which had escaped fire," and Murray, speaking of the three regiments which marched into Quebec on the 19th of September, says they occupied "the ruins of it."

However much Wolfe longed to fight, Montcalm gave him no opportunity. No effort could draw the latter from his long line of inaccessible cliffs which border the river St. Lawrence above and below Quebec. The British commander's first attempt was to attack the French if possible in flank or rear, by crossing the Montmorenci by some ford. To carry this into effect, towards evening on the 8th of July, three thousand men were taken to the left bank of the river and landed before daybreak the following day. Whilst the main body fortified itself on the plateau above the landing-place, a company of rangers was sent up the Montmorenci to look for a ford.

Wolfe's divided forces were in a dangerous position; but the French remained inactive, and many of the Canadians deserted. In the interval, on the 18th, at night, the *Sutherland* with some frigates sailed up the river beyond the town, and boats were sent overland to Point Levi, launched above the basin, and prepared to take troops on board—a move which compelled Montcalm to weaken his forces below Quebec to protect the approaches on the west.

On the 28th, the French made a second attempt to set the British fleet on fire by means of rafts, boats, and schooners; this failed, owing to the gallantry of the sailors, who grappled them before they could get down about a third part of the basin, and towed them safely to shore.

On the 31st of July, Wolfe attacked de Lévis's camp at the Montmorenci. Thirteen companies of grenadiers, and a detachment of the Royal Americans came over in boats, and two battalions of Monckton's brigade, Amherst and the Highlanders. A column of two thousand men was to join them from the Montmorenci camp. The parties which crossed in boats made a premature attack, the grenadiers dashed forward without orders, and were repulsed with heavy loss. A fearful storm of rain clashed with the contest, and Wolfe, seeing the impossibility of continuing in the attempt, ordered a retreat. This attack cost the British a loss of four hundred and forty-three killed, wounded, and missing.

This failure and loss of life deeply moved Wolfe, who rebuked the grenadiers for their impetuous and unsoldierly behaviour. It is said that he desponded of being able to carry the enterprise through with such a small number of troops. He then began to lay waste the settlement, trusting that Montcalm would issue forth to prevent it; but his opponent let the farmhouses burn, and kept his troops within the Beauport lines.

In general orders, Wolfe reminded his soldiers that, "next to valour, the best qualities in a military man are vigilance and caution." The truth of these words was amply proved by the conduct of his adversary. An enemy, difficult to force to battle, commanded by a wary chief, who put nothing to risk, was, however, not all that the young general had to contend against. Wolfe never enjoyed health such as is necessary for a man in his position. Constitutionally weak, in fact, consumptive, his health was undermined by a chronic complication of gravel and rheumatism, which was aggravated by his restless energy. Always moving from camp to camp, observing everything, and directing everything, Wolfe was soon prostrated by sickness.

For six weeks he saw his men wasting away in inactivity, and himself in the power of an incurable disease. He was, nevertheless, consumed by an ardent longing to accomplish the task assigned to him, and in this he was determined to succeed before winter should compel the fleet to quit the

river. The spirit of the man triumphed over the sufferings of the body.

Amherst's want of enterprise in not coming to Wolfe's aid has never been satisfactorily explained. Kingsford attributes a bad motive to it, and writes: "There is scarcely an instance in history where an expedition, undertaken in accord with a settled plan of operations, was left so unaided as that of Wolfe. The secret of the inactivity of Amherst can only be attributed to his belief that Wolfe would fail in his enterprise." We are inclined to think that the right solution lies in the extreme cautiousness of Amherst's character, for it is hard to believe that the general, to whom the entire operations in Canada had been intrusted, could, from any personal motive, desire to witness the failure of one of his lieutenants. In his journal, de Lévis describes how Amherst was peaceably rebuilding the works which the French had blown up at Saint Frederick (Crown Point, at the southern end of Lake Champlain), and believes that he entertained no intention of advancing any further that season. His supposition was right.

There was no hope of aid from Amherst, and every plan which Wolfe devised appeared equally desperate. The one of scaling the heights of St. Michael was, nevertheless, the most advantageous, inasmuch as an army in position there would have entirely cut off Montcalm from his base of supplies. Wolfe had personally reconnoitred the river and the shores with more than ordinary care; then, landing

on the right bank, and looking across the water with a telescope, he descried a path that ran with a long slope up the face of the woody precipice, and, by the small number of tents at the top, he assumed that the guard could not be numerous. His mind was soon made up; a small party must follow this path, overcome the guard at the top, and open a way for his troops. Audacious as this plan was, it was worthy of the intrepid leader who conceived it.

In Wythe's memoirs of Major Robert Stobo, he gives him credit for having suggested this plan to Wolfe. It may be so, for during his captivity in Quebec, not always in close custody, the major had many opportunities for acquiring a personal knowledge of the neighbourhood. The author's words are, "he pointed out the place to land, where afterwards they did, and were successful." Nevertheless, on the 10th of September, Wolfe himself, with Holmes, Monckton, and Townshend, surveyed the locality from a rising ground below the Etchemin river. Wolfe was always diligent and painstaking, and it is related of him that in the expedition to Rochefort he solicited leave to reconnoitre the coast, landed on the Isle of Aix soon after its surrender, from whence he soon returned to inform his general that the most favourable place for landing the troops was near to the low point of Chattelaiellon. The failure of that undertaking he summarized in these words: "We lost the lucky moment in war, and are not able to recover it."

The lateness of the season, which necessitated the withdrawal of the fleet, demanded that what was to be attempted should be done quickly. According to two writers on the French side, it was only by assuring the admiral that he had found a spot where there was a prospect of being able to scale the heights, that Wolfe succeeded in persuading the naval commander to delay the departure of the fleet.

Parkman relates a story of a council held on board the British flagship, on the 10th of September, in which the commanders resolved that the lateness of the season required the fleet to leave Quebec without delay. He quotes his authorities for this statement which, strangely enough, is not corroborated or denied by any one on the British side, though the council must have been well attended. That Admiral Saunders may have been disquieted on account of the coming winter is probable enough; still, if there is any truth in the story, he appears, from subsequent events, to have been somewhat premature in urging the departure of the fleet, for it was past the middle of October when the fleet actually sailed down the St. Lawrence, Quebec having capitulated on the 17th of the previous month.

Wolfe's reply to a taunting message from the enemy, "I will have Quebec if I stay here till the end of November," seems to indicate that there was not much need for considering the question of quitting the river in the early part of September.

One of the two authorities quoted by Parkman is Chevalier Johnstone, and the above statement appears in a pamphlet, entitled "A Dialogue in Hades between Montcalm and Wolfe. A narrative of the siege and operations before Quebec in 1759 —attributed to the Chevalier Johnstone, A.D.C. to General Levi." The passage runs thus:—"In all expeditions composed of sea and land forces, it seldom fails that disputes, animosities, jealousies, and quarrels arise between the different commanders equal in authority; and it is a miracle if you see the admiral and the general unanimously of the same opinion with regard to operations. The sea and the land service are sciences whose principles are entirely different; as certainly there can be no analogy between the working of a ship and the drill of a regiment. Nevertheless, the admiral meddles continually with the land operations, and the general will have fleets do things that are impossible—both of them equally ignorant of each other's service; from whence results a clashing discord in their operations, when sent out with equal power. If each of them would confine himself to that part of the art of war which he has studied, and have only in his soul the good and welfare of his king and country, these mixed expeditions of land and sea would succeed much better than they do . . . The naval officers tormented me a great deal, and were still more troublesome as the season advanced. They had a council of war on board

the flagship on the 10th of September, when it was determined to set sail immediately for Europe, seeing the imminent dangers to which His Majesty's fleet would be exposed in the tempestuous seas by remaining longer before Quebec; and in consequence of this decision, orders were given to some men-of-war to take up their anchors and fall down the river, while orders were issued at the same time to begin the general preparations for the immediate departure of the fleet."

Is it at all probable that officers who only two and a half months before, had dared to sail up a river difficult of navigation with pressed pilots, would have been in such a mortal fear of tempestuous weather, as to make them anxious to be off before their task was fully accomplished? No, we have a better opinion of our navy than to believe such a very improbable story.

Nevertheless, Wolfe knew well enough that he had only a few weeks left in which to achieve his purpose, for he writes:—"Beyond the month of September, I conclude our operations cannot go." The only hope of the defenders was to prolong the resistance until, at the latest, the middle of October, when the British ships could no longer remain in safety before the town.

To carry his plan into effect, Wolfe had to evacuate the camp at Montmorenci, and to embark his troops in the vessels of Admiral Holmes's squadron, which lay at anchor in the St. Lawrence above

the town. This was accomplished by the 5th of September. The breaking up of the camp, the re-embarkation of the British forces, with the advancement of the season raised fresh hopes in the French camp. These were all taken as indications of an imminent departure of the fleet.

Notwithstanding that the heights above the town were considered impassable—for, according to Parkman, every point above the city where a wild cat could climb the precipices was watched and guarded—Wolfe's bold character was so well known that it was not expected that he would quit the St. Lawrence without delivering another attack, which the French anticipated would be directed to a spot on the town side of the St. Charles, known as the Canardière.

As became a careful commander, Montcalm took every precaution to prevent a landing. Bougainville, with three thousand men, was enjoined to watch the river bank from Cap Rouge, six miles above Sillery, where he had his head-quarters, to Jacques-Cartier, and to follow every movement of Holmes's squadron. Sillery, under the Chevalier de Rumigny of "La Sarre," was occupied by a hundred and thirty men with cannon, and seventy men with four guns were posted further down at Samos, under Mons. Duglas of "Languedoc." Vergor, with the colony troops, was in charge of the Anse du Foulon, a mile and a half from Quebec. The regular battalion of Guienne was

ordered to encamp on the plateau of Abraham to afford him support.

The plateau of Abraham is a narrow plain which lies between the rivers St. Charles and St. Lawrence. On the side of the latter it is bound by perpendicular cliffs two hundred feet high. At the extremity of this plateau stands the upper town of Quebec with fort St. Louis and a bastioned front, whose flanks rest on the two rivers. The lower town of Quebec occupies a small space at the foot of the plateau between the St. Charles and Cape Diamond.

Heedful as Montcalm had been in making his dispositions, he committed a serious error in entrusting the defence of an important post to Vergor, whose previous conduct had been blamable. Not long before he had been tried for cowardice in the surrender of Beauséjour, only escaping punishment through the protection of De Vaudreuil, the governor, who did not allow any unfavourable evidence to be produced at the trial. In this instance, Vergor had permitted most of his men to go to their homes to work at the harvesting. Then the order for the battalion of Guienne to take post on the plain of Abraham had not been complied with; for some reason which has never been explained, that corps still remained on the left bank of the St. Charles. On the 4th it had marched from Beauport to Sillery, to protect the river line above Quebec. It had only been there twenty-four hours when it was recalled.

There must have been something more than a mischance, for the extent of the defences was not so great that the fact of the order being disregarded could have escaped the attention of Montcalm or of his staff officers.

It is surprising that the ground immediately beyond the city of Quebec should have been left so unprotected, when we bear in mind the straitened communications between it and the camp at Beauport. These lay athwart a single bridge of boats which spanned the St. Charles, the crossing of which must have delayed the arrival of reinforcements.

The French being on the alert, it became necessary to impose on de Bougainville. With this object, Holmes's squadron was for several consecutive days made to drift up the St. Lawrence with the flood tide and down with the ebb, passing continuously between Cap Rouge and Quebec. De Bougainville always expecting an attack, moved along the heights and followed the ships to and fro by day and by night. His soldiers were soon exhausted by these constant forced marches, and Wolfe attained the desired object, when that officer ceased to keep up with the movements of the British fleet. De Bougainville, moreover, expected that the attack would be delivered either at Cap Rouge or at some point between that and Point aux Trembles, and had cast aside all probability of an attempt lower down.

The forces above the town having been wearied into inactivity, it was decided to rivet Montcalm's attention to the ground below Quebec by a threatening demonstration. To this effect Admiral Saunders, on the evening of the 12th of September, ranged his fleet along the Beauport shore, made a great display of preparations, lowered and filled his boats with sailors and marines, and opened fire on the beach to clear a way for the assailants. Montcalm, who did not believe that the greater portion of the British force was above the city, was induced into error, and massed his troops in front of Beauport, ready to contest the landing.

Holmes's fleet lay silent at its anchorage below Cap Rouge. Thirty flat-bottomed boats with some boats of the squadron lay moored alongside of the vessels, and at about nine o'clock in the evening, when it was pretty near high water, the troops were ordered to get into them.*

The boats with the troops on board were ordered to rendezvous abreast of the *Sutherland*, between her and the shore. Captain Chads, R.N., had the direction of their movement, and no one was allowed to interfere with him, "lest (as the boats move at night) there be confusion and disorder amongst them." Bougainville looked on these preparations as indications of an attack, and to confirm him in this idea, the boats were allowed to drift a little distance up the river, as the tide was still flowing.

* General orders of the 11th of September.

Wolfe had that day issued the following—his last—general order :—

"*Sutherland*, at anchor off St. Nicholas, September 12.—The enemy's forces are now divided, great scarcity of provisions in their camp, and universal discontent amongst the Canadians; the second officer in command has gone to Montreal or St. John's,* which gives reason to think that General Amherst is advancing into that colony; a vigorous blow struck by the army at this juncture may determine the fate of Canada; our troops below are ready to join us; all the light artillery and tools are embarked at the Point of Levi, and the troops will land where the enemy seems least to expect it.

"The first body that gets ashore is to march directly to the enemy, and drive them off any little posts they may occupy.

"The officers must be careful that the succeeding bodies do not by any mistake fire upon those who go before them.

"The battalions must form upon the upper ground with expedition, and be ready to charge whatever presents itself.

"When the artillery and troops are landed, a corps is to be left to secure the landing-place, while the rest march on, and endeavour to bring the French and Canadians to battle.

* De Lévis, with twelve hundred men, sent by the Governor-General to attack Amherst, after the failure of Wolfe's attack on the lines of Beauport on the 31st of July.

"The officers and men will remember what their country expects from them, and what a determined body of soldiers are capable of doing against five weak battalions mingled with a disorderly peasantry.

"The soldiers must be attentive to their officers, and resolute in the execution of their duty."

Montcalm depended on the supplies which could be brought down the St. Lawrence from Three Rivers and Montreal. The obstacles to such supplies reaching Quebec were many, and such were the difficulties of transport by land that the French were compelled to forward them by boats from Cap Rouge to Beauport; the boats drifting in the dark between the left bank of the river and the British ships. Wolfe being aware of this practice, determined to take advantage of it, and expecting that a convoy of provisions would be sent down from Cap Rouge with the ebb tide, resolved that the attacking party should go in advance of it.

Towards two o'clock a.m. the tide begun to ebb, and the signal to cast off (two lights in the main-top-mast shrouds, one over the other) was made from the *Sutherland*. The night was sufficiently dark to favour the enterprise. For two hours the boats, without sail or oars, glided silently down the St. Lawrence with the tide; in the foremost were twenty-four volunteers from Howe's Light Infantry, who were to lead the assault. The thirty large bateaux, with some boats of the squadron, held about seventeen hundred men; at some distance

in rear of them followed a few ships carrying troops. These were:—

The *Leostoff*	with	300	of Amherst's.
The *Squirrel*	„	240	Louisbourg grenadiers.
The *Race Horse*	„	250	Highlanders.
Three armed vessels	„	200	Light infantry.
The *Lovel* transport	„	400	Royal Americans.
The *Adventure*	„	400	of Otway's.

The ordnance vessels with tools and artillerymen. Total, 1910.

The troops were in light marching order, for the orders ran as follows:—"Arms, ammunition, and two days' provisions is all the soldiers are to take into the boats; the ships, with the blankets, tents, necessaries, etc., will soon be up."

When Bougainville saw the British vessels drift down stream—as they followed the boats—believing that they would return as usual with the flood tide, he abstained from following them with his wearied troops.

Intimation had been sent to the various posts along the heights of the coming convoy of provisions. Its departure was countermanded, but of this no notice was given to the sentries. As the boats were borne past the shore, two sentries challenged; but, being assured by an officer who spoke French fluently that they conveyed provisions to Beauport, they were allowed to continue on their way.

The scaling of the heights has scarcely a parallel

in war. Montcalm believed that it could not be accomplished, and had assured Vaudreuil that a hundred men posted where Wolfe came up would stop the whole of his army. Even in modern times many of the greatest victories of the British army have been gained when circumstances looked at their worst. Success in this instance was the result of various fortuitous circumstances, not the least of which was the absence of a post or sentry at the Anse du Foulon.

It was an hour before daybreak when the gallant little band began scrambling up the cliffs, nothing better than a precipice of about two hundred and fifty feet, very steep and covered with wood and brush. The twenty-four volunteers lost no time, and on reaching the summit surprised Vergor and his men. The Canadians, who were looking for an approach by the path, were not prepared for them, and unaccustomed to hand-to-hand fighting, were either captured or put to flight.

As Wolfe, from the landing-place, caught the sounds of musket-shots and cheering, he gave the word to the troops to land; these leapt on shore, and clambered up the heights, some here, some there, clutching at trees and bushes. The slanting, narrow path on the face of the cliff had been obstructed by trenches and abatis; these impediments were promptly cleared aside, and thus the way was made easy for those who followed. As the boats were emptied, they returned for the troops

still on board ship, and for those waiting on the southern shore under Colonel Burton, about twelve hundred in number.

Colonel Malcolm Fraser, who served as a lieutenant in the Highlanders, writes in his account: "A little before four in the morning, we were fired at by a French battery, about two miles above the town." This was a four-gun battery, which Howe was ordered to capture. The same eye-witness of the events states: "We were fired on in the boats by the enemy, who killed and wounded a few." Other accounts corroborate this, and relate how the French sentries on the banks, on the alarm spreading, fired on some of the boats.

The most difficult part of the enterprise had been accomplished. Wolfe, nevertheless, had not too many men. The state on that day shows that he had a total of 4395 men; but, as the 3rd battalion Royal Americans, 543 strong, was left to guard the landing-place, not more than 3852 remained to draw up for battle. The French, as is always the case in a surprise, were bewildered, and had not a very clear idea of what was best to be done. At first Montcalm, who had spent a troubled night through the threatening attitude of Saunders' false attack on the Beauport shore, refused to credit the report that the English had obtained a footing on the heights above Quebec. "It can be but a small party, come to burn a few houses and retire," he exclaimed. However, soon seeing that the business was serious,

he gave orders for the whole garrison to follow him across the bridge of boats over the St. Charles, whilst a courier was sent to bid de Bougainville hasten to the scene of battle.*

The breadth of the plain, between the St. Lawrence and the St. Charles rivers, was too great to be occupied by the British forces, and two battalions on Wolfe's left had to be wheeled back so as to front the St. Charles. Colonel Howe's battalion of light infantry was detached and posted in a wood, to meet any possible attack de Bougainville might make on the rear.

At no other moment were the evils of divided authority more apparent. Montcalm saw where the real danger threatened above Quebec, but Vaudreuil still believed that the attack would be made on the Beauport shore. The forces opposed to Wolfe, according to French accounts, were equal or inferior to his own ; but, after comparing the different writers and dissecting their conflicting statements, we are led to accept Knox's estimate, which, he states, was corroborated by the evidence of a French officer. Independent of de Bougainville, he reckons them at about 7440, of which 1940 were regulars. They should have been more, but Montcalm's orders for the troops to follow him to the Plains of Abraham were not fully obeyed. It was said that a portion of the combatants were detained by the governor.

* De Bougainville was no further from the Plains of Abraham than was Montcalm at Beauport.

No aid could be got from the garrison of Quebec. De Ramezay — the commandant of the city — who was asked by Montcalm for twenty-five field-pieces, which were in the Palace battery, would only send him three; the rest, he alleged, were wanted for his own defence. Evidently an attack on the ground west of the town was not contemplated in the scheme of defence; nothing was prepared for it, and, when the crisis came, there were orders and counter-orders, misunderstandings and perplexity.

By seven o'clock a.m., Montcalm had formed a line-of-battle, and the three field-pieces sent by de Ramezay opened with round and canister shot. A most harassing fire was also kept up by a body of Indians and Canadians, concealed in the corn and in a coppice opposite the British right-wing and centre. Opposite their left, the enemy's sharp-shooters had concealed themselves amongst thickets and behind buildings, and gave much trouble. Skirmishers had to be thrown out in front of the British line to keep the enemy's marksmen in check, and orders were given for the soldiers to lie down to avoid the shot. At about nine, the two armies moved closer to each other, and de Bougainville attacked a house where the light infantry were posted. Montcalm has been blamed for not having concerted a combined attack in front and rear with that officer. The part Bougainville took in the battle has never been clearly shown. Captain Knox, who was present, relates: "Monsieur de

Bougainville, with his troops from Cap Rouge, came down to attack the flank of our second line, hoping to penetrate there; but, by a masterly disposition of Townshend, they were forced to desist." He apparently sought to break the left flank and reach Montcalm; in any case, his attack was of little consequence on the fate of the day.

As the men were full of ardour, Montcalm resolved not to delay the attack. He judged that there was no time to lose, for Wolfe might be reinforced, or might fortify his position. At any cost he felt himself compelled to brush the invaders aside, for the French army and the population were dependent on what supplies came from the upper St. Lawrence, and these Wolfe was now in a position to cut off. It has been held that, as he had everything to gain by delay, he should have retreated within the walls of Quebec, and compelled Wolfe to break ground and establish batteries, at a time of the year which was too advanced for a siege. But with a great scarcity of provisions, it was very evident that the city would not be able to hold out many days. The soldier preferred the hazard of a battle.

At ten o'clock the final struggle occurred. Without much order, and with loud shouting the French advanced to the attack in three columns, regulars in the centre, regulars and Canadians on the right and on the left. As soon as they came within range they commenced to fire. The two field-

pieces which Wolfe had brought up opened on the advancing columns with grape, and the British troops rising from the ground, prepared to receive them.

The British infantry displayed the greatest intrepidity and steadiness. When the French had reached a spot forty paces from them, a well-directed volley checked their advance and threw them into disorder. Regular and well-timed volleys were followed by a clattering fire, which had not lasted above a few minutes when the order to charge was given. The French fled and were pursued almost to the gates of Quebec, the pursuit only ceasing as the British came under the fire of two hulks and of a gun mounted on the ramparts. It was in charging with the Louisbourg Grenadiers on the right that Wolfe received his wounds.

Though Montcalm and de Sénezergue displayed great gallantry and capacity, de Lévis, Bigot, de Ramezay, and others all concur in stating that the French made a very feeble résistance, and soon abandoned the battlefield. They evidently appear to have been more or less astounded and demoralized by the audacity and persistence of their adversaries. Some regiments of militia under cover on either side, held out the longest. On the left the Canadian marksmen held obstinately to their ambuscade, and their fire caused considerable loss.

The following tribute to the valour of the troops opposed to him has been put in the mouth of the

unfortunate Montcalm. "Since it is my misfortune to be discomfited and mortally wounded, it is a great consolation to me, to have been vanquished by so brave an enemy. If I could survive, I would engage to beat three times the number of such forces as mine were, with a third of British troops." If it were true, this would tend to corroborate the evidence given above; but, however much these words would do honour to such an upright soldier as was the brave Montcalm, he was a zealous patriot, and as such we cannot believe that he ever uttered them.

In the memorable battle of the 13th of September both commanders displayed great energy, braving danger and inspiriting their troops by their noble example. Both sealed with their life their devotion to their country; neither could have desired a more worthy antagonist. Wolfe died content when he beheld his plan carried to a successful termination; Montcalm went to his rest happy that he had been spared seeing the British flag flying over the fortifications of Quebec. It was fitting for a gallant soldier, who had spent most of his years on battlefields, to find a last resting-place on earth in the crater hollowed out by one of the enemy's shells.*

Both Wolfe and Montcalm had done their duty,

* When they came to bury the marquis, they made use of a hollow which had been made by the bursting of a shell in front of the high altar in the church of Ursulines.

and what greater satisfaction can there be for a mortal than the consciousness of having honestly performed one's allotted task? Is there any flattery, honour, or reward which can in any way compare with this?

When Lord Dalhousie was governor of Canada, he erected to their memory in the governor's garden, overlooking the St. Lawrence at Quebec, an obelisk sixty-five feet high. Two simple names —WOLFE, MONTCALM—engraved on it, recall the deeds of two brave and devoted soldiers. The base bears the following inscription: "*Mortem virtus, communem famam historia, monumentum posteritas dedit.*" Their courage gave them death, history equal glory, posterity this monument.

1759 was a glorious year for Great Britain! She had never known a year so full of triumphs. At Lagos, at Quiberon, at Minden, at Quebec her fleets and her armies won renown. It was this succession of fortunate events that made Horace Walpole say, "We must ask every morning what new victory there is."

CHAPTER XX.

UTTER COLLAPSE OF AN EXPEDITION THROUGH A TEMPEST AT SEA.

Haroudj and Khaïr-el-Dinn—Haroudj becomes king of Algiers—He is defeated by the Marquis de Comarès—Khaïr-el-Dinn succeeds Haroudj as king of Algiers—Places his dominions under the protection of the Grand Seigneur—Khaïr-el-Dinn captures Tunis, from which he is driven out by Charles V. —Hassan Aga, ruler of Algeria in 1541—His depredations spread terror in Spain—Charles V. is entreated by his subjects to reduce Algiers—Forces collected for the enterprise—The Emperor refuses to listen to the advice of Andrea Doria—The expedition exposed to a severe storm after setting sail—Unopposed landing of the army—A tempest arises two days after the disembarkation—The Spaniards attacked by Hassan Aga—Continuance of the tempest; all prospect of success lost—Charles V. hears from Doria that a portion of the fleet is safe at Cape Matifu—Hardships endured by the troops on the march thither—They reach Matifu and re-embark—The Emperor's gallant bearing in this sequence of disasters.

In Chapter XI. we have seen what risk the British armies, in the early days of the Peninsular and Crimean wars, ran of being separated from their floating base, the fleet. Had stormy weather compelled the ships to heave anchor and get away from the coast, the supply of those armies would

have been very precarious. The full meaning of such a disaster will be appreciated by looking at the dire discomfiture of the expedition which the Emperor Charles V. led against Algiers in 1541.

Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, the Turks begun to lay the foundation of their establishment on the northern shores of Africa; and the history of Algeria is bound up in that of two of the most terrible pirates that have ever sailed on the seas.

According to tradition, Haroudj and Khaïr-el-Dinn were the sons of a potter of Mitylene, a town on the island of Lesbos. These brothers are known to fame as Barbarossa. The name is held to have been given them by reason of the red tinge of Haroudj's beard; others suppose, with better reason, that it came from the Arab words Baba-Haroudj, badly pronounced by Europeans. They abandoned their father's humble calling to become pirates; and having, to start with, through treachery and murder, acquired possession of a brigantine, they soon got together a fleet of twelve galleys with other small vessels. The terror of their name soon spread from the Dardanelles to the Straits of Gibraltar.

From having often conducted his prizes into the ports of Barbary, Haroudj recognized all the advantages which an establishment on that coast would give him. A check before Bougie compelled him to accept an asylum from Ben-el-Kady at Gigel; but his name was popular all over the coast

of Barbary, and not long after Eutemi, the ruler of Algiers, solicited his assistance to drive the Spaniards from the fort of Pegnon, which they had constructed to overawe the town.

Haroudj seized this favourable opportunity, armed a few ships and sailed for Algiers. There, under pretext of carrying out the siege of Pegnon, he assembled around him a host of Turks. Eutemi soon discovered that he had invited to Algiers a most dangerous auxiliary; it was, however, too late, the unscrupulous outlaw had him strangled, and caused himself to be proclaimed king in his place. Constantly at war with the neighbouring tribes and with the towns on the coast, he triumphed over the first and captured the latter, sometimes by force, sometimes by treason.

Haroudj continued to infest the coasts of Spain and Italy with his fleets, which more resembled the squadrons of a mighty monarch than the petty flotillas of a corsair. Charles V. sent don Diego Fernandez de Cordova, Governor of Oran, to attack him, and in 1518 he was besieged in the citadel of Tlemcen by the Spaniards and Arabs. The Turkish troops sent by his brother to help him were surprised and exterminated. After a stout defence, Haroudj escaped through a badly guarded breach, but was followed and overtaken near the River Ouchda, when, after a desperate resistance, he was mortally wounded by a Spanish officer, Garcia Fernandez de la Plaza, and soon killed.

Khaïr-el-Dinn succeeded his brother as king of Algiers. Seeing with what great reluctance the Moors and Arabs submitted to his rule, and fearing lest his constant acts of piracy might turn the arms of the Christian Powers against him, with singular cunning he placed his States under the protection of Sultan Suleiman II. He was able to persuade the Grand Seigneur that the capture of Pegnon would be a considerable gain for Islamism, which in a free Algiers would have a powerful offensive and defensive position against Christendom. Suleiman sent him two thousand well-disciplined Turkish soldiers, and issued a firman inviting men of good will to embark at the expense of the State, promising them in Algeria an organization similar to that of the Janizaries. After the collapse of De Moncada's expedition in 1518,* he declared Khaïr-el-Dinn's possessions a Turkish province, authorizing him at the same time to coin money.

The capture of the rich province of Tlemcen,

* Charles V., informed of the success of his arms over Haroudj at Tlemcen, directed Hugo de Moncada, viceroy of Sicily, to drive the Turks from Barbary. In the month of August, 1518, a fleet carrying seven thousand soldiers cast anchor in the Bay of Algiers. General Marino de Ribera, instead of disembarking the whole of his forces, put fifteen hundred men ashore, and having taken post on the high ground to the south-west of the city, waited for the promised co-operation of the chief of Tlemcen. While so waiting, on the 24th of August, a frightful tempest arose, most of the Spanish ships were cast ashore, and four thousand men were drowned. The troops on land had the greatest difficulty in re-embarking in the few ships which had providentially resisted the fury of the storm.

and this increased renown, soon made him enemies; Khaïr-el-Dinn consequently quitted Algiers with twelve galleys, and for three years resumed the life of a pirate. These years proved of the greatest embarrassment to European commerce, and were calamitous for the populations of the Mediterranean coast. At the end of this period, aided by the pirates of the island of Gelves, Khaïr-el-Dinn took vengeance over his enemies; defeated Hamel-ben-el-Kady, who had taken possession of Algiers, and soon after wrested the citadel of Pegnon from the Spaniards.

Piracy became no longer a scourge for trade alone, but a military power. The most renowned of the pirates of the island of Gelves flocked to Algiers, and one Cacchi Diablo vanquished and captured the leader of the Spanish galleys, Rodrigo Portondo, with eight of his galleys. An expedition to Cadiz with sixty ships, amongst which were ten galleys, was contemplated; but it failed, for as Doria approached Shershel, Ali-Camaran, who commanded a division of the fleet, sunk his ships.

Khaïr-el-Dinn having been appointed commander of the Sultan's fleets, with very extended powers, ravaged the Italian littoral and Sicily, pillaging, burning, and carrying the inhabitants into captivity. He then made for Tunis, which he captured through cunning and violence, proclaiming the Sultan as its ruler. Christendom

became alarmed at the news of his success, terror reigned in Italy, in Sicily, along the shores of Spain, at Malta, and at Rhodes. It was then that Charles V., having gathered a fleet of four hundred sail—ninety of which were war galleys—twenty-five thousand infantry, all tried soldiers, and two thousand horsemen, drove him out of Tunis.* The daring corsair was not tamed, and though with difficulty he made good his retreat to Algiers, the same year he surprised Mahon, carried off all the inhabitants prisoners, and, having deposited a vast quantity of spoil in Algiers, set sail for Constantinople.

The two brothers were not simply vulgar sea-robbers, but enterprising and able leaders, to whom dangers and obstacles were naught when the question was a commensurate gain, or an injury to be inflicted on Christians. Though pirates by taste, they were soldiers and skilled seamen when necessity demanded. Courageous, violent, faithless, devoid of morals and of pity, they were daring and unscrupulous characters, such as in unsettled times often make a large place for themselves. Some of their enterprises were risky; sometimes they had to contend with the Pope's galleys and with the war-ships of Spain, with forces generally superior

* Khaïr-el-Dinn's baker one day appeared before Charles V. and offered to poison his master. This villainous proposal horrified the Emperor, who forthwith sent a message to his adversary to be on his guard.

in number; whilst other sudden irruptions on the Mediterranean coast led to sanguinary combats. Haroudj laid the foundation of the power of the Deys of Algiers; his days were full of hard and bold strokes, of treachery and terrible executions. Khaïr-el-Dinn was more cunning, and acquired considerable fame as a naval commander. He was reputed second only to Andrea Doria; indeed, in 1530, in the gulf of Larta, that renowned admiral had to fly before him, not having had time to get his fleet drawn up in battle array. Haroudj was killed in 1518, at the age of forty-four years; his brother died at Constantinople, in 1547, at the ripe age of eighty.

When Khaïr-el-Dinn left Algeria, that country remained unconquered, and the depredations of the Algerian pirates were not stamped out until nearly three centuries later.*

In 1541, Algeria was ruled by Hassan-Aga, a chieftain who in the lawless service of the pirates had acquired great experience in war, and who was capable of occupying a position which demanded courage and tried ability. Hassan carried out his depredations with surprising activity on all the Christian states, and his followers had nearly put

* The part which the Algerians took in the contests between the Turkish Empire and Christendom ended in 1572, at the battle of Lepanto, in which the forces of the Pope, of Venice, and of Spain encountered those of Turkey. Aluch-Ali, sangiac of Algiers, reputed the greatest seaman of his time, played a conspicuous part in that event.

an end to all trade in the Mediterranean. They had so frequently spread alarm on the neighbouring shores of Spain, that the government of that country found itself compelled to stud the coast with a chain of military posts, from which sentries watched the approach of the pirates to warn the defenceless inhabitants of their incursions.

After the capture of Tunis (1535), Charles V. had intended to follow Barbarossa to Algiers, and to complete the Christian victory by wresting from the indomitable corsair that port of refuge. However, the Marquis du Guast, his chief general—who had argued against the army pushing on to Tunis after the capture of the fort la Goulette—and other officers, raised serious objections against any further operations. Plausible excuses were not wanting; the season was advancing, the provisions were already running low, the soldiers were weary, and, above all, there was the risk of compromising a decided success by fresh enterprises. Nevertheless, the emperor's views were just; his expedition remained incomplete, and his officers had to learn by sad experience how much better it is to complete a victory than to have to undertake a second expedition with that object.*

* Tunis fell in 1574 through the efforts of the pirates of Barbary, aided by Sultan Selim. Aluch-Ali, who ruled Algeria at that time, took a prominent part in that expedition, by which all the good done by the conquest of Charles V. thirty-seven years before was destroyed.

For a long time the emperor had received urgent complaints from his subjects. They represented to him that the interests of humanity made it his bounden duty to subdue Algiers—which, after his conquest of Tunis, had become the chief refuge of all the pirates—and thus to exterminate these implacable enemies of Christendom.

Whether moved by these entreaties, or possibly also seduced by the hope of adding some glory to his former African expedition, Charles V. issued orders for the preparation of a considerable fleet and the assembly of an army for the reduction of Algiers.

He rightly conceived that to render himself master of the principal points on the northern shore of Africa, which faced his States from the kingdom of Grenada as far as the kingdom of Sicily, would preserve Spain from fresh Mahommedan invasions, and he well knew what it cost to get rid of the former one. It would, moreover, place the seaboard of Italy and of the southern islands of the Mediterranean, almost all at that period under his sway, out of the reach of attacks from the cruel Barbary pirates.

The preparations were made on a large scale. The fleet was commanded by Andrea Doria, reputed the first sea-captain of the age, and comprised over three hundred and sixty vessels, Genoese and Spanish, amongst which were two line-of-battle ships and sixty-four galleys. Doria, the liberator of

his country in 1528 and its wise guider, was captain-general of the emperor's naval forces. By combining the fleets of Spain, Genoa, Naples and Sicily in one body, he had rendered his master supreme on the Mediterranean.

The land forces collected for the expedition were considerable and well capable of inspiring good hope of success. They consisted of twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry drawn from Spain, Italy, and Germany, mostly tried soldiers. Besides these there were three thousand volunteers, the flower of the Spanish and Italian nobility, who were keen to have some share in the glory which they felt confident the emperor was going to reap; also five hundred Maltese soldiers, furnished by the order of St. John, and led by some of its most valiant knights. The most renowned soldiers were found in the army; notably amongst these was Fernando Cortés, the conqueror of Mexico, by whose side were his three sons. There were besides, Fernando de Gonzaga, viceroy of Naples and of Sicily, the Duke of Alba, Pedro of Toledo, with the Colonnas, the Dorias and the Spinosas from Italy.

Pope Paul III., in a personal interview, Du Guast, Doria and others endeavoured to depict to the emperor all the risks he was running by exposing the fleet to almost inevitable destruction in approaching the dangerous coast of Africa at such an advanced season of the year, when the autumn

winds blow with great violence. However reasonable this warning may have been, Charles V. refused to be persuaded; to put off the expedition to a more favourable season, he believed, might give the king of France an opportunity of breaking one of those short truces which went then under the name of peace. It was a question either of undertaking the expedition at once, notwithstanding the risk from bad weather, or giving it up altogether.

Adopting the first alternative, he embarked his troops, and on the 1st of October, 1541, set sail from Porto Venere on the Ligurian coast. Soon, however, he had reason to regret having neglected to pay attention to the prudent counsels of his experienced admiral. A violent storm arose, and it was with the greatest efforts that, after a fortnight of considerable peril, he succeeded in gaining the harbour of Mahon, the rendezvous appointed for the concentration of his fleet.

This first lesson was not sufficient to shake the resolute courage and inflexible determination of the emperor, and had no other effect than to strengthen his resolve to persevere in the enterprise. The voyage from the Balearic islands to the coast of Africa was not less perilous than it had been in the first stage, the violence of the winds increasing as the armada neared the land. On the 22nd of October the fleet passed before Algiers, and cast anchor in the bay.

As has been the case in most expeditions of a similar nature, the agitated state of the sea hindered the landing of the army. The wind began to blow again with force, and compelled the fleet to seek shelter behind Cape Matifu. Whilst, on the 24th, Charles V. summoned Hassan to surrender the city, Fernando de Gonzaga and Jacopo Bosse, two experienced officers, reconnoitred the coast, searching for such localities as appeared best adapted for a disembarkation.

With all his experience of war, Hassan could not but perceive that with the small number of combatants at his disposal—eight hundred Turks, and from five to six thousand Moors—it was hopeless to think of holding out for long. The force arrayed against him was more numerous than that which had wrested Tunis from Khaïr-el-Dinn when at the head of sixty thousand men, and had balked all the efforts made by that intrepid corsair. Yet after distributing his small body of troops in the best possible way, he replied that it was folly to listen to the advice of an enemy, and that Algiers, already renowned for the ruin it had caused to the Spaniards, would reap fresh glory as the result of this new expedition.

On the 25th, the wind having moderated, the fleet returned to its anchorage in the bay; and on the 26th of October the disembarkation began at a spot half a league to the east of the town. Some Arabs on the shore, who were bent on contesting the

landing, were put to flight by a few well-directed shots, and, every obstacle being removed, twenty-one thousand men and nine guns were landed in the forenoon.

The emperor having divided his forces into three corps, to each one of which he assigned three light field-pieces, advanced inland the same day for three miles. The horses and the rest of the artillery were only landed the following day.

On the 27th of October, the army moved forward and encamped at a mile and a quarter from the Bab-Azoum gate. The Spanish infantry on the left occupied the most elevated ground, the Germans were in the centre on the slopes, and the Italians, who formed the right, were posted in the plain close to the sea. The imperial head-quarters were in some vineyards in the rear of the centre of the Germans. The front of the position was covered by a deep ravine spanned by a bridge.

Up to that moment everything had prospered; at the very time, however, when the emperor believed that he had least to fear from his opponent, he saw himself suddenly exposed to a most dire calamity, one which it was impossible for human power to avert. On the 27th, the Spaniards on the left had been skirmishing the whole day with the Arabs, and carrying successively the highest points of ground which lay in that direction, when towards evening the wind suddenly shifted to north-east, heavy clouds accumulated, the sky

became dreadfully overcast, and towards nine o'clock rain driven by a strong wind commenced falling in torrents. The tempest, which lasted all night, increased in fury towards morning. The troops, who had landed with little beyond their arms and ammunition, lay exposed, without tents or shelter of any description, to all its violence. Their clothing was speedily saturated with the icy-cold rain, the ground overflowed with water so that they could not lie down, and the camp on the plain was entirely inundated.

Hassan-Aga was too alert to forego such a favourable occasion for attacking the invaders. At break of day he led a sortie from Algiers; his followers, who had not been exposed to the fury of the tempest, were fresh and vigorous, and their cross-bows were in a serviceable condition. The Italian soldiers, who under Prospero Colonna held the nearest posts to the city, chilled by the cold and disheartened, fled on the approach of the enemy. Others, who occupied the posts further in the rear, displayed great valour, but the rain having damped their matches and moistened their powder, their matchlocks were rendered useless; faint, and able to do little more than hold their weapons, they were soon overpowered and driven back in disorder. At this juncture Fernando de Gonzaga, exhorting his troops to retrieve this repulse, assumed the offensive and led them up to the gates of the city. These were closed in their

face, and the assailants, overwhelmed by huge stones thrown from the ramparts, taken in flank by that portion of the Turks who had failed to gain admittance within the walls, and lastly in front by Hassan himself, were dismayed and took to flight. Some sturdy veterans rallied round Spinosa and held their ground, so did some of the knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This put an end to the retreat, and the emperor and the officers of the court were thus able to throw themselves into the midst of the troops, to reanimate them and lead them back to the contest. The Turks, having killed a large number of the imperialists and spread dismay amongst the rest, retired in good order.

This partial and soon repaired check was nothing in comparison with the calamity which was at the same moment overtaking the fleet. As the day advanced the tempest continued in all its force. The ships, on which the army depended for its subsistence and war materials, dragged their anchors, crushed into each other, or went to pieces on the rocks; several were driven ashore, others foundered. The galleys, being more strongly built and more skilfully handled, resisted better than the transports. In less than one hour fifteen war-ships and a hundred and forty transports were lost. Eight hundred men who were on board were drowned; and any who escaped from the fury of the waves and endeavoured to swim ashore were pitilessly massacred by the Arabs.

The emperor, full of amazement and grief, contemplated this terrible disaster in silence; he beheld all his munitions of war, and the immense store of provisions intended for the supply of his troops, on which all success depended, swallowed by the waves. At last the wind began to abate, and some hope was entertained that enough vessels might be saved to keep the troops from starving, and to convey them back to Europe.

In the evening the sea was dark, the commanders of the ships which had ridden the storm were not able to communicate with the troops on land, and these passed a night of most depressing anxiety. When daylight appeared on the 29th, a ship sent by Doria was able to reach the shore, and brought news to the camp that the admiral had escaped the most furious tempest he had seen in the fifty years he had been at sea, and that with the damaged vessels he had been compelled to seek shelter under the lee of Cape Matifu. But, as the sky was still overcast and the weather threatening, the admiral advised the emperor to march thither, as being the most convenient spot for the re-embarkation of the force.

However much the emperor may have been relieved on hearing that a portion of the fleet had escaped the fury of the storm, he was, nevertheless, very anxious about the condition of his army. Cape Matifu lay only six leagues from his camp, it is true, but the few provisions which had been landed

had been already consumed, a number of wounded encumbered the army, and his troops, disheartened and borne down by fatigue, were barely in a position to undertake even such a short march.

There was, however, no option; and, as the safety of the army depended on prompt action, Charles set his troops at once in motion. The sick and wounded were placed in the centre, and the most vigorous and able soldiers were detailed for the advance and rear guards. The march proved a trying ordeal; some of the men were almost incapable of carrying their arms; others, unable to endure the trudge over almost impracticable paths, sunk to the ground exhausted, and were left there to perish. All that the troops could obtain for food were roots, wild herbs, and the flesh of such horses as the emperor caused to be destroyed. The retreat was delayed by two streams, the Haratch and the Hamiz, which were swollen by the recent rains, and had to be bridged. The Turks and the Arabs, led by Hassan, molested the column by day and by night until it had crossed the second stream, killing the stragglers and massacring the wounded.

On the 31st of October the army reached Matifu in a pitiable condition. Fortunately the weather suddenly became sufficiently calm to enable communication to be established between the fleet and the shore; ample provisions were landed, and the spirits of the troops revived

now that they were no longer at the mercy of a pitiless enemy, and exposed to the cruel pangs of hunger.

Fernando Cortés, then Marquis of the Valley of Oaxaca, was a volunteer on board of the vessel of the admiral of Castile. In the tempest, the admiral's ship was wrecked upon the coast, and Cortés escaped death by swimming. A council of war was called, and it was decided to abandon the enterprise and return to Castile. Cortés, always daring, was much irritated by this decision, and solicited the command of the army, promising the emperor the capture of Algiers if his Majesty would deign to confide to him the leading of his forces. He only expressed regret that he had not by his side a handful of those gallant veterans who had served with him in the conquest of Mexico.* The utter state of demoralization into which the army had fallen rendered the success of this plan so very doubtful, that Cortés's demand was not entertained. The courtiers, weary of the service, were too much bent on an immediate return to Spain, and on the 1st of November the army commenced to re-embark.

Apropos of the above request, Raleigh writes :— "I have heard it, that when Charles V. had the

* He always had great regard for his former comrades. At his death he left in his will a sum for the celebration of two thousand masses for the souls of those who fought with him in the campaigns of Mexico.

repulse at Algiers in Africa, Fernando Cortés, one of the bravest men that ever Spain brought forth, offered unto the emperor to continue the siege at his own charge. But he had never good day after it. For they that envied his victories, and his conquest of Mexico in the West Indies, persuaded the emperor that Cortés sought to value himself above him, and to have it said, that what the emperor could not, Cortés had effected, and was therefore more worthy of the empire than he that had it." *

Charles displayed great fortitude in this horrible sequence of disasters; his courage, determination, and constancy were on no other occasion so much admired.† He bore all the fatigues like the most humble of his soldiers; wherever the greatest danger was there he was in person; he reanimated the spirits of the depressed, visited the sick and wounded, and infused fresh courage in all by his speech and example. When the army re-embarked he remained on shore with the last, though a body of Arabs lay not very far off threatening to fall at any moment on the rear guard.

* Sir W. Raleigh, "The History of the World" (Edinburgh Edition, 1820), vol. v. p. 11.

† In his expedition to Tunis the emperor always marched with the most advanced parties. Seeing the risks he incurred, the Marquis du Guast addressed him thus:—"As general, I order you to take place in the centre of the army, and with the colours." Not to weaken the military discipline which he had established, Charles obeyed without making any remonstrance.

The fleet had no sooner quitted the African coast than it was overtaken by a fresh storm; the vessels were scattered, and running before the wind had to make for any ports they could reach. Five weeks after his departure the emperor put back in the island of Majorca.

Such was the end of this expedition, which once promised so well. The utter collapse of the undertaking not only exercised an unfortunate influence at the time, but its effects were felt for a long period to come. The recollection of what befell the emperor's army saved Algiers from fresh enterprises. The defeat of the Spaniards in 1518, and still more in 1541, made the populations believe that destiny pronounced itself in favour of the city. This laid the foundation of a superstitious belief in the immunity of the place, and generation after generation appeared thoroughly convinced that no expedition for its reduction had a chance of success.

Indirectly the unfortunate result of the expedition was injurious to Charles V. The coalition which he had been so anxious to prevent was accomplished. In 1543 Khaïr-el-Dinn appeared before Marseilles with a fleet of a hundred and fifty ships. Francis I. and the Sultan had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance; a shameful alliance which France could only finally break off by paying to the Turkish admiral an indemnity of eight hundred thousand dollars.


Annapolis
Bladensburg
WASHINGTON
Alexandria
Upper Marlboro'
Rail Road
ALEXANDRIA
R. R.
ORANGE
Manassas Junction
Benedict
Patuxent R.
CHESAPEAKE BAY
Aquia Creek
Fredericksburg
POTOMAC RIVER
Hollands I.
Smiths I.
POTOMAC R. R.
Hanover C. H.
Pamunkey R.
Mattapony R.
RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER
Urbana
Mechanicsville
Spring Mill
Richmond
James R.
Fork Oak Sta.
Meadow Sta.
White House
Tunstall's Sta.
West Point
Dispatch Sta.
New Kent C. H.
Chickahominy R.
Malvern Hill
Jones Br.
Harrisons Landing
Charles Cy. C. H.
Petersburg
Williamsburg
York River
Gloucester
York
JAMES RIVER
Warwick Cr.
Big Bethel
Little Bethel
Hampton
Fortress Monroe
Newport News Pt.
Hampton Roads
Norfolk
C. Charles
MAP OF
PART OF VIRGINIA
TO ILLUSTRATE
GENERAL McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN OF 1862
SCALE OF ENGLISH MILES
10 8 6 4 2 0 10 20 30
Rail Roads thus
Roads thus

CHAPTER XXI.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN VIRGINIA.

The Government of Washington think they can easily suppress the Southern rising—Battle of Bull Run—Major-General McClellan appointed to command the Division of the Potomac—He prepares a draft of the operations he believes most desirable—Plan of operating in Eastern Virginia and marching on Richmond—Advantages and disadvantages of landing at Urbana—General McClellan explains the advantages of his scheme—It does not meet with the approval of the executive—Submitted to a council of war, it is approved by eight out of twelve Divisional commanders—McClellan learns that the fleet cannot co-operate with the army—Reconnaissance made towards the Rappahannock—Provision of transports—Change in the place of embarkation—Spies at the centre of government—The embarkation commences on the 17th of March—Strength of the Federal army on the 1st of April, 1861—The President takes General Blenker's division from McClellan—He deprives him of all control over General Wool's troops—The Federals advance in the Yorktown Peninsula—Disposition of General Magruder's forces—The fear of uncovering Washington revived—General McDowell's corps retained by the President—The Federals settle in front of Yorktown—Retreat of the Confederates—Battle of Williamsburg—The Federals reach the Chickahominy—Evil effects of the siege of Yorktown—McClellan's

army severed by the rising of the Chickahominy—The bridges broken—Attack by Johnston—Lee succeeds in preventing the junction of McClellan with McDowell—The seven days' battle—The Federals reach the James river.

THE right claimed for the States comprising the Union to complete internal autonomy was the cause of the American Civil War. On the 20th of December, 1860, as soon as Mr. Lincoln's election became certain, South Carolina passed an "ordinance of secession," and declared that the Union between South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the United States of America, was at an end.

On the 13th of April in the following year, Fort Sumter capitulated. Two days later, President Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand volunteers to put down the rebellion, and the Confederate Government made an appeal to the Southern States for thirty-five thousand volunteer soldiers. Several times that number of men came forward on both sides.

The war which then began between the North and South has particular interest for us, because in it are to be found many examples of combined naval and military operations. The configuration of the coast and the great rivers which flow to the Atlantic, or mingle their waters with the sea in the Gulf of Mexico, give to that war some of the features to be met with in many of our undertakings beyond the seas. The contest for the retention or possession

of the inland waterways demanded the concurrent efforts of both services.

It seemed to the Government at Washington that the Southern rising was nothing beyond a gigantic uproar, which might be suppressed in a few weeks. It was the battle of Bull Run which revealed to the people of the North the true character of the enterprise that lay on their hands. In the next four years every effort was made to suppress the secession by the employment of all resources, national and individual.

Amongst other movements of large bodies during the war which afford considerable instruction, we have General McClellan's in 1862, when he transferred his army by sea from the neighbourhood of Washington to the Yorktown Peninsula.

The overland road from Washington to Richmond is crossed, about thirty-five miles from Washington, by a little stream called Bull Run. On the right bank of this stream the Confederate army was posted about Manassas Junction under General Beauregard. On Sunday, the 21st of July, 1861, on this ground was fought the battle of Bull Run. Few armies ever sustained a more humiliating defeat than did the half-drilled Federals in that field; fortunately for them the Confederate generals did not appear to have been fully aware of the utter demoralization of their opponents. They missed their opportunity, for, had they advanced instantly after the battle, Washington must have fallen.

President Davis was strongly in favour of such a course, but allowed himself to be dissuaded by the generals in command.

On the 27th of July (six days after this battle) Major-General G. B. McClellan, called from Western Virginia, assumed the command of the Division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington on both banks of the river. When General Scott, on the 31st of October, sent in his resignation, he succeeded him in the general command of the forces of the Union.

For a considerable time after the battle of Ball's Bluff, fought on the 21st of the following October, no movement was made by either army in Virginia. The rain of the winter months had swollen the rivers and rendered the roads impassable. The Federals were neither ready nor willing to undertake offensive operations; for four months the great marine avenue to the capital of the country was blockaded, and Washington itself kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly inferior enemy,* in face of a movable army of one hundred and fifty thousand men. On the other hand, the extensive-

* In the early part of 1862 Johnston's army was in great part covered by the Bull Run; there he had from fifty-three thousand to fifty-five thousand men. On the Lower Potomac, on his right, were about ten thousand men, and in the valley of the Shenandoah was Jackson with from twelve thousand to fifteen thousand more. In all probability not more than seventy-five thousand. The Federal Intelligence reckoned the enemy at a hundred and fifteen thousand men and three hundred guns.

works round Washington rendered an attack of that city by the Confederates a hopeless undertaking.

Soon after General McClellan had assumed the command of the Union forces, at President Lincoln's instance, he prepared a draft of the operations which he considered advisable, setting down the means necessary for their execution.

The Southerners had chosen for their capital Richmond, the chief city of Virginia, situated on the James River, one hundred and thirty miles from Washington. For the advance of the Army of the Potomac on Richmond, the capture of which was the real object of the campaign, there was as the most direct line of operation the road from Washington, leading past the positions occupied by the Confederates at Centreville and Manassas. The General conceived that to attain the southern capital it was not necessary to act by way of Manassas; for, being masters of the sea, it was possible to carry the war in another quarter, and to strike at the Confederates in some point far from a battlefield which was haunted by unfortunate reminiscences.*

He had been struck by the facilities which the large fleet of steamers that ploughed the waters of the great American rivers offered for a voyage of

* "General McClellan became convinced that the enemy had 115,000 men at Manassas and on its flanks; and upon these false data he determined that he could not take or turn their works."—"The Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862," by Alexander S. Webb.

short duration, and by the special configuration of the Virginian coast so favourable for the disembarkation of an army. His plan was to operate against Richmond from the lower part of Chesapeake Bay, and, as he demonstrated in his memorandum, Eastern Virginia was the important strategical point where, in his opinion, the struggle was to be fought out.

The Chesapeake Bay is a large inland sea which stretches parallel to the Atlantic. It is two hundred miles long, and from four to forty miles broad. Many rivers merge their waters with the Atlantic in this bay, and between them lie long peninsulas very well adapted for a disembarkation, because the army which takes one of these for its base of operations can rest its flanks on the sea, and can count on the protection insured to it by the fleet.

Of the two rivers principally concerned in General McClellan's plan, the York is formed by the union of the Pamunkey and Mattapony flowing south-east to Chesapeake Bay, nearly opposite Cape Charles; it is forty miles long, and from one to three miles wide. The James rises in the centre of Virginia, and has its entire course in that State. It is four hundred and fifty miles in length, and widens into an estuary for the last sixty miles of its course, falling into the Atlantic at the southern extremity of Chesapeake Bay. The James is navigable up to Richmond, one hundred and fifty miles from its mouth.

The General proposed to embark the disposable part of the Army of the Potomac at Annapolis, in the upper waters of the Chesapeake, to convey his forces to one of the Virginian peninsulas, and to march on Richmond, turning the river ways to every possible account. This plan reduced considerably the number of marches to be made to reach Richmond; it changed the rivers from formidable obstacles into powerful auxiliaries, and the difference in the climate permitted the opening of the campaign to take place a fortnight sooner than would be possible if operating from the direction of Washington.

Owing to the maritime resources at their disposal, the Federals could outreach the enemy on the coast, and gain several days' march on them before meeting with any serious resistance. Moreover, by menacing Richmond without exposing their communications—the base of which rested on the sea—they compelled their adversaries to withdraw from Manassas without fighting, to hasten to the assistance of their capital.

Fort Monroe—situated at the point which divides the James from the York River—was already in the hands of the Federals, and this appeared the most natural place for a disembarkation. Nevertheless, at first General McClellan was disposed to accord the preference to the village of Urbana, situated on the right bank of the Rappahannock. It lay nearer both to Annapolis

and Richmond, the disembarkation, therefore, could be effected more speedily, and the operations by land somewhat abridged.

What was, however, of greater consequence was that the Confederates had made preparations for resistance on the peninsula which terminates with Fort Monroe, whereas it was known that no defensive work of any kind existed between Urbana and Richmond. Nevertheless, a landing at Urbana was not free from certain inconveniences. The shores were less facile than those in the neighbourhood of Fort Monroe, and, when the landing had been effected, it was necessary to turn the back on the Rappahannock and make for the York River or its affluents. In this march there was a difficult watercourse—the Dragoon swamp—to cross. Besides, the navigation of the York River was closed by the fortifications of Yorktown and that place could not be captured unless invested from the side of Fort Monroe.

Whatever was to be done, the possession of Yorktown, which both commanded the York River and the peninsula of Virginia, was necessary for any campaign undertaken with a base resting on the Chesapeake.

General McClellan exposed the advantages of his project in the following words:—"The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line by Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the

line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. . . .

"The advantages of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers are too obvious to need any explanation; it is also clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached and used as our main depôt, that we may have the shortest line of land transportation for our supplies, and the use of the York River.

"There are two methods of reaching this point:

"1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps.

"2nd. To make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this, the navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries: its reduction should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility of developing

and bringing into play the whole of our available forces on either or both banks of the James.

"It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of either time or men. . . .

"It may be summed up in a few words, that, for the prompt success of the campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point—there the knot is to be cut."

The authorities at Washington dreaded an attack on the capital during the absence of the army, and were very anxious that McClellan should move in a south-westerly direction towards Richmond, so as to keep the army always between the enemy and Washington. But the country on this route was very rough, was crossed by many rivers, and had been strongly fortified by the Confederates.

Notwithstanding the objections raised against McClellan's plan, inquiries were made in the month of January respecting the sea transport which would be required to move the army to the proposed base of operations on the Lower Chesapeake.

McClellan's and the President's plans were submitted to a council of war, in which eight out of twelve divisional commanders reported in favour of the first. The Government yielded their assent to the operations being transferred to the Yorktown peninsula.

War Department, March 13, 1862.

The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution :—

1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

2. Leave Washington entirely secure.

3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

(Signed) EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

General McClellan's plan of operations was sound in conception; and, if it failed in execution, a great part of the blame would rest on other shoulders. The history of those days shows that he did not possess the confidence of the President, nor of his Government.* His plan had no

* On the 17th of March, under the excuse that General McClellan had personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, he was removed from the position of General-in-Chief.

attraction for them, and was thwarted by men who were ignorant of military matters, and who were influenced by political bias. The General had laid particular stress on the co-operation of the navy as an essential part of his scheme, but on his arrival at Fort Monroe, the flag officer commanding the fleet informed him that he could expect but little assistance from the navy. The *Merrimac* completely closed the James River, and the fear of her attacks prevented the co-operation in the York River of the most powerful vessels of the fleet.

General Keyes, who commanded the fourth army corps, in a letter to the Honourable Ira Harris, of the United States Senate, dated April 7, 1862, wrote of McClellan's plan: "He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and, without modification, the enterprise was certain of success. But with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success."

Pending the arrival of the transports required for the conveyance of the troops to the new base of operations, the Army of the Potomac quitted its lines on the 9th of March, and marched to Centreville, principally with a view of giving the troops some training in marching and bivouacking. The Confederates had retired from the positions they formerly

occupied, a strong reconnaissance was therefore pushed as far as the Rappahannock, whilst the main body of the Federals marched back to Alexandria to make ready to embark for Fort Monroe. A council, composed of the four corps commanders, had, on the 13th of March, selected that place as the new base of operations for the Army of the Potomac.

The transport of the army by sea was a difficult task, nevertheless it was accomplished in a very creditable manner. In this instance, the Secretary of War followed a singular course, in placing the hiring and preparation of the transports in the hands of one of his assistant-secretaries, and not under the Quartermaster-General.

We prefer giving in Mr. Tucker's own words an account of what was done in this direction. He writes: "I was called to Washington by telegraph, on the 17th January last, by Assistant-Secretary of War, Thomas A. Scott. I was informed that Major-General McClellan wished to see me. From him I learned that he desired to know if transportation on smooth water could be obtained to move at one time, for a short distance, about fifty thousand troops, ten thousand horses, one thousand waggons, thirteen batteries, and the usual equipment of such an army. He frankly stated to me that he had always supposed such a movement entirely feasible, until two experienced quartermasters had recently reported it impracticable in their judgment. A few days

afterwards I reported to General McClellan that I was entirely confident the transports could be commanded, and stated the mode by which his object could be accomplished. A week or two afterwards I had the honour of an interview with the President and General McClellan, when the subject was further discussed, and especially as to the time required.

"I expressed the opinion that, as the movement of the horses and waggons would have to be made chiefly by schooners and barges, that as each schooner would require to be properly fitted for the protection of the horses, and furnished with a supply of water and forage, and each transport for the troops provided with water, I did not deem it prudent to assume that such an expedition could start within thirty days from the time the order was given.

"The President and General McClellan both urgently stated the vast importance of an earlier movement. I replied that, if favourable winds prevailed and there was great despatch in loading, the time might be materially diminished.

"On the 14th of February, you (Secretary of State) advertised for transports of various descriptions, inviting bids on the 27th of February. I was informed that the proposed movement by water was decided upon. That evening the Quartermaster-General was informed of the decision. Directions were given to secure the transportation — any assistance was tendered. He promptly detailed

to this duty two most efficient assistants in his department. Colonel Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Annapolis, where it was then proposed to embark the troops, and Captain Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. With these arrangements I left Washington on the 28th of February.

* * * * *

"I beg to hand herewith a statement, prepared by Captain Hodges, of the vessels chartered, which exhibits the prices paid, and parties from whom they were taken—

113 steamers, at an average price per day...				$215 10
188 schooners	„	„	„ ...	24 45
88 barges	„	„	„ ...	14 27

"In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days), these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure having been changed, which caused delay) 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1150 waggons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss of which I have heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe—the cargoes being saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest accident has occurred to my knowledge.

"I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record."

The cost of transporting the army to Virginia is said to have come up to fifty million dollars.

The change in the place of embarkation to which Mr. Tucker makes allusion was brought about by the Confederates withdrawing from Manassas and abandoning the batteries which commanded the Lower Potomac. McClellan had always insisted that the movement to the peninsula would compel the enemy to retire from its position at Manassas, and would free Washington from danger. This, in fact, is what did happen as soon as the Confederates became cognizant of the contemplated change in the line of operations. When the navigation of the Lower Potomac was again free, the vessels originally ordered to rendezvous at Annapolis were brought round, as it was found more convenient to embark the troops and materials at Alexandria.

"General J. E. Johnston had determined to quit the line of the Potomac, as he deemed that it had become necessary that the main body of the Confederate forces in Virginia should be at a supporting distance and position with the Army of the Peninsula; and, in the event of either being driven back, that they might combine for a final resistance before Richmond. For the space of three weeks before the army left its intrenchments at Manassas,

preparations were being made for falling back to the line of the Rappahannock, by the quiet and gradual removal of the vast accumulations of army stores; and with such consummate address was this managed, that our troops had no idea of what was intended until the march was taken up. The first intimation the enemy had of the evacuation of Manassas was the smoke of the soldiers' huts that had been fired by our army." *

Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher shows how the Confederates possibly got wind of the change in the line of operations. "Numerous spies in the employment of the Confederate Government, and acting from strong feelings of attachment to the South, resided at Washington; and had access, or were related, to some of the highest officers of the State. It was probably by means of them that the General commanding the Confederate army in Virginia was informed of General McClellan's plans, even when they had only been divulged to Mr. Lincoln and his advisers." †

General McClellan explains that it was his intention to embark the 1st Army Corps in mass . . . "But transports arrived so slowly, and the pressure of the administration for a movement was so strong and unreasonable, that I felt obliged to embark the troops by divisions as fast as the transports arrived,

* "The First Year of the War," by E. A. Pollard, p. 283.

† "History of the American War," by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, vol. i. p. 319.

and then determined to hold the 1st Corps to the last, and land it as a unit whenever the state of affairs promised the best results."

With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, it took about six weeks to embark the army and materials. The embarkation began on the 17th of March, Heintzelman's corps leading, Hamilton's division moving first; on the 22nd, Porter followed; the rest of the army embarked as fast as it could.* The infantry were accommodated in large paddle-wheel river steamers; the horses in schooners. On leaving Washington the Federals had two hundred of these schooners, each one of which could carry fifty horses. A spar was made fast to the two masts of the vessel, and the horses tethered on either side facing inwards. The headquarters of the army embarked on board the *Commodore*, a large river steamer, on the 1st of April, and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2nd.

At page 239 of McClellan's own story, "The War for the Union," after quoting Mr. John Tucker's account of the transport got together by direction of the Secretary of War, we read, "The following

* General Sir Daniel Lysons witnessed part of the embarkation at Alexandria. On this subject our former Quartermaster-General can speak with authority, and according to him the operation was done well, though in a peculiar sort of a way. A certain irregularity, according to our ideas, was not surprising, seeing that such a large embarkation was quite a new experience for the staff.

memoranda were found lying with the manuscript at this point—

"Memoranda—On the 5th of March there were no transports of importance at Annapolis, some at Perryville and Washington, and many engaged fitting at New York.

"On March 12th there were at Alexandria transports for fifteen hundred infantry and one squadron, but they were not coaled or ready to receive the troops. The pontoon trains and engineers' tools were loaded up.

"March 17th. The leading division—Hamilton's —embarked.

"March 20th. There were eight to ten horse transports at the wharves of Alexandria, and as many more at anchor. Artillery-transports ready at the wharves.

"March 21st. Porter's artillery at Alexandria, but not sufficient accommodation for the horses, and no arrangement of vessels for infantry or artillery.

"March 22nd. Porter's division moved off in splendid style, and well provided; reached Fort Monroe on the 23rd.

"March 23rd. Only a hundred and fifty horses fit for artillery in Alexandria depôt; three hundred expected next day.

"March 24th. Many new regiments arriving from the north. No additional transportation. Hunt and Averill can embark."

The state of the 1st of April, 1862, shows the strength of the army to have been—

	Present under arms.	On detachment or sick.	Absent.	Total.
2nd Corps, Sumner	26,778	1129	3130	31,037
3rd ,, Heintzelman	33,047	2795	3010	38,852
4th ,, Keyes	32,924	1874	3112	37,910
Regular Infantry	3905	237	623	4765
Regular Cavalry	2601	170	370	3141
Reserve Artillery	2731	175	210	3116
Various Corps	910	73	161	1144
	102,896	6453	10,616	119,965

When the army took the field in March, 1862, the field artillery consisted of 92 batteries (30 regulars and 62 volunteers), with a total of 520 guns, 12,500 men and 11,000 horses, fully equipped. The Army of the Potomac, which embarked for Fort Monroe and the Virginia Peninsula in March and April of that year, had 52 field-batteries, comprising 299 guns. A fortnight before the capture of Yorktown, Franklin's Division brought 4 more batteries of 22 guns, and a few days before the battle of Mechanicsville, McCall's Division brought 4 more batteries of 22 guns. Each division had 4 field-batteries, and the artillery reserve for the whole army consisted of 100 guns.

No uneasiness was experienced with regard to the conveyance of the army down the Chesapeake to Fort Monroe. The action of the *Merrimac* on the 8th of March made the plan of the Peninsular campaign appear risky, but the engagement

between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* on the following day had sufficiently demonstrated the superiority of the former, and the other naval preparations were so formidable that no fear was entertained of a Confederate attack on the transports.

Throughout the Civil War, the necessity for protecting Washington and Richmond, the two capitals, interfered with the plans of the Federal and Confederate Generals. Mr. Lincoln's contention was that General McClellan did not accord sufficient weight to the measures for the safety of Washington, and did not detail an adequate number of troops for its defence. General McClellan, on the other hand, not only held that the forces were sufficient, but that these fears were unfounded, as the Confederates on retiring from Manassas had destroyed all the railway-bridges behind them, thereby indicating their intention to abandon that route. Further, that the coming operations in the Yorktown Peninsula would have the effect of making Mr. Davis recall all the troops that might threaten Washington to undertake the defence of Richmond.

When the troops were collected at the points of embarkation, ready to go on board as soon as the transports were forthcoming, the President took General Blenker's Division of ten thousand men from McClellan's command. The General could not disguise his annoyance in a personal interview he had soon after with Mr. Lincoln, when the

President spontaneously promised that no more troops would be taken from him.

Worse was to follow. In March, 1862, General Wool was commanding at Fort Monroe, the *base of operations* selected for the Army of the Potomac. By an order issued by the War Department, Fort Monroe and its dependencies were placed under the control of Major-General McClellan, who was moreover, authorized to draw from the troops under General Wool's command ten thousand men, which were to be assigned to the 1st Corps. During the night of the 3rd of April, the Adjutant-General, by order of the President, telegraphed to General McClellan, to acquaint him that he was deprived of all control over General Wool's troops. In the General's own words, "This order left me without any base of operations under my control."

McClellan having landed at Fort Monroe, did not wait to take the field until the disembarkation was completed. Of the army which he was to have under his orders, on the day of his arrival he found fifty-eight thousand men with a hundred guns ready to march. The rest had not disembarked, or had not yet the land transport they needed to undertake a forward movement. Many teams were still wanting for the numerous carriages, without which a body of troops could hardly venture on the heavy roads that the army was likely to find.

On the 4th of April the Federals broke up their camp near Fort Monroe; two divisions of the 4th Corps under General Keys were ordered to march by the James River road, whilst four divisions of the 3rd Corps under General Heintzelman were directed to advance on Big Bethel and Howard Creek; and, if possible, to cut off any detachments of the enemy which might be in garrison in the works near Shipping Point. The works prepared by the enemy to resist a landing at any part of the peninsula south of Yorktown, or an advance from Fort Monroe, had been abandoned, and on the 5th of April the Federals arrived without hindrance in front of the enemy's position.

They appear to have had but scanty knowledge of the country. Brigadier-General J. C. Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, states that the maps were so incorrect that, before the troops reached the neighbourhood of Yorktown, they were found to be worthless.

The Confederate General Magruder had only eleven thousand men under his command, but he had prepared a line of works extending from Yorktown on his left to a point on the Warwick River on his right. Of his troops, six thousand men garrisoned the important posts of Yorktown and Gloucester Point, the remaining five thousand were detached to watch the line of works stretching across the peninsula. His force was quite inadequate to watch a line of defence thirteen and

a half miles long, but he boldly resolved to keep the enemy in check till assistance should come to him from General Johnston's army.

The Confederate Government was evidently harassed by the same apprehensions as President Lincoln, and did not dare any more than he to uncover their capital. Thus, when McClellan appeared before Yorktown with his fifty-eight thousand men, not a single soldier had yet been sent to Magruder in the way of reinforcement. This fact, which was officially proved after the conclusion of the war, is a very convincing testimony of the soundness of the plan which the chief of the Army of the Potomac had drawn up and undertaken to carry into execution.

Whilst his army, full of confidence and happy in being released from long inaction, was embarking, there were not a few individuals in Washington who felt, or pretended to experience, considerable alarm in seeing the capital of the Union left destitute of troops. The result of adopting a line of operations which did not of itself cover the capital was to invite interference with the disposal of the troops. It was easy to revive the old objections of the President to a plan which was only being executed by his orders after much opposition. Two generals, who professed to have his special confidence, declared that in case of attack the garrison of Washington was not adequate,* and,

* Generals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the

though they admitted that the capital was not threatened, Mr. Lincoln resolved to provide for this presumed danger by a display of his authority.

The great operation of the transport of the Army of the Potomac was in a very forward state and promised every success. Barring a few regiments which were late, McDowell's corps alone remained in the neighbourhood of Alexandria. This corps, however, was the finest in the army; it had an effective strength of 38,544 men of all arms, well trained, well equipped, and well commanded. It was divided into three infantry divisions, four regiments of cavalry, and twelve batteries of field artillery.

A sufficient number of transports had been collected to convey the whole of McDowell's Corps together, and, whilst the rest of the army marched up the peninsula formed by the James and the York Rivers, it was intended to land this corps on the north side of the York River in such a way as to cause the fall of all the defences raised to close its entrance. The accomplishment of the task reserved for it was, in General McClellan's mind, indispensable to insure the success of a rapid campaign.

At the moment, however, when he was about to embark, McDowell received from the President an

Secretary of War to examine if the President's instructions of March 8th and 13th had been complied with by General McClellan.

order to remain with all his forces in the neighbourhood of Washington, and a laconic despatch informed McClellan that the troops, whose arrival he was looking forward to with such eagerness, were withdrawn from his command. Since the operations had commenced almost one-third of the army, which he had formed with such care, and for the good organization of which he had sacrificed most of his popularity, was under different pretexts taken away from him. This last reduction was the most serious of all, for McClellan counted on the 1st Corps landing, as had been arranged, near Gloucester Point, overcoming all resistance, and, after turning the enemy's defences at Yorktown, marching on West Point.

In spite of the President's action, General McClellan had still a great army under his orders; an army composed of active, vigorous, brave, and intelligent men, wanting only in experience. These men were recruited from all classes of society, and in the ranks were many individuals whose military capacity was as yet unknown to others and to themselves.

On the 16th of April, General Smith tried to force a passage at Lee's Mills, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses the Warwick River; this was the weakest point of the Confederate position, but the attack, not being properly supported, led to no result. As reinforcements were constantly arriving for General Magruder's army

the idea of breaking through the Confederate lines was relinquished, and works for the reduction of Yorktown were taken in hand.

All was ready for the batteries to open fire, when, early in the morning of the 4th of May, the pickets noticed an unusual stillness along the enemy's lines; and, advancing cautiously, ascertained that the Confederate forces had withdrawn. There had been nothing to indicate an approaching evacuation, and the news brought to headquarters at four a.m. created some surprise. As none of the batteries had yet opened, the Federals could not claim to have driven the enemy out of Yorktown by force of arms; the Confederates simply evacuated the place for prudent reasons.

In their retreat they showed a sound military organization. Hardly any evidence remained on the roads of the march of a large army; the retreat had been conducted in excellent order, there were no stragglers, little of the *débris* which might be expected from the baggage of so large a body of men, and no damage had been done to the farms on the line of route.

The following day the Confederate forces were overtaken at Williamsburg, and an undecided battle was fought.* The battle commenced at about 7.30 a.m.; on the side of the Federals it was fought without

* Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher states that the march of the Federals from Yorktown looked more like the retreat of a defeated than the advance of a successful army.

plan or leader, but they outnumbered their opponents. The Federals apparently received a serious check, but, as on the 6th they entered Williamsburg without opposition, the Confederates having retired in the night, McClellan claimed Williamsburg as a victory.* The enemy had retired, many prisoners had fallen into his hands, and some cannon abandoned on the line of retreat had been secured by his cavalry. The Federals lost 456 killed, 1400 wounded, and 372 missing; total casualties 2228. Johnston had gained his object. He had secured a safe retreat for his army with its baggage and supply trains, and, although forced by the configuration of the land and superior numbers of the enemy to abandon the Yorktown Peninsula, yet he

* The following incident occurred during the American War of Independence: On the 1st of May, 1776, the Royal Highlanders (1st Battalion of the Black Watch) sailed from Greenock for America. One company of the regiment was on board the *Oxford*, a transport which was captured on the passage by an American privateer. After the officers had been removed to the privateer, a prize crew was put on board the transport, with instructions to gain the nearest friendly port. After some days the Highlanders overpowered the crew, and navigating the *Oxford* into the James River, anchored at Jamestown. The transport was seized by the Republican Government, and the soldiers were taken to Williamsburg as prisoners of war. Greatly to their honour, though every effort was made to get them to throw over their allegiance by promises of military promotion and grants of fertile lands, these brave Highlanders stoutly declared their intention to recognize no one but their lawful king. They were then removed to the back settlements in detached parties, but at the end of two years were exchanged and rejoined their regiment.

did so in a manner which insured the safety and efficiency of his army. The Confederates retreated on Richmond without molestation, for the Federals were not in a condition to pursue.

By the 21st of May, General Stoneman had reached the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and with the advance of the Federals thereto the first period of the operations of General McClellan's army may be said to have closed.

Let us return for a moment to the York River. About the 20th of April, General Franklin, commanding one of McDowell's divisions, arrived at Cheeseman's landing. It had been McClellan's intention to throw this division across to the north side of the York some three or four miles below Gloucester Point, with the object of seizing or turning the works there, and of distracting the enemy's attention whilst the main assault should be delivered at Yorktown. Ample preparations had been made for landing the division, and the locality below Gloucester had been selected, when, on the 4th of May, the defences of Yorktown were found to be abandoned.

The Confederate cause was never at such low ebb as at the time when McClellan's army landed in the Yorktown Peninsula; it seemed, nevertheless, to grow and gain fresh vigour with the slow progress and errors committed by their adversaries in this campaign. The month the Federals wasted before Yorktown had enabled the Confederates to reinforce

their army. At the date of the events of the 4th of May their army was computed at from a hundred thousand to a hundred and twenty thousand men; on the 26th of June—according to the report furnished by the chief of McClellan's secret service corps—it was estimated at a hundred and eighty thousand. The report also showed that numerous heavy earthworks had been completed for the defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these two hundred guns were mounted. The Confederate forces, through conscription, had risen from their low state into an army most formidable in numbers, with an excellent organization, and inspirited by a great success.

Brigadier-General J. C. Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, attributes much of this to the evil effects of the siege of Yorktown.

On this point he writes: " . . . My opinion now is, that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by a strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the *morale*, was on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded; and if we failed, it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labours of the siege. Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of the Warwick.

We lost few men by the siege; but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the *morale*. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the fruits of that month gained by the enemy, we have tasted to our hearts' content; they are not yet exhausted." *

Here was a repetition, though on a smaller scale, of the very loitering course pursued by the Allies in the Crimea, after they had secured their bases on the south side of Sebastopol. Later on, as the Russian reinforcements poured into the Crimean Peninsula, how much they regretted not having shown a little more enterprise in the opening days of the campaign.

General McClellan attributed most of his defeats to his inferiority in numbers. Apparently he could not adduce the same excuse in the spring of 1862. On the 6th of April, at a moment when he had a large superiority of troops, the President telegraphed to him, "You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once." Again he telegraphed, on the 9th, "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And, if so, I think it is the precise

* "Report of the Engineer and Artillery operations of the Army of the Potomac," p. 62.

time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow."

After the action at Williamsburg, the Confederates gathered within the line of intrenchments raised close round Richmond; the Union troops were on both banks of the Chickahominy, a river which passes round that city on the north, and empties itself into the James. The capture of Richmond was looked on as certain, and the situation of the Federal army was regarded completely as one for offence.

In the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge the Chickahominy is about forty feet wide, and is bordered by low marshy bottom lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. A rise of a few feet in the water of the river overflows the bottom lands on both sides. At low water it can be forded at almost any point; but during high water it is not fordable. McClellan occupied both banks of the river, with the object of extending his right far enough north to join McDowell, then at Fredericksburg, and get the assistance of his corps without quite uncovering Washington.

In the latter part of May, owing to heavy rains, the Chickahominy rose rapidly, and the water carried away the bridges. The whole country on its banks

became a great swamp. McClellan's army was severed, and the weaker portion of it, camped about Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, was attacked by Johnston.

The position of the Federals astride of the Chickahominy was such that it led the Confederates to believe that they could crush the two corps which had been pushed across the river, before assistance could come to them from the remainder of the army. An unusually rainy week at the end of May, and the consequent rise of the waters of the Chickahominy, favoured the plan. The Confederates, on the 31st of that month, in the battle of Seven Pines, drove back their opponents for two miles, and captured nine guns, with a vast amount of camp equipage and stores; but a terrible storm on the previous night had made the roads impassable, and delayed the advance of General Huger's division as arranged. But for this accident, the destruction of the Federal left would have been effected.

The conflict was resumed at five the next morning, and carried on till ten a.m.; the Federals regained the ground lost on the previous day. Johnston was badly wounded; struck by a splinter of a shell, in falling from his horse he broke two ribs. His troops fell back on Richmond. On the 31st the Confederates had missed their opportunity, and on the following day they fought entirely on the defensive. Had all the Federal corps been engaged in the battle of the 1st of June, the Confederates

would have fought for existence, but McClellan threw away his chance. The battle of Seven Pines, as this action was called, was indecisive, nevertheless it had the effect of revealing to the Federal Generals what a difficult task the capture of Richmond was likely to be.

Whilst McClellan spent several weeks in rebuilding his bridges, Jackson, early in June, was operating north of the Shenandoah. He defeated Banks, and chased him to the Potomac. The road to Washington was open to him, and so alarmed became the Union Government that they called McDowell back from Fredericksburg to defend the city. With a total force of seventeen thousand men, it has been computed that Jackson paralyzed the action of at least eighty thousand men. The panic at Washington had this effect—that McDowell's corps was no longer permitted to co-operate with the Army of the Potomac; only one division of it, McCall's, played a part in the battles before Richmond.

Lee having succeeded in preventing the junction of McClellan and McDowell, had now to deal only with the former. He hastened Jackson back to Richmond, and crossed the Chickahominy to meet him. Lee had about ninety thousand men, and McClellan nearly as many, but his troops were still separated by the river.

On the 12th of June, Stuart started on his memorable raid round the rear of McClellan's army. Between eight and nine o'clock on the morning

of the 25th the latter assumed the offensive, and attacked the woods in front of Seven Pines to advance his pickets. The following day—the day upon which McClellan had decided as the time for his final advance—commenced a series of hard-fought battles, known as the seven days' battle.

These began with an attack of the Federal right, which was posted about Mechanicsville, by General Hill, on the 26th of June. On the second day Longstreet attacked Porter's corps at Gaines Mill, on the left bank of the Chickahominy; Generals D. H. Hill and Jackson formed a junction, and McClellan was cut off from his base of supplies on the York River. The whole day the Confederates made demonstrations of attack on Generals Sumner's and Franklin's position, and thus additional reinforcements, which might have been sent across the river to Porter, were detained to guard the lines. The action began shortly after noon, and lasted till dusk. The Federals were weary, and retired; there was no panic, the men simply declared that they had had enough of fighting.

McClellan's despatch to the Hon. E. M. Stanton is strange reading; he declares that he lost the battle, on the 27th, because his force was too small, and that he was not responsible for this. He says nothing about the dangerous position in which he had placed his right wing, that it was threatened with a renewal of the attack, and that Jackson was advancing with fresh troops on its flank.

On the 28th there was little fighting. As Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's farm, the Confederates opened fire upon one of his divisions commanded by General Smith. This division was again attacked later in the day as it was withdrawing from its more advanced positions. The Federal troops were much demoralized. On the 29th, Generals Magruder, Huger, and McLaws attacked Sumner's and Franklin's corps near Savage Station. The orders given to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman were misunderstood; the first took up a more advanced position than had been intended, and consequently did not receive any assistance from the latter. The Confederates attacked in earnest at four p.m., and the action continued with great obstinacy until between eight and nine p.m., when they were driven from the field. As soon as the battle was over, the Federals fell back, and crossed the White Oak swamp; by 5.30 the next morning all had crossed, and the bridge was destroyed.

On the 30th the Confederates took up the pursuit. Jackson cannonaded Franklin across the White Oak stream, but Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving the enemy back. At two o'clock in the afternoon the Confederates advanced in force by the Charles City road, and at three o'clock Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill attacked General McCall's division, which, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. During the afternoon long lines of baggage-waggons and

many thousand stragglers reached Malvern Hill. Between twelve and one o'clock in the morning General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and with a portion of Sumner's reached that locality soon after daylight.

On the 1st of July the waggons were sent to Harrison's landing, and McClellan took up a very strong position on Malvern Hill, fourteen and a half miles from Richmond. The left and centre rested on Malvern Hill, with the right bent back through a wooded country towards a point below Haxall's on the James River. The flanks of the position were protected by gunboats, and a powerful artillery, to which was added a portion of the siege-train, swept the roads leading up from Richmond. At three o'clock p.m. the Confederates attacked with great determination and suffered very severe losses. At four there was a pause in the contest, but the attack was resumed at six o'clock, when their divisions, brought into action as they arrived, were beaten in detail. The Federals held their own till darkness put an end to the battle.

On the following day, the 2nd of July, the Federals, to be nearer to their source of supply, retreated to Harrison's Bar; the movement was carried out with scarcely any molestation on the part of the enemy.

The campaign of the York Town Peninsula was over. It had lasted four months, during which time ten severely-contested and sanguinary battles,

besides numerous smaller engagements, had been fought. After all these efforts and a heavy loss of life, all that the Union could show was the occupation of York Town and of Gloucester Point.

Up to this period of the war the Confederates had a great advantage in the ability of their chiefs, and in the confidence with which they had been able to inspire their soldiers. The following eulogy by Fletcher—though written after the combined armies of the Potomac and Virginia had been driven within the fortifications around Washington in the following September—shows how fortunate the South was in that respect.

"First among the advantages possessed by the Confederates must be numbered the presence of such a man as General Lee to command the armies.

"It is, indeed, but seldom that so many noble qualities are found united in the same person. He evinced talents both for organizing and moving armies; he excelled in council and in the field.* Irreproachable in character, a deeply religious man, even his enemies could not attribute motives to his conduct other than those which actuate good men; whilst amongst his companions-in-arms he was not only respected and obeyed, but deeply beloved.

* Lee, having refused the most tempting offers of lucrative positions in the North, died as Head of the University of Virginia. Sherman endeavoured to prove that his ability as a General was inferior to that of General Grant. However, the greater number of those who served under Grant, and the impartial military opinion of Europe, were not to be persuaded.

Jealousy against such a man as Lee could find no place amongst the other leaders of the war. Jackson and Longstreet, his two most able lieutenants, supported him, not only as generals under his command, but as men actuated towards himself by the deepest admiration and warmest personal friendship. Like all truly great men who have risen to successful pre-eminence, General Lee had the faculty of imbuing his subordinates with his own spirit, and, as the limbs of a body are governed by the head, so were the leaders who directed the movements of the several parts of the army in complete accord with the General commanding-in-chief.

"If the Confederate army was fortunate in possessing a head like General Lee, so was General Lee especially happy in the men who acted under him. The campaign of the Shenandoah Valley in the previous March, followed by the attack on the Federal right on the Chickahominy, sufficiently established General Jackson's fame; but the climax of his glory was reached when, by the bold and almost unprecedented flank march round Pope's army, he cut it off from its supplies, and not only compelled a retreat, but so completely confused its commander as to render the retreat disorderly, and to neutralize the benefits of the reinforcements which were continually arriving.*

* Stonewall Jackson, who was beloved by his soldiers, was accidentally shot by them at Chancellorsville. At the moment of

"If to Jackson the more brilliant strategy is to be attributed, yet the able manner in which General Lee's plans were carried into execution by Longstreet must not be forgotten in the history of the campaign. The personal friendship between these two men, and the mutual confidence of each in the other, sufficiently testify to the noble qualities of both.

"The army was also greatly indebted to the young cavalry general who knew how to utilize the bold riders of the south, and to employ them in services for which they were peculiarly fitted, directing their energies to the efficient performance of picket duty, and to dashing raids on the enemy's lines of communication. General Stuart had succeeded to the reputation of Turner Ashby as the best cavalry general in Virginia, and both in chivalrous character and in daring exploits emulated the renown of those cavaliers from whom it is the boast of the Virginian gentleman to have descended. Led by such men, the Confederate army had carried the war from the gates of Richmond to those of Washington."

Stuart was a brilliant leader of mounted infantry, and his raids were daring performances. He fell on the 12th of May, 1864, at the time when the North was beginning to wrest from the South the preeminence in the mounted arm.

his fall he was bringing about the successful accomplishment of one of his most brilliant manœuvres.

The Virginia Peninsula campaign was one that needed great unity of purpose, but it had not a fair chance from the very beginning. It was unpopular with the head of the Government, and did not succeed in banishing from his mind the deep-rooted fear of an attack on Washington. The President and his advisers should have given their entire support to the plan proposed by their chief commander, and made his forces in the Peninsula of Virginia as strong as possible. The opening scenes of the war were in favour of the Confederates, and it was difficult to persuade the Executive that vigorous operations in the Peninsula would have left too few troops to their opponents to employ on any other enterprise. Nor could they be made to understand that the protection of Richmond from attack by McClellan's threatening army was enough to engage the attention of all their forces.

Political reasons, however, influenced the whole question. The Government could not overlook the necessity of giving commands to generals who represented or could exercise influence over the great political parties. They conferred on several generals an independent command, and thus encouraged a system of detached operations. General McClellan's political principles were at variance with those of the President and of his advisers, and it has been said, with what truth we know not, that on the plea of his slowness and want of energy they gradually tried to sap his popularity. There

were faults on both sides, and certainly in his irritation McClellan made little allowance for the responsibilities of the civil government.

What is required in war, beyond forming a good plan, is the ability to carry it out. General McClellan showed little enterprise and devoted more attention to forming a line of intrenchments and a rallying-place for his army than to attacking the enemy. These defensive works, he explained, were necessitated by his inferiority in numbers, so that he might bring the greatest possible quantity of combatants into action, and secure the army against the consequence of unforeseen disaster. But by doing this he gave time to the Confederates to gather their forces and assume the initiative. His promise to the Secretary of War, "will do my best to out-manœuvre, out-wit, and out-fight the enemy,"* was never fulfilled. Though he had a force of ninety-five thousand men—which he called "the splendid army I have the honour to command"—he was always asking for reinforcements. He was always over-estimating the forces opposed to him. He did so at Washington, he did the same at Yorktown, and he fell into the same error before Richmond. On July 25th he estimated the Confederate forces at two hundred thousand men,† whilst in reality not

* McClellan's telegram to the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Camp, Lincoln, June 26th, 1862.

† "The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, (200,000), including Jackson and Beauregard." Telegram from General McClellan to the Hon. E. M. Stanton, 25th June, 1862.

more than half of that number were opposed to him. Fletcher remarks on this point, "For the best part of the war the numbers under General Lee's command were very much exaggerated; and so greatly had he and his subordinates, especially General Jackson, risen in the opinion of their enemies, that no project was thought too extravagant, or enterprise too daring, for the adoption of such successful generals."

What was the use of saying, "The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James River, with the exception of the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all"?* Why, when the enemy had been sorely punished, did McClellan continue to retire and abstain from assuming the offensive? There is no denying the fact that the reverses on the Chickahominy were by far the most serious the Union had sustained since the battle of Bull Run. The money market, a sure indication of disaster, was violently agitated when the news arrived. In the following words Chesney sums up the result of the battles at the end of July: "No official version of the details of the 'strategic movement' to the James could hide

* General McClellan always looked back with pride on these seven fierce days of battle. The last sentence he ever penned referred to that struggle against Lee and Jackson. The page was never completed; the morning after he had written it he was dead.

the one great fact that the Army of the Potomac had been checked and repulsed with terrible loss of men, *matériel*, and reputation." *

The effect of Lee's offensive actions, the most telling strokes of the war, is thus described in the General Order, dated Richmond, July 9, 1862: "The immediate fruits of our success are—the relief of Richmond from a state of siege; the rout of the great army that so long menaced its safety; many thousand prisoners, including officers of high rank; the capture and destruction of stores to the value of millions; and the acquisition of thousands of arms, and fifty-one pieces of superior artillery."

The qualities McClellan possessed were power of organization, and the knack of securing the attachment of his men; he was honest of purpose and moderate, but, owing to his unreadiness to move promptly and to act vigorously, he cannot claim to be numbered amongst the leaders of his age.

To manœuvre large bodies of troops of the three arms with effect requires considerable practice and much training. It is certain that McClellan had no opportunity for this before the war; and that the machinery of his army was not in such perfect order as to insure the efficient working of each separate part after the directing impulse had been given.

* Chesney, "Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland," vol. i. p. 74.

The training of the men was imperfect, many were recruits, and the best not thoroughly broken to discipline. Means for supplying ammunition were few, and the troops wasted theirs by firing into the woods.

What has been written of the battle of Fredericksburg applies to the Peninsula campaign. "The Federal army was too large for the capacities of the men who commanded it; it was unwieldy, its strength was frittered away in dribbles, and it suffered defeat in detail."*

* "History of the American War," by Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, vol. ii. p. 250.

CHAPTER XXII.

INVASIONS.

Thucydides' speech against the possibility of an Athenian invasion—Hon. Sir E. Fremantle on patriotism, loyalty, and heroism—What constitutes the weakness of the British Empire—The question of invasion not to be dismissed on the score of impossibility—Prominent part the elements play in an invasion—The landing of William III. in England—Steam makes it easier to take a country by surprise—Admiral Dupetit-Thouars' remarks on an invasion of England—Marshal Bugeaud's estimate of the British infantry—Comparative numbers of the population of the United Kingdom and France—Napoleon asks for the command of the Channel for twenty-four hours—His comparison between his undertaking and Cæsar's—Great Britain's preparations in 1805—Miltiades with inferior numbers counsels an attack of the Persian host—Cæsar's task not quite an easy one—England escapes being invaded in 1692 and in 1778—The Spanish Armada—Measures taken by Napoleon to invade England—Vessels composing his flotilla—Its division—He witnesses an embarkation of his troops—Time considered necessary to overpower England—Napoleon's plan—Prince Metternich's idea of the real object of the Boulogne preparations—What might have occurred had the French reached the British coast—James's opinions—Hoche's expedition to Ireland.

IN treating of operations beyond the seas we must not omit the case of an invasion. To be complete,

a review of the subject should investigate such an event both from an offensive and a defensive point of view. We should not only look forward to being the aggressors, but also to what the hostility of other Powers might do to us.

It has at all times been difficult to persuade the mass of the population to make sacrifices for a remote contingency such as the invasion of their country. Limited as their knowledge of military history is, they too often disregard the warnings of experts to be prepared for such an event. Sir Edward Creasy, in "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," gives in the words of Thucydides the speech of a Syracusan orator who argued against the possibility of an invasion.* "Even if the enemies were to come, so distant from their resources, and opposed to such a power as ours, their destruction would be easy and inevitable. Their ships will have enough to do to get to our island at all, and to carry such stores of all sorts as will be needed. They cannot, therefore, carry besides an army large enough to cope with such a population as ours. They will have no fortified place from which to commence operations; but must rest them on no better base than a set of wretched tents, and such means as the necessity of the moment will allow them. But in truth, I do not believe that they would even be

* Sir E. Creasy, "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," p. 43.

able to effect a disembarkation. Let us, therefore, set at naught these reports as altogether of home manufacture; and be sure that if an army does come, the State will know how to defend itself in a manner worthy of the national honour."

Creasy adds, "Such assertions pleased the Syracusan assembly; and their counterparts find favour now, among some portion of the English public."* There were exceptions; Wellington prayed earnestly that England might be brought to see her danger. He once said, "I am bordering on seventy-seven years, passed in honour; I pray God to protect me from being witness of the tragedy I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take proper measures to avert."

Vice-admiral the Hon. Sir E. A. Fremantle, in a review of the China-Japan War, makes the following observation:—"It is as true now as in former ages, that, if a nation is to attain to power or to retain it, it must not only be as 'the strong man armed,' but it must inculcate in its citizens the manly virtues of patriotism, loyalty, and heroism. Though Bacon tells us that 'no nation need expect to be great unless it makes the study of arms its principal honour and occupation,' the axiom has not received general acceptance of recent years.† In

* The book was published in 1851.

† "The sufferings entailed on man by every international conflict, the suspicion that wars have too often been entered upon without justification, or without a clear understanding of the purposes to be served from them, and the growth of human

England, in the British Colonies, and to some extent in America, it became the fashion some years since to talk of wars as improbable, to eulogize the theoretical merits of arbitration, and to advocate the substitution of a cosmopolitan altruism for Old-World patriotism.* In England, the peace-at-any-price party and the Cobden school urged that energies should be directed to the arts of peace and money-making; and though recent events in America and Europe have shown that wars are still the last arguments not only of the kings, but of the peoples, the teachings of the Free-Trade League still remain with us as pious opinions to be accepted at least in theory."

Our forefathers have raised a mighty empire, but it is for us to keep it. Our principal danger is the jealousy of the other Powers; a jealousy of our wealth, of our industries, of our colonial possessions and of all the power which these give us. Our prosperity tempted Napoleon, and this temptation is stronger now, when our wealth is immensely greater than it was in his days.

One of the results of Great Britain's power at

sympathy which rightly shrinks from every form of violence, have given rise to a widespread feeling that war is wicked in itself, and might perhaps, by political arrangement, be rendered unnecessary." —"Imperial Defences," p. 1.

* Quite recently, on the 26th of July, 1896, there was a grand demonstration in Hyde Park, convened by the promoters of the Trades Union Congress, with the following programme :— "To warn the world at large that wars must cease, and that capitalists who make wars must be no more."

sea, is that hardly anything occurs anywhere in the world without her having something to do with it. It is this fact that irritates the continental mind. There is evident proof that there is a diffused dislike to British activity in every part of the world, and that much ill-feeling is stirred up by the foreign press, which never loses an opportunity of misrepresenting the policy of our country, and of saying disagreeable things about us. To these writers nothing is too unscrupulous for perfidious Albion; every little incident is used to heap on us unmeasured abuse. Foreign Powers, wilfully ignoring that their subjects in our colonies enjoy the same means of acquiring wealth as our own people,* are too ready to turn small difficulties into international questions, which may at any moment give rise to serious complications.

Our national debt was incurred in opposing the threatened domination of Napoleon. Great Britain knows what the help she gave to Europe in Europe's time of trouble cost her, and how the liberty and independence of many states on the continent would have been impossible had she been less lavish with her gold. On the continent it is often forgotten that the many years of peace which

* "What sometimes they seem to forget is, that every Colony of the British Empire, every new country which is brought under civilization and under the British flag, is open to them, and open to all foreigners, just as freely and with as little restriction as it has been to our own subjects. Is there any one of them that can say the same?"—Speech by the Right Hon. J. Chamberlain at the South African dinner, May 21, 1896.

Europe enjoyed after Waterloo were due to the immense sacrifices made by this country.

In 1793 the total debt of Great Britain was two hundred and sixty millions sterling; in that year began the wars with France, which, with a slight interruption, lasted till 1815. In the twenty-two years which followed, there was hardly one of the European states, not even excluding France, that did not receive large sums of money to assist them in holding out against Republican and Imperial France. These sums were received as direct subsidies; as payment for special troops; as loans, of which Great Britain always found the capital, and, in many cases, also the interest; or as guaranteed loans. The Austrian campaigns of 1805, of 1809, and others, would not have been possible without the funds which Great Britain in some way or other provided.

The national debt at the time of the peace of Amiens, 1803, had already increased to six hundred and twenty millions; after the Waterloo campaign it had reached the figure of eight hundred and eighty-five millions. The struggle for the empire of the seas and for the liberty of the continental states of Europe, had cost Great Britain no less than six hundred and twenty-five millions. Most of the millions advanced to the German states have never been repaid; the last instalment was received in 1823, since which the remaining sums have been added to our national debt.

These sacrifices were made in the interest of peace, and now we read "England has become great only by promoting or causing and fomenting continental wars, during which she amassed her Colonial Empire, and developed her commerce and industry at the expense of the Continental States, while the latter were bleeding to death; and she can maintain her position only by the same means. Her watchword is *Divide et impera.* This fact indicates the only correct policy to be pursued towards those intriguers who are constantly undermining the peace of Europe." * When we look at the wars which have occurred in Europe from the fall of Napoleon to this day, there can be no doubt that, with one exception, they were all *promoted, caused,* or *fomented* by circumstances over which Great Britain could exercise no influence.

In the days when Continental Powers were less prepared for war than they are now, Wellington saw in the indifference of our nation a great source of danger. The country is certainly much to blame for its apathy and unconcern for dangers which, though dubious, are still too possible. Were it not for the dread of invasion and of the ruinous consequences which such a calamity would bring about, our preoccupation in amassing wealth is such that we should forget to spend enough money to keep an adequate fleet and army. "We studiously keep aloof from entering into any obligations abroad,

* *Hamburger Nachrichten,* October 9, 1896.

we refrain from seeking useful alliances, with the too probable result that other Powers will stand looking on when we are attacked.*

The two following passages occur in an article in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, "Prince Bismarck and the Position of England." † "England will not give up Egypt, but does not feel herself a match for Russia and France, and is, therefore, casting about for help—hitherto, and, let us hope, in future, in vain, so far as Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary is concerned."

* * * * *

"A wise policy must, therefore, take care that we hold aloof from England's conflict with France and Russia, which will not seek war with us, when fighting England in three continents, and that we shall reserve our strength in order to be able to throw it into the scale when things come to be arranged."

The occupation of Egypt is no doubt a great bone of contention. The motive for that occupation lies chiefly on the necessity for guarding the main route to the far East. To appreciate the importance of this point we must look at the use made of the

* In 1835 Cobden went so far as to express himself against our having a foreign policy. What surprises one is that a clever man could have been so led away by his favourite project as to believe it possible that a country which did business all over the world could limit itself to a trading intercourse and nothing beyond it.

† See *Standard* of Tuesday, 21st of July, 1896.

Suez Canal. In the year 1894, 2386 British ships, with a tonnage of 8,326,826, passed through the Canal. The French, the tonnage of whose mercantile navy comes next after the British and the German, passed through that highway in the same year only 185 ships with a total tonnage of 710,990.

Foreign nations cannot divest themselves of the suspicion that we are actuated by some selfish motive in everything we do. English policy is always misunderstood, for they always pretend to see in our actions some hidden scheme of self-aggrandizement. Even in the performance of the duties incumbent on a great civilizing power, England is accused of a second motive.

Naturally some one is constrained to assume the unpopular *rôle* of alarmist, and to sound a note of warning, to make the nation open its eyes to the dangers to which the country is exposed. To maintain both the army and the navy, the bugbear of invasion has to be constantly paraded before the people, a course which is not creditable to a nation which has raised a mighty empire in all quarters of the world.

The question of invasion, as far as our islands are concerned, must not be dismissed on the score of impracticability. No one would dare to question the military knowledge and ability of Napoleon or Wellington, yet both of these great captains were persuaded that an invasion of our islands was a military possibility. We must not allow ourselves to believe for one single moment that it was set at

rest because the greatest military genius of the century had to abandon his cherished scheme; for, had fortune given him amongst his admirals a man of enterprise and nerve, he might possibly have succeeded.*

The great ambition in our days is to overcome the difficulties of nature; the more arduous a matter is, the greater the inducement to study and discover some means for conquering the difficulties which encompass it. Prudence enjoins that the subject of invasion be examined in all its bearings, because steam, by multiplying an invader's power and chances, has made such an operation far more feasible than it was in the time of Napoleon. An attempt to invade England is still a risky enterprise, but no longer an impossible one.

An invasion of the European Island Empire is not absolutely necessary to affect our position; the invasion and loss of any of our possessions abroad would be sufficient to lower our prestige as an all-powerful nation.

"Steam power offers to an enemy such prospects of success in an invasion as he never had in the days when ships were dependent on wind and weather. Armies now can move more easily and speedily by sea than was practicable heretofore; and ships propelled by steam make it possible to take a

* But for the fortunate chance of Captain Battersby noticing the direction followed by Villeneuve's fleet, Napoleon's plan might have been successful.

country by surprise. The mercantile marine abounds in large steamers built for passenger traffic, with enormous engine power to enable them to make rapid crossings. On these accommodation can be found for a large number of troops. Under the new conditions, an adversary can better conceal the object of his preparations; he has no need for concentrating all his forces at one point; the preparations can be set going in several and far-distant ports, the measures being so concerted that the different contingents furnished by each one are able to concentrate at, or about, the point selected for the landing by a given date.

An invasion might be conducted with singular secrecy resulting in a thorough surprise. If the enemy is taken quite unawares, or the bulk of his forces are away in other quarters; if the force landed is sufficiently strong and ably led, it might conclude the war on its own resources, and from what it may be able to appropriate and extort from the invaded country, without having to put much dependence on its communications by sea.

This, certainly, would be a very exceptional case, yet it is more or less what occurred in the Norman invasion.

In our days the study of the art of war has made great strides, and all manner of problems are carefully worked out by the great general staffs. From this, as well as from the state of readiness in which all continental armies are kept, we may well

conceive that an invasion of a country by sea would be conducted on very sound lines.

We should take into account that a combination of two or more Powers might, at any time, bring on an invasion, and that whilst attention is closely riveted to one part of the coast, there is the liability of being attacked in quite another quarter. The French Channel Fleet alone is already nearly a match for the English, and its junction with the Russian Baltic Fleet would put an end to England's superiority in the waters in which the conflict must be decided.

The late Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, in his parliamentary evidence, referring to England, stated, "She is not prepared for a land war, a war as we would make it. The English have not the warrior spirit; and if we have war with them we should have but one thing to do, that is, landing." We have taken his words, for, if we mistake not, they represent more or less the general opinion of his country. It is difficult to conceive what gave the gallant Admiral a right to say that the British are deficient in warlike spirit, when more than one of his own countrymen have paid tribute to the worth of our soldiers. He had evidently forgotten the judgment passed by a distinguished French officer, who had served for seven years in the Peninsula, Marshal Bugeaud. "*L'infanterie anglaise est la plus redoutable de l'Europe; heureusement il n'y en a pas beaucoup.*" Did not Soult before the battle of

Waterloo warn Napoleon of the stubbornness of the British troops? Emerson, a still better judge of national character, wrote of the British nation, "Though not military, yet every common subject is fit to make a soldier of."

Napoleon did not undervalue the resistance he was likely to meet after landing. His army of invasion numbered 160,000 men. Now that the population has more than doubled, that we have a well-organized and efficient force of 229,500 volunteers, that the telegraph can transmit information to the furthermost parts of the kingdom, and railways can move troops with great rapidity, it may be doubted if that number would be sufficient for an invasion of our shores.

In 1801 the population of the United Kingdom was 15,896,412 souls, in 1895 it amounted to 39,134,166. The population of France, which was, in 1801, 27,500,000, is now estimated at 38,500,000, and at the present moment our population possibly exceeds that of France by one million of souls.

Let us grant that Admiral Thouars' estimate of seventy thousand men may be sufficient for an invasion of England, there still remains the last part of his statement, "and if we have war with them, we should have but one thing to do, that is, landing." There is the rub, that is the most difficult thing of all. Napoleon said, "Give me the command of the Channel for twenty-four hours, and England will have lived!" When he used those memorable

words the great conqueror had not yet experienced the stubbornness of the British soldiery. Only a few years later, in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, the tenacity with which the British troops can hold their positions was fully revealed. All the dash and courage of Napoleon's best troops could not prevail against them.

Is it reasonable to imagine that their stubbornness would have been a whit less when called to fight in defence of their country? History certainly is full of examples of the superiority of veteran and trained troops over new levies, however numerous and brave; nevertheless, it teaches that men fight best when they bear arms in a good cause. What better cause can there be than fighting in the defence of the fatherland? We recall the words of a popular novelist, who justly wrote that "The most ennobling of all warfare is that which defends home from the aggression of an invader." *

The Spaniards and the French always counted on being welcomed with open arms by a section of our people; a fatal mistake, for such is the deep-rooted contempt in which our people hold all aliens, that any co-operation on their part is the last thing likely to occur. If France ever had a chance of gaining this co-operation it was in 1690, when there was a party bent on restoring the ex-king.

James observes, "Being in the constant habit of perusing, by the aid of an interpreter, the contents

* "The Gladiators," by Whyte Melville.

of the London newspapers, Napoleon must have seen, with a feeling of bitter disappointment, the formidable preparations that were making to resist his army on landing; those to obstruct the passage of the flotilla he cared less about, having, as already has appeared, no intention to make the attempt unless his fleets were in temporary possession of the Channel." * What must also have added considerably to his vexation was the want of confidence his naval experts had in the favourable result of the attempt. Decrès, his Minister of Marine, had gone so far as to declare his plan as "horribly dangerous."

There is a point, in the case of an attempt against our islands, which is often overlooked. In an invasion by sea we must not look at the millions of men that foreign powers can place in the field, so much as at the amount of tonnage that will be required to convey an army across the ocean. The mercantile marine of only a few states can supply sufficient tonnage to convey a respectable force by sea without seriously interfering with their trade. It has been shown in Chapter VII. how the transport of 53,746 men has been estimated to require 134 large ships, or 457,112 tons of shipping; now, according to a return published in the month of January, 1896, the aggregate tonnage of the principal mercantile marines (vessels of a hundred tons gross and upwards) stood as follows:—

* James, "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 319.

	Tons.
England	13,227,185
Germany	1,886,812
France	1,094,752
United States	994,675
Italy	778,941
Russia	487,681

As we have seen, the transport of a force can be done with fewer ships, and a country at war can certainly obtain shipping on hire from other nations; yet the invasion of a first-rate power will demand a force considerably greater than the one given above. It is not intended by this at all to infer that we are not to trouble ourselves too much about an invasion, for even in the face of difficulties, an able commander may find a way to carry his plans into execution. National apathy would only make the way easier for him.

Great Britain has several times escaped invasion by sheer good fortune, as her enemies did not understand how to make proper use of their opportunities. On two memorable occasions they had more than a fair chance of carrying it into effect, for with them rested the mastery on the sea. In March, 1690, ten thousand French soldiers landed in Ireland to aid the dethroned king, James II. The king brought with him from Brest a fleet of thirty line-of-battle ships, seven frigates, and some fire-ships. A second trip made by the fleet brought over Count Lauzun * and about five thousand

* The appointment of Lauzun to command the troops was bad, and was made against the advice of Louvois.

seasoned French troops. The landing was effected without molestation by the English fleet. The English naval forces were then in a disorganized state, and when the news reached Admiral Herbert that the French had landed at Kinsale, he was only just getting his fleet together.

When William III. crossed over to Ireland, in June of that year, he had a fleet of two hundred and eighty transports convoyed by six ships-of-war. He reached Carrickfergus on the 14th; his army was thirty-six thousand strong. The French fleet was not properly made use of, for it could have easily intercepted William's large flotilla of transports when passing from the Dee to Belfast Lough. In moving south from Belfast, the fleet of transports, convoyed by a small fighting squadron, conformed with the march of the army, keeping abreast of it; the troops were supplied from the ships. To meet the French in Ireland, William had left England unprovided with regular troops, and the Government, oblivious of this, and despising the French, took no steps to prepare against invasion.

On the 30th of June of that year, the combined English and Dutch fleets were defeated by Admiral Anne Hilarion de Costentin, the Count de Tourville, in the battle of Beachy Head. The French had a fleet of seventy-eight men-of-war and twenty-two fire-ships; of the allies, the English had thirty-four sail, and the Dutch twenty-two. On the other side of the Channel a considerable army

was cantoned under the orders of the celebrated Marshal Louis de Crevant, Duc d'Humiers, waiting to embark for England.

The Earl of Torrington,* who commanded the allied fleets, was loth to risk a battle with such inferior forces, and, though ordered to fight the French, he determined not to hazard all. He engaged only a part of his fleet, and let the brunt of the battle fall on the Dutch. After the action he sought refuge in the Thames, where he caused all the buoys to be removed, which made the navigation of the river so dangerous that Count de Tourville did not dare to follow him. Never was there a more promising chance of a successful invasion of England than after the defeat of the allied fleets at Beachy Head. Notwithstanding that their fleets held the absolute command of the Channel for the nine months which followed, so much so that no ship flying the red cross of Saint George could venture there, the French did not make any proper use of their advantage.

"On the 22nd of July, De Tourville anchored in Torbay. His fleet, consisting of one hundred and eleven vessels, sailing ships, and rowing galleys, had on board a considerable number of troops. The French Admiral had been led by the Jacobites to

* Two years before, Admiral Herbert had given great dissatisfaction to his officers and men by leaving the French in full possession of Bantry Bay. To appease this discontent, William III. made a special journey to Portsmouth, and created Herbert Earl of Torrington.

believe that the whole of the population of England was impatiently expecting their foreign deliverers. He was soon undeceived, for the population turned out as one man against him. He sent his galleys to Teignmouth,* seventeen hundred men landed, and wrecked the place; after which exploit the French, seeing the numbers of armed men that were collecting from all quarters, became impatient to depart. De Tourville showed an utter want of enterprise; all he did was to publish a pompous description of the expedition. But the wanton cannonade and desecration of the churches at Teignmouth did much to exasperate the people against the French, and showed them their boasted deliverers in their true colours.

In 1692, an army of twenty thousand men was destined to land on the Sussex coast; but by that

* In the fleet De Tourville brought to Torbay, there were a number of galleys, long and narrow vessels, propelled by from fifty to sixty large oars, each one worked by five or six slaves, who were kept at their work by the lash. The full complement of one of these ships was one hundred and fifty officers and soldiers, with a crew of three hundred and thirty-six slaves. The Most Christian King, Louis XIV., was so very proud of this fleet that he had a medal struck in commemoration of this experiment. The English sailors predicted that the first gale would send these galleys to the bottom, for, as their decks were not more than two feet from the water, they deemed them unfit for sea. In fact, like the ancient trireme, they generally had to keep close to the shore, and could only venture out to sea when the weather was extra fine. But, unfit as these galleys were for a voyage on the Atlantic, they possessed one good quality, and that was the ease with which the combatants could step ashore.

time the English had profited by experience, and the superiority of the attacking and defending fleets was the reverse of what it had been in 1690. A fleet, consisting of 99 sail, armed with 7144 guns, and carrying 41,711 seamen and marines—Dutch and English—was assembled in the Channel, under the command of Admiral Edward Russell.* The French fleet, which mustered 63 ships with 20,000 men, and was again under the direction of Count de Tourville, despite its numerical inferiority, attacked the British near Cape La Hogue. The battle commenced a few minutes after eleven in the morning, and from that moment till one o'clock both fleets plied their guns with equal fury. De Tourville, who was not much in favour of an attack, had been reprimanded for having shown great want of enterprise after his victory at Beachy Head. He soon found out that, contrary to the expressed opinion that the English seamen would not fight stoutly for King William, they were animated by great spirit; his men had fought well and valiantly, and he deemed he had done enough for the honour of his flag. A retreat now commenced, and, but for a fog that came on at about four in the afternoon, the French fleet would have been involved in inevitable ruin.

* This member of a renowned family was bred to the sea. On Lord William Russell's judicial murder he quitted the court. He was a strong supporter of the Revolution, and distinguished himself as one of the most eminent naval commanders of William III.

The *Soleil Royal*, the *Admirable*, and the *Conquérant* reached Cherbourg, but were driven ashore and set on fire by Admiral Sir Ralph Delaval. The other French war-ships had sought refuge in the bay of La Hogue, close to the very camp of the army destined for the invasion of England.

Admiral Russell blockaded the enemy's ships, but his exploits were not at an end, for he planned an attack for the 23rd of May. At twilight, a flotilla, consisting of sloops, fire-ships, and all the boats of the fleet, two hundred in number, full of armed men, put off with orders to proceed up the bay and destroy everything that was there. The boats first pulled for six men-of-war anchored under the guns of Fort Lisset. Exposed to a severe but badly-directed cannonade from the forts and batteries, the British boarded the three-deckers, lashed all the vessels together, and set them in flames. As the tide turned, at eight o'clock, the boats came back to destroy the ships moored under the guns of Fort St. Vaast, where King James II. had his quarters. The vessels were soon won, and, as the ships were taken, their guns were levelled at the batteries on shore. After having silenced the batteries, all the French vessels, transports, and store-ships were set on fire, King James, De Tourville, and Marshal De Bellefonds looking on helplessly.

In the great battle of La Hogue the French

lost sixteen of their finest ships, amongst others the *Soleil Royal*—the pride of the French navy. This double victory on the sea and in the bay put an end to the contemplated invasion of England, and made ample amends for the disaster of Beachy Head. James wrote to the King of France, who had hitherto always been victorious, urging him to cease to support the cause of so unfortunate a prince.

The French made another attempt in 1774 to forward the cause of the Stuarts by aiding the young Pretender. The English, however, assembled a large force in the Downs, and De Roquefeuille, seeing the great odds arrayed against him, deemed it prudent to retire.

Our near neighbours who have conferred on our country the obloquious title of "Perfidious Albion" have ever been devising how they could bring about an invasion of our islands. Nevertheless, they have lost heart whenever it has been within the reach of possibility. In 1778 Spain joined the league of France and the revolted American colonies against England, and in the following year the joint fleets of France and Spain rode masters of the Channel.

Their combined fleets from Brest and Ferrol amounted to sixty-six sail-of-the-line, with fourteen frigates and smaller vessels. To oppose these England had not more than thirty-seven sail-of-the-line, with twenty-four smaller vessels. The country was never in greater peril; for a whole month the enemy's fleet was in possession of the entrance to

the Channel, and along the French coast from Havre to St. Malo were fifty thousand soldiers ready to be ferried over to our shores.

But, to start with, the Spaniards little relished serving under the supreme command of a French admiral, and irritating delays marked the commencement of the joint venture. Constant east winds, scurvy, which carried off one-sixth of the crews, dearth of provisions and of water, were made to account for the collapse of the undertaking; but it was bad management and want of accord which really saved England from her enemies. D'Orvilliers, the French admiral, did not know how to turn his superiority to account, finally the approach of a Dutch convoy, mistaken for the enemy, led to the great fleet quitting the Channel.

If our people were more familiar with the history of their country, they would realize what serious risks have been run in the past, and how near the brink of invasion the apathy and the heedlessness of the nation has often brought it.

England's greatest danger would be, if she found herself at war, to maintain one of her largest possessions abroad, say India or Canada. This would cause a considerable call on the military forces of the country and the absence from our islands of the best military talent. Our weakness would then be our adversaries' opportunity.

There still remain two instances of attempted invasion to notice, in both of which there is a certain

analogy. In either there had been careful preparations, and there was an army of picked soldiers, led by a skilful commander, on the other side of the Channel, ready to be carried over in a flotilla of small boats as soon as a powerful fleet had secured the command of the passage. In both the collapse of the undertaking was brought about by the want of the mastery on the sea.

The Spanish Armada, according to one account, was a fleet of about a hundred and thirty vessels, not including those under two hundred tons. These vessels carried 3165 guns, 8760 sailors, and 21,855 soldiers, with a very large quantity of arms and ammunition. Professor Laughton's estimate is—

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Men.	
130	57,868	2431	8050	Seamen
			18,973	Soldiers
			1382	Volunteers, etc.
			2088	Rowers
	Total		30,493	

A commander, to give greater lustre to his victories or to inspirit his troops, is apt to overstate the strength of the enemy he has beaten and the difficulties he had to contend against. The same applies to a nation, and in the true interest of history Professor Laughton did good work in showing the real strength of the opposing fleets in 1588.* His

* "The Invincible Armada, a Tercentenary Retrospect," read by Professor Laughton at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, May 4th, 1888.

arguments show clearly that the gallant defenders of our country had not tremendous odds to overcome, and that in ships, in seamen, in guns, and in gunners, the English fleet was superior to the Spanish.

Sir Edward Creasy, on the subject of the ships, writes: "Although the number of sail which the Queen's Government, and the patriotic zeal of the volunteers, had collected for the defence of England, exceeded the number of sail in the Spanish fleet, the English ships were, collectively, far inferior in size to their adversaries; their aggregate tonnage being less by half than that of the enemy. In the number of guns, and weight of metal, the disproportion was still greater." * Professor Laughton, on the other hand, says: "There is no doubt, however, that the Spanish ships looked larger. Their poops and forecastles, rising tier above tier to a great height, towered far above the lower-built English . . . The difference offered a great advantage to the Spaniards in hand-to-hand fighting; it made their ships leewardly and unmanageable even in a moderate breeze, and, added to the Spanish neglect of recent improvement of rig, rendered them very inferior to the English in the open sea.

* * * * *

"More important, however, than even this inferiority of the Spanish ships and sailors, was the inferiority of their guns and gunners. Now here I

* Sir E. Creasy, "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World."

come on to what is, I believe, to most of you, new ground. You have always been accustomed to hear of the number and size of the Spanish guns. The statements to that effect are absolutely incorrect. The Spanish guns were, as a rule, small—4, 6, or 10-pounders; they were comparatively few, and they were execrably worked." Laughton quotes the following words from Duro.* "The cannon was held to be an ignoble arm; well enough for the beginning of the fray, and to pass away the time till the moment of engaging hand to hand, that is, of boarding. Actuated by such notions, the gunners were recommended to aim high, so as to dismantle the enemy and prevent his escape; but as a vertical stick is a difficult thing to hit, the result was that shot were expended harmlessly in the sea, or at the best made some holes in the sails, or cut a few ropes of no great consequence."

This powerful fleet, which made its appearance off the Lizard on the 19th of July, was to sail along the French shore, avoiding the English fleet, and reach the Straits of Calais, there to effect a junction with the Duke of Parma. This officer, renowned for high military genius, had collected a squadron of war-ships at Dunkirk, and a flotilla of other ships and flat-bottomed boats for the passage of a picked body of troops across the Channel. All this was not done without immense toil and skill, thousands

* "La Armada Invencible," por el Capitan de Navio C. Fernandez Duro, vol. i. p. 77.

of workmen being employed night and day. These preparations comprised one hundred vessels, built at Antwerp, Bruges, and Ghent, laden with provisions and ammunition; together with sixty flat-bottomed boats, each capable of carrying thirty horses; and one hundred smaller vessels, equipped at Nieuport, and thirty-two at Dunkirk, provided with twenty-two thousand empty barrels, and with materials for making pontoons, for stopping up the harbours, and raising forts and intrenchments.

The army which these vessels were designed to convey to England amounted to thirty thousand men, besides a body of four thousand cavalry, composed chiefly of the ablest veterans of Europe.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada is too well known to need repeating. On the 29th of July, eight fire-ships scattered the fleet about, and the last and decisive battle between the fleets was fought within sight of Gravelines. In this the English fleet expended all its ammunition. It could do no more, the Spanish Admiral was driven northward, and the junction of the Duke of Parma's forces was effectively hindered. Lord Effingham left a squadron to continue the blockade, but the Duke soon withdrew his troops. The defeat of the Armada laid the foundations of our empire.

In 1588 and in 1805 England was threatened by two of the most powerful rulers that have ever lived. In his critical and historical essays, Lord Macaulay draws a comparison between Philip II.

of Spain and Napoleon. He shows how the territories over which the former ruled in Europe, Asia, and America constituted an empire which was undoubtedly one of the most splendid that ever existed. Philip's power over Europe during several years he rates higher than even that of Napoleon. He held, during the greater part of his reign, what no other prince in modern times has held, the dominion both of the land and of the sea. Even after the defeat of the Armada, English statesmen continued to look with dread on Philip's maritime power. In his time Spain had what Napoleon desired in vain, ships, colonies, and commerce.

Let us now look at the measures which Napoleon took for the invasion of England. The army of England, according to Jomini, was to consist of 120,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, 8000 dragoons, to be mounted in England, 4000 artillerists, 450 field-guns, and 7000 horses. Two thousand two hundred bateaux, shallops, and pinnaces, armed with five thousand cannon, were prepared to transport the troops the moment our fleet was clear of the Channel.

This army was encamped for two years on the shores of the Channel, and its organization had been brought up to the greatest state of perfection. Napoleon set down its strength at a hundred and sixty thousand men. It was of the most formidable description with regard to its numerical strength, the material character of the troops, the

experience and ability of their leaders, and the extent and perfection of its equipment. Everything had been provided for; the Emperor's genius for organization had not overlooked any detail. Everything depended on whether his fleets would be able to give him what he so ardently desired —the temporary command of the Channel.

The invasion of England by means of flat-boats and gun-boats, had for a long time been a favourite plan of the Emperor. He had suggested it to the Directory in 1797, he took to it again in 1801, and three years later he gave to it gigantic proportions. Napoleon's idea of taking his legions to England had considerably augmented since the peace of Amiens. He did not want to frighten England, but to conquer it.

The Emperor took for his model the arrangements made by William the Conqueror, who ferried his army across the British Channel in a multitude of small vessels. The following table, taken from the *Précis des Evènements*, shows the different vessels of the flotilla which lay in the seven ports facing the English coast, and the number of men and horses they were to carry over.

Flotilla.	Ports.							Total of vessels.	Total.	
	Etaples.	Boulogne.	Vimereux.	Ambleteuse.	Calais.	Dunkerque.	Ostende.		Men.	Horses.
Prames		13		3	1			17	1,920	840
Bombardes, Paquebots, and Avisos ...	1	11						12	480	56
Gun vessels—										
French	217	530	144	1	2		30	924	89,885	676
Dutch				135	14	131		280	28,038	404
Caïques corvettes de pêche and péniches	1	22			81			88*	9,315	233
Vessels of war ...	219	578*	144	139	98	131	30	1339	130,638	2219
Transports	146	526	92	34	105	26	25	954	30,577	6840
Grand total	365	1104	236	173	203	157	55	2293	161,215	9059
Crews of transports									2,430	
									163,645	

James† tells us, "The flotilla was separated into six grand divisions. The first, under the designation of the left wing, commanded by Rear-admiral Jean-François Courand, and stationed at the port of Etaples, was destined to carry the troops from the camp of Montreuil, commanded by Marshal Ney; the second and third, called the left and right wings of the centre of the flotilla, under the respective commands of Rear-admiral Daniel Savary and Capitaine de vaisseau Julien le Ray, occupied the port of Boulogne, and were destined to carry the troops from the two camps to the right and left of the town, commanded by Marshal Soult; the fourth, named the right wing of the flotilla, commanded by Capitaine de vaisseau François Henri Eugène

* These figures are given as they stand in the work, but are incorrect.

† James's "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 315.

Daugier, occupied the port of Vimereux, and was to carry the corps of Marshal Lannes, composed of sundry divisons of light infantry, among which were those of the grenadiers of the advance and of the reserve. The Gallo-Batavian flotilla, assembled at the port of Ambleteuse, under command of Vice-admiral Ver-Huell, formed the fifth grand division of the expedition, and was to carry the troops commanded by Marshal Davout. The sixth or reserve division, lying in the port of Calais, under the command of Capitaine de frigate Charles l'Evêque was destined to transport the division of Italian infantry, and several divisions of dragoons mounted and dismounted.

"The first four grand divisions only had a regular organization; each was separated into two portions, called 'escadrilles'; and each of the latter was to embark a division of the army, composed of four regiments of the line, and one of the light infantry, with its cavalry, artillery, and baggage."

Referring to the preparations for the invasion of England, Napoleon said, "The perfect order which reigned in this immense flotilla—the frequent exercises by which I habituated the troops to embark and disembark in less than an hour at an appointed signal—the care with which each man was instructed in his particular duty—in a word, everything had been provided that could secure success to this grand operation."

"Anxious to have ocular proof of the degree of

celerity with which the army could be embarked, Napoleon, who arrived at Boulogne on the 3rd of August, ordered the operation to be executed twice in his presence. The result surpassed his belief. Although the troops had to march from camps, the extremities of which were more than two miles from the point of embarkation, an hour and a half after the beating of the *générale* men and horses were all on board." *

According to Napoleon's own words, "But three weeks was time enough for me to make my descent, enter London, ruin the shipyards, and destroy the arsenals of Portsmouth and Plymouth. The rapidity with which I hoped to strike the important blow, and to return to France, was the principal circumstance upon which I based my hope of success; I overlooked neither the rashness nor the difficulty of the enterprise." To Montholon he said, "London is situated only a few marches from Calais; and the English army scattered for the purpose of defending the coasts could not have joined in time to have covered the capital once the descent had been actually made."

"Je voulais réunir," says Napoleon, in a note dictated after his return from Boulogne,† "quarante ou cinquante vaisseaux de guerre dans le port de Martinique, par des operations combinées de Toulon, de Cadix, de Ferrol, et de Brest; les faire

* James's "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 316.

† "Précis des Evènements," tome xii. p. 315.

venir tout d'un coup sur Boulogne; me trouver pendant quinze jours maître de la mer; avoir cent cinquante milles hommes et dix mille chevaux campés sur cette côte; trois ou quatre milles bâtimens de flotille, et aussitôt le signal de l'arrivée de mon escadre, débarquer en Angleterre, m'emparer de Londres et de la Tamise. . . . Il a cru que je me proposais de passer de vive force par la seule force militaire de la flotille. L'idée de mon véritable project ne lui est point venue."

In the following words, Mahan shows that the British Government was not as ignorant of the Emperor's plans as he supposed: "About the beginning of May it was known in England not only that the Toulon fleet had sailed, but whither it was bound; and about the first of June, despite the cautions about secrecy imposed by Bonaparte, the British were informed by a prisoner that the combined fleet, of sixty sail-of-the-line, will fight our fleet (*balayer la Manche*), while the large frigates will come up Channel to convey the flotilla over. The troops are impatiently awaiting the appearance of the ships to set them free." *

When, on the evening of the 15th of August, Admiral Villeneuve decided to make sail for Cadiz, in lieu of continuing his course in the direction of Brest, Napoleon's scheme collapsed. By the end of the month the mighty host which had for months

* "Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire," Captain Mahan, vol. ii. p. 158.

threatened England from the camps of Montreuil, Boulogne, Ambleteuse, and Ostende was hurrying towards the Rhine. Writing to Talleyrand on the 25th of August, the Emperor says, "My decision is taken; my movement has begun."

Prince Metternich relates how in a long conversation he had with Napoleon, in 1810, the Emperor admitted that his preparations at Boulogne were principally made to hide his hostile intentions against Austria, and only to cause uneasiness to England.* It is difficult to believe that he was sincere in this declaration, and that his combinations, so costly, so thoroughly calculated, and so minute in all their details, were only intended as a blind to conceal his real purpose.

Napoleon failed too much on the point of veracity to make his confidence to Prince Metternich of much value. All through his rule he showed such unbounded animosity towards England that if he could have crushed her he would have done so eagerly. It is on record that when the peace of Amiens was broken in 1803, and Napoleon dismissed the British ambassador, he told him that all his efforts would be directed towards an invasion of England. The threat was not an empty one, for in the month of May of that same year he commenced his preparations for carrying the invading troops across the Channel. It may have pleased Napoleon's vanity to assign a different reason for the collapse

* "Mémoirs de Prince de Metternich," vol. i. p. 38.

of his designs, still it would have been more magnanimous to have acknowledged that the attempt was really intended to destroy the main obstacle in his path to universal dominion, and failed because there were too many difficulties to overcome.

How otherwise are we to interpret his words to Villeneuve, "I hope that you are at Brest. Get under way; lose not a moment. Bring my united squadrons into the Channel, and England is ours! We are all ready; everything is embarked. Be here but for twenty-four hours and all is ended." *

Napoleon's words to Metternich were: "The very day an insurrection broke out in England, I would have sent over a detachment of my army to support the insurrection. I would not the less have fallen on you, for my forces were echeloned for that purpose." It is not clear where the Emperor saw any prospect of an insurrection in England, and his forces, massed on the western frontier of France, were strongly echeloned for an irruption into Austria.

Thiers has described the outburst of rage to which the Emperor gave way when Decrès told him on the 22nd of August that Villeneuve would next appear at Cadiz, and how Daru was sent for, to take down the instructions for the march to the Rhine. If this story were only true, it would fix in an unmistakable manner the date on which the preliminary orders for the Austrian campaign were issued. Many incidents related about Napoleon

* Thiers, "Consulat et Empire," vol. v. p. 245.

belong to the realm of romance, and Lanfrey ridicules the fable of the Emperor improvising and dictating to Daru the plan of his magnificent campaign in Germany. "He had," he writes, "thought of it for several months, reserving to himself, it is true, the choice of the moment, and he had already taken a great many preliminary precautions, which, however, in no way diminish the merit of the conception." * In short, the Emperor was fully prepared for a failure in his plans for the conquest of England.

Napoleon's admirers have maintained that the project of invasion was a mere feint, yet there are a thousand proofs that the Emperor was really in earnest, and that he thought seriously of his project. As one of the proofs, Lanfrey cites the medal prepared for issue. It bore the image of Hercules stifling in his arms the giant Antæus, with the words *Descente en Angleterre;* underneath, in small letters, *frappée à Londres en* 1804. To Villeneuve the Emperor wrote, "Votre seul passage nous rend, sans chances, maître de l'Angleterre." He knew too well that England had the means for subsidizing the states of the continent and keeping them in arms against him, consequently that it was the Power which it was most desirable to crush.

He was not the man to submit to such a disappointment; it was imperative for him to try some other field where he might gain the victory. Having

* Lanfrey, "History of Napoleon the First," vol. iii. chap. i.

been accustomed to make his plan in two ways, so as never to be taken unawares, he had promptly to resolve on some bold step which would conceal the mortification he felt owing to his failure, and as he did not seek at this time to conciliate his adversaries on the continent, but rather to provoke them, this was not difficult.

It was Pitt who found work for Napoleon's troops elsewhere, by forming a powerful coalition in the centre of Europe ; and Austria offered the first opportunity for war by invading the territory of Bavaria. Alison puts it that the Austrians, seeing the French so completely engrossed in their preparations for crossing the Channel, passed the Inn and invaded Bavaria. Napoleon had declared that he should consider an attack upon Bavaria as a formal declaration of war. According to Lanfrey, Murat, who was travelling in Germany in a private capacity, reported that the Austrians crossed on the 18th of September, so that the French troops had been nearly three weeks on the march before receiving any provocation from Austria. Napoleon may have gladly availed himself of any favourable pretext to hide the discomfiture of his plans against Great Britain, but it is astonishing, if he had no other object but to mislead his adversary, that he should have thought of commencing a campaign by a march of four hundred and twelve miles.*

* From the Channel to the Rhine the distance was three hundred and ninety-five to four hundred and twelve miles; the French army took twenty-five and twenty-six days to cover it.

Napoleon, in comparing his undertaking with Cæsar's, said, "He (Cæsar) had a fleet superior to the miserable barks of the Britons both in number, in strength, and in skill. He was certain of arriving at port, and certain of his means of retreat; more still, he went to certain victory. I, on the contrary, was to attack the most industrious and proudest nation of the globe; a nation that ruled the sea with one hundred and forty heavy ships of war, armed with fifteen thousand cannon; a nation presenting a population of fifteen millions of inhabitants; a nation that in a little time could oppose to me, even deducting Ireland, at least two hundred thousand men, unwarlike it is true, but animated by a love of country. The expedition of Cæsar was child's play; mine the enterprise of Titans."

Entirely apart from her well-appointed fleets,* in 1805 England had made preparations to an extent before unknown in her history. An ancient enactment of Henry III., which bound all citizens below the age of sixty to exercise themselves in the handling of arms, was again put in vigour. To nearly one hundred thousand troops of the line were added eighty thousand militia, and a force of three hundred and fifty thousand volunteers sprang up and attained—looking at the shortness

* In 1802 the British navy had seven hundred sail, of which one hundred and forty-eight were of the line. In 1813 there were a thousand ships—two hundred and fifty-six of the line—measuring about nine hundred thousand tons, and carrying one hundred and forty-six thousand seamen and marines.

of time—considerable efficiency in the use of arms. Unwarlike and inexperienced these troops may have been, nevertheless, the love of country by which they were animated constituted, a factor which a consummate leader dared not despise.

It is too much the fashion to decry the troops which England would have to depend on in case an invader, after overcoming all resistance at sea, should land on our shores. It is apparently forgotten that fighting in the defence of one's country has in all ages led to great efforts in battle. Miltiades was fully alive to the great numerical inferiority of the Greek, when he counselled an attack of the Persian army on the Plains of Marathon; he, nevertheless, had formed a just estimate of the enthusiasm by which the Athenian soldiers were animated, and calculated that he could count on no ordinary heroism. At that period the Medes and Persians had proved themselves invincible; but the events of the battle showed what an incentive to gallant deeds is a strong spirit of patriotism.

In 1588 England showed how this spirit of patriotism is stronger even than religious fanaticism. In spite of the anathema fulminated against Queen Elizabeth by the Church of Rome, the English Catholics proved themselves loyal to their Queen and true to their country.

Whatever arguments it may have pleased Napoleon to adduce in accounting for the collapse

of his designs against England, Cæsar had not such an easy task as the Emperor tried to make out. True enough that all the elements of success were on his side, that he had quite recently conquered the Gauls, that his war-galleys were more than a match for the miserable barks of the Britons, that he led an army of veterans, and that he had nothing to contend against but an ill-armed and badly-disciplined horde; nevertheless, his first invasion, conducted with too small a number of troops, made no impression on the islanders. He accordingly withdrew his soldiers from our shores—as soon as they had repaired their ships, which the first tempest had considerably damaged. His intention was to return the following year with a much larger army.

In the winter of 699–700 U.C., he sailed a second time for the Kentish coast, with a transport fleet of eight hundred vessels, carrying five legions (about twelve thousand men) and a body of two thousand horsemen. It was the formidable appearance of the Roman armament that so discouraged the Britons in this instance as to make them abstain from resisting the disembarkation.

In its ultimate results, Cæsar's second invasion was not much of a success, for the General achieved no victory, the soldiers did not acquire any booty, and Rome never received the annual tribute stipulated with Cassivellaunus, and took no steps to exact it.

Napoleon's demand for twenty-four hours' command of the Channel, after all, was nothing but a phrase, for we have his own words to show how he needed to be master of the Channel for a longer period. In one instance, he writes: "Make us masters of the Straits of Dover, be it for five days";* in another he shows that he needed to be master of the Straits for two or three weeks. Whatever period he may have deemed necessary, we may speculate on what would have happened had a British fleet appeared after the French had reached the coast. With the best arrangements, a disembarkation of a large number of combatants, horses, guns, war materials, and provisions on the beach requires several consecutive days and moderate weather. An attack, carried out with the vigour and intrepidity which was such a marked characteristic of the officers of the British navy in those days, upon a mass of crowded transports could have had no other result for the invaders but an unheard-of catastrophe.

According to James, "Even admitting that the Channel, Mediterranean, and North Sea fleets of England were away, were there no other ships to check the course of the flotilla? Let but a breeze have blown from any point of the compass, and innumerable frigates—heavy frigates too—sloops, bombs, gun-brigs, and cutters would soon have been on the spot. No shoals or shore-batteries

* "Correspondance de Napoléon," 16e Juillet, 1805.

would then have interposed to prevent the guns of the British from producing their full effect. The more numerous the French troops, the greater would have been the slaughter amongst them, the greater the difficulty for the sailors to manœuvre the vessels. Confusion would have ensued; and the destruction or flight of a part of the flotilla would, in the end, have compromised the safety of the remainder. Every hour would have brought fresh British vessels to assist in the general overthrow." * The writer continues to review the chances of the flotilla getting across in a calm. He shows the difficulty of managing such a fleet, such a large number of vessels possessing different powers of progression, with cross-tides and partial currents; how the delays and confusion were likely to augment if a breeze sprung up.

If a leader has not the mastery at sea, he may try to evade the enemy's fleets and baffle their vigilance. The result, however, cannot be a lasting one; and, when the enemy recovers from the surprise, the invader—in the case of our islands—would find himself entirely cut off from the mother country. He might be victorious on land, but, not being able to repair the waste of war, would, sooner or later, have to succumb.

Mahan shows how this contingency did not escape the attention of Hoche in his expedition to Ireland, in 1796. The success of the proposed

* James's "Naval History," vol. iii. p. 316.

invasion really depended largely upon the co-operation of the disaffected inhabitants; Hoche, nevertheless, did not make the mistake of trusting to them for the most serious part of the work. No less than seventeen thousand troops were to be embarked; and, as the General recognized that the difficulties would by no means be over when Ireland was reached, and that the British navy, if successfully eluded by the expedition, would, nevertheless, seriously interfere with subsequent supplies, he insisted upon carrying with him what supplies he could, and, consequently, he took as many ships as could be had in Brest.

The troops embarked consisted of—

Infantry	...	...	...	14,110
Cavalry	...	...	...	2,000
Artillery	...	...	...	1,200
		Total	...	17,310

The cavalry had no horses. The fleet prepared at Brest comprised sixteen sail-of-the-line, fourteen frigates, six corvettes and smaller vessels, six lighters, and twenty transports.

Hoche had to overcome a good deal of opposition. Truguet, the French Minister of Marine, was dead against his plans; Vice-admiral Villaret-Joyeuse disagreed with him, and had to be removed; the naval officers had no sympathy with his schemes of invasion, and dreaded meeting the British fleet after leaving port.

The French attached considerable importance

to the capture of Ireland; it always entered into their plans to turn to profit the animosity which the Irish people nurtured against England. Sir Robert Wilson * relates that when General Hutchinson's army had drawn near to Cairo, in June, 1801, the camp was startled by the loud report of a *feu de joie*, fired by the garrison of Cairo. Many conjectures were made on this singular celebration, when a Maltese deserter came into camp and reported that it had been ordered by the French General to celebrate the capture of Ireland!

Hoche's objective, Bantry Bay, was well chosen, for it lay only forty-five miles from Cork, which held an enormous amount of stores and provisions. Had Napoleon in 1805 succeeded in landing on the Kentish coast, he would not have found a place close at hand so well stocked in stores as Cork was. He would have found a population animated by a love of country, and possibly not one ready to second his efforts.

The accident which separated Hoche from the greater part of his fleet, and deprived the expedition of its guiding spirit, was caused by fear of being overtaken by a supposed British cruiser. Neither of the two portions, however, took advantage of a favourable wind. Having sailed from Brest on the 16th of December, the frigate *Fraternité*, with Vice-admiral Morard de Galle and General Hoche

* "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," by Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 124.

on board, arrived in Bantry Bay only on the 8th of January. Thirty-six other ships were assembled at Cape Clear on the 21st of December, but did not attempt to make for their anchorage. The following day the wind shifted, and the ships were scattered up and down the bay. Soon provisions began to run short. Some ships were forced to sea, and in the afternoon of the 27th the rest left the bay.

Marshal Grouchy, who has been accused of having largely contributed to bring about the loss of the battle of Waterloo,* was second in command of the expedition, and flinched from landing the French troops in Bantry Bay. He was on board of the *Immortalité*, Rear-admiral Bouvet's ship, which left the bay on the night of the 26th, and deserted the rest of the fleet.

In our last wars with France, the French, encouraged by Irish malcontents, made five attempts in two years to land their troops in Ireland. In this instance they had made ample preparations to aid a general uprising of the Irish population. They brought over with them forty-one thousand one hundred and sixty stand of arms, twenty field-pieces, nine siege-guns, sixty-one thousand two hundred barrels of powder, seven million musket-

* This is a much-disputed point. In his orders, however, the Marshal was directed to approach the main French army, so as to unite his communications with the Emperor's. This he neglected to do, and instead led his force more to the right, away from Napoleon.

cartridges, and seven hundred thousand flints. But, if they did not show much spirit in their fear of falling in with Colpoys' fleet when coming out of Brest, they did not show more pluck when they came to take in the situation; and, with all the welcome they expected from the Irish, they seem to have been appalled by the fear of having to deal with British troops on shore.

An invasion, or a hostile entrance into the domains of another Power, is pre-eminently a daring operation. In this particular instance there was not a single atom of boldness recorded, and such a travesty of an invasion could redound to no one's credit.

In any case it is very doubtful if Hoche would have received much assistance from the population. There were many Irish malcontents in France at that time, and they had persuaded the French that they had only to show themselves for the population to rise and welcome them. Nothing shows more clearly the perfect ignorance of the French as to the ideas and feelings of the Irish people than the injudicious proclamation which was distributed after Humbert's landing.* It declared that the chief aim of the French was to free the Irish peasants from the fetters of religion, and the frauds of priestcraft. The revered head of their religion was called an impostor.

* General Humbert landed at Killala Bay on the 22nd of August, 1798, with from a thousand to twelve hundred men.

With reference to Hoche's attempt, Sir Archibald Alison very properly observes, "The result of this expedition was pregnant with instruction to the rulers of both countries. To the French as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on even a great fleet, and the unforeseen disasters which frequently on that element defeat the best-concerted enterprises; to the English as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion; that in the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her sailors, nor the valour of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions." *

* Sir A. Alison, "History of Europe," vol. iii. p. 197.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PER MARE, PER TERRAM.

Uncertainty as to a field army being on the right spot to meet the invaders—Battleships are better adapted for the purpose —Sufficient land forces must be kept independently of the fleet—Circumstances which may interfere with its proper action—The French navy endeavours to correct past faults —A superiority at sea annulled by a combination of two or more fleets—Examples of a fleet detained by contrary winds —A blockading fleet driven from its rendezvous—Difficulties of preventing elusion—Labours of our naval commanders in enforcing blockades – Ignorance as to the enemy's intentions —Concentration of fleets at sea with hostile intent—Serious predicament should any of these circumstances occur in the absence of the land forces—The defence cannot be intrusted to the navy alone—Mahan's opinions as to the necessity for fortifications and an army—Arguments of the Royal Commission in 1860 on this point—Napoleon's observations regarding the weakness of England—Strong opinions expressed by some naval officers—Difference of opinion in the two services—The maintenance of adequate land forces may lead to an attempt being abandoned—Foreign opinion as to the inadequacy of our army—Inability of the present system to give us the army that we should have—Objects for which we require it—A proper estimate to be made of the forces absolutely needed, and care taken that they are always at our command.

WHATEVER measures may have been taken for the defence of a coast, by observing great secrecy, or

by diverting attention by means of false reports and demonstrations, it is possible for the aggressor to deceive and out-manœuvre his adversary, and to induce him to leave some important point inadequately guarded.

Were the guarding of a long extent of coast entirely relegated to the land forces, their commander would be harassed by the uncertainty of being able to place a sufficient body of troops in the right spot at the right moment. The speed of battleships, on the other hand, enables them easily to come up with the enemy in any quarter; and these movable forts are, without question, a better protection, for a long stretch of coast than a field army.

Coast defences—a large number of scattered works and batteries, and a field army—can never replace the supremacy at sea; once this is lost, an invader is sure, sooner or later, to find some weak spot where he will try to effect a landing.

The best way of warding off an invasion, therefore, is to overcome the enemy at sea, and to destroy his naval force as soon as possible. The adversary must be prevented from reaching the land; and this can only be done by the naval forces attacking him boldly at sea. Nevertheless, as it is prudent to provide against surprise or a series of adverse circumstances, the land forces of a state must be maintained in sufficient numbers, and be located in time of danger in such a manner

as will favour a rapid concentration at any threatened point.

We should always bear in mind Raleigh's truth, "It is more difficult to defend a coast than to invade it." No one will deny that an insular nation like ours should never permit a hostile force to reach its shores, consequently that any attempt at invasion should be frustrated at sea. This evidently was the meaning of Raleigh's words, "Surely I hold that the best way is to keep our enemies from treading upon our ground." The patriot, nevertheless did not close his eyes to the possibility of a reverse, for he added, "Wherein if we fail, then we must seek to make him wish that he had stayed at his home." This last part of the sentence very clearly proves that Raleigh intended to convey that, should the fleet from any reason whatsoever fail to intercept the invaders, his defeat must be undertaken by the land forces.

The art of war is now much studied, and armies are kept in a greater state of preparation than in Raleigh's time; when war comes, it is so sudden, that a nation which cannot stand forth fully fitted for a conflict is certain to be beaten. Owing to the proximity of the continent of Europe, the attacks to which England is liable are of the most serious nature, and, unless we have a home army sufficiently strong, well equipped, and organized to crush the invader after he has landed, we may be conquered.

Such is the unbounded confidence which our naval officers have in the efficiency of their branch of the service that it seems almost high treason to their mind for any individual to believe that anything might happen to our fleets to keep them away at a critical moment. The various accidents and mischances which may jeopardize the naval forces are many. There is always a possibility of a defeat at sea. With all the confidence we are bound to place in the power of our navy, are we for ever to be everywhere superior at sea? Who can foretell what reverses may not overtake an army or a fleet? Who could have thought it possible, for example, that the monarchy which Frederick the Great had left in 1786 one of the greatest powers of Europe, could in 1806 be utterly crushed in seven weeks? Bad strategy, a serious reverse, or exceptional circumstances may at any time wrench from a navy its reputed superiority.

A failure of our naval forces is an unpleasant prospect to contemplate; our national pride, indeed, will hardly let us believe such a thing possible. Is there, nevertheless, any reason why in the future some nation may not put forth a bold and skilful naval commander who may get his fleets to do what Nelson accomplished?

Great Britain has not been at war with a naval power since the introduction of steam fleets, heavy-armoured battleships, and fast cruisers have thoroughly altered the conditions of naval warfare.

The superior seamanship which once constituted the foundation of British supremacy at sea has been levelled with the application of steam. We can no longer boast of being able to sail our vessels with greater skill than others, or to get more speed out of them by a judicious adjustment of the sails and trimming of the ship. It is now a question of speed and manœuvring as much as ever, for the power of bringing about, accepting, or refusing a battle must always lie with that side whose fleet is superior in point of speed.* It is speed that will give to a naval commander the option of compelling the enemy to fight him, or of avoiding an engagement when greatly inferior in strength; but this speed is the result of build, of machinery, and of consumption of fuel, and not so much as formerly of nautical craft.

The old wooden battleships could stand a prodigious amount of battering, and still keep afloat. In the action of the 19th of May, 1652, in the Downs, Blake's own ship, the *James*, of eighty guns sustained the greatest damage; it received a thousand shots; its mainmast was carried away, its rigging torn and cut; its hull was pierced between wind and water so that seventy holes could be counted. In the action on the 29th of November 1652, Blake's flagship, the *Triumph*, was reduced to a wreck. The foretopmast was shot

* The standard of speed in a fleet is determined by the pace of its slowest vessel.

away, the mainstay was gone, the sails, the tackling were all in strings. The hull was shattered and pierced with hundreds of shot; the survivors of the crew were hardly sufficient to man the guns. At the bombardment of Algiers, the *Impregnable* received 233 shots in its hull. Now, when two fleets draw nigh and close with each other—as our ships were wont to do in the old days—such are the effects of the powerful guns, of the ram, and of the torpedo, that even the best-handled ship runs a great chance of going down or having to be taken out of action. In manœuvring under steam there is much greater risk of collision with a friend.

As yet there has been no opportunity to show which is the nation that holds the predominance in naval tactics. Our officers and seamen, there is every reason to believe, are as good, brave, and efficient as they were, and have not ceased to be animated by the splendid record of the past; nevertheless ours is not the only nation which has devoted considerable attention to its navy.

In our days both branches of the national forces are striving to attain great efficiency. The French, our principal opponents in the last century and in the early part of the present one, have not failed in fathoming the causes which led to their disasters at sea. The principal ones were the bad effect which the Revolution had on their navy; the emigration and removal of many of their best naval officers; the emptiness of their arsenals; the inefficiency of

their crews—men picked up at random, often at the time of sailing; their want of discipline and little knowledge of gunnery; bad tactics, and want of boldness in issuing forth to attack the enemy at sea. One of the principal requisites in fighting is confidence. What confidence the Republican navy could have had can be estimated by the following passage contained in a letter from Admiral Brueys to the Minister of Marine. "Our crews are too weak in number and quality of men. Our ships, generally speaking, are very badly armed, and I consider that it needs a good deal of courage to burden one's self with the leading of fleets so badly furnished." * Villeneuve, in 1805, when in course of giving effect to Napoleon's great scheme, writes to Decrès, "Our naval tactics are out of date; we only know how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for." Again he writes to him from Vigo, "Two squalls of north-east wind have caused us damages; because we have bad masts, bad sails, bad rigging, bad officers, and bad sailors. . . ."

Fully recognizing in their defeats the results of these many causes, the French have striven to remedy all this, and to make their navy a truly formidable instrument. Their officers are highly trained, and eager to restore the prestige of the French navy; the crews are now picked men, full of intelligence and discipline, and their gunnery has

* Aboukir, 9th of July, 1798.

immensely improved. Other nations—above all the Germans—are likewise steadily working to raise the efficiency of their naval forces.

The more powerful foreign navies become, the more it behoves a country having an extensive seaboard to provide a second element of defence.

Independently of a defeat at sea, a considerable portion of our naval forces may be employed in distant expeditions, in protecting far-away colonies, in patrolling the trade routes to prevent the food supply and merchandize being cut off. All the world knows to what injuries and disasters is exposed anything that floats on the water. There are chances of collision; or a continuance of heavy gales may at any time compel the fleets to seek shelter and repair damages; or the coals may have run out. There may be considerable difficulty in blockading the enemy's ports and preventing hostile fleets putting to sea. There may also be a combination of two or more navies, or a well-devised and secret concentration in distant waters, with the object of undertaking sudden offensive operations.

A combination of two or more navies may render a fleet so inferior in number as not to be able to try issue with the enemy with any prospect of success. In 1854 the Russians had two squadrons in the Black Sea, mounting 1908 guns, and manned by 18,500 seamen. These two squadrons were more than sufficient for the protection of their coast in the south in ordinary circumstances, and

had quite recently destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope. When, however, the allies declared war against Russia, and their fleets entered the Black Sea, their united strength was nearly double what she there possessed.

Had the Emperor Nicholas entirely relied on his fleet, the capture of Sebastopol would have been an easy matter. But at the time when the Allies landed near Eupatoria, according to the best accounts, the Russians had an active army of 50,500 men available for operations in the field. When questioned on this point, the Tartars at Eupatoria stated that the garrison of Sebastopol consisted of forty thousand men; that there were besides fifteen thousand men between Eupatoria and Sebastopol, and an army south of that town sent to meet any attack coming from the direction of Kaffa.

Kinglake computes the force which Prince Mentschikoff had in the Crimea in September, 1854, at the time when the Allies landed, to have been made up as follows:—

The army...	51,500
Local companies...	1,000
Stationed marines	2,666
Seamen of the Black Sea Fleet	18,500
Artillerymen appropriated to the coast defences	2,708
Total	76,374

The simple fact of there being a fleet ready to measure its strength with the enemy is not always a

sufficient guarantee. Take as an example the case treated in Chapter XV.: when William III. sailed for the coast of England, Dartmouth had a fleet powerful enough to try issue with the Dutch. Contrary winds, however, prevented its leaving the Thames, whilst rough weather damaged the frigates sent out to gather information. James had no reserve fleet; and although in 1688 the regular army was the largest he had ever commanded, when William reached Torbay there were no land forces to contest the landing, as the only measures the King had taken were for hindering a disembarkation in Yorkshire.

The above is an instance in which a contrary wind kept the fleet from coming out of the Thames; a century later we have a case in which a fleet was driven from its appointed rendezvous by foul weather. In 1796 Admiral Colpoys with fifteen sail-of-the-line had orders to watch Brest where it was known that unusal preparations were being made. His fleet had been blown away, but four frigates under the command of Sir Edward Pellew remained to keep watch. As the French put to sea on the 16th of December, Pellew sent one frigate to England, two to Admiral Colpoys, whilst he remained in the *Indefatigable*, and as night closed in, tried to mislead the French by firing guns and rockets. The frigates sent to apprise the Admiral of the event, could not find him, for the winds had driven his fleet from the appointed

rendezvous, twenty-four miles to the west of Ushant. When, on the 22nd of December, Colpoys received the news, he could not surmise the direction the French fleet had taken; neither had the British Government any idea that Hoche's purpose was to effect a landing on the coast of Ireland.

In the beginning of this century the blockading of the ports of France and Spain, two contiguous countries, did not offer insurmountable obstacles; but what very materially helped in this was the little daring displayed by the French and Spanish admirals. Matters would be different were our enemies not inclined to admit our superiority at sea, and operating from points wide apart.

In our last war with France the conception was that no portion of the French navy should put to sea without the prospect of being immediately attacked by a superior force. With all the vigilance observed by our officers, however, it seemed impossible to prevent evasion. Alison states that in 1801 the British Government was alarmed by their experience that, notwithstanding our great maritime superiority, it was impossible at all times to prevent a vigilant and active enemy from putting to sea during the darkness of the autumnal and winter months.*

Of the flying visit paid by the French squadron under Missiessy to the West Indies in 1805, he wrote: "The successful issue of this expedition

* Alison, "History of Europe," vol. v. p. 604.

excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleet might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions." *

Let us give an example to show how ready in those days the British squadrons were for any occurrence. On the 19th of January, Nelson's fleet was in the Mediterranean at anchor in the roadstead of Agincourt. This bay at that time bore the name of the British line-of-battle ship *Agincourt*, and is situated near the Straits of Bonifacio, sheltered by Magdalena Islands. Two of his frigates, the *Active* and the *Seahorse*, suddenly appeared in sight, flying the signal: "The enemy's fleet has gone to sea." It was three o'clock in the afternoon when the frigates cast anchor near the *Victory*; by 4.30 p.m. the fleet was out at sea.

The wearisomeness of watching the enemy in port during our last war with France is vividly depicted in the following passage, which occurs in one of Collingwood's letters, written before Cadiz.† "I have little to tell you from here; the enemy's

* Alison, "History of Europe," vol. v. p. 320.

† Whilst Nelson had the good fortune of gaining fresh laurels, Collingwood, whom we can justly call his competitor, and whose conciliatory measures at a critical moment had done so much towards restoring discipline in the navy, from the day of the battle of Cape St. Vincent to that of Trafalgar, was doomed to be employed in inglorious blockades.

squadrons are quite ready for sea, but in the upper part of the harbour, out of the way of storms, while we continue to watch them that they may not go out without an encounter. A battle is really nothing to the fatigue and anxiety of such a life as we lead. It is now thirteen months since I let go an anchor, and, from what I see, it may be as much longer." *

Our naval commanders, who were seriously in earnest, had not an easy time of it in those days. James, in his account of Nelson's return from the West Indies in 1805, states: "On the 19th of July the British fleet anchored in Gibraltar bay; and on the 20th," says Lord Nelson in his diary, "I went on shore for the first time since June 16th, 1803, and from having my foot out of the *Victory*, two years wanting ten days." †

We can hardly picture to ourselves what would happen without an army in case the action of the enemy's fleet partook of the nature of raids, landing on the coast and engaging in the destruction of valuable public and private property. In 1760, at a period when the British navy had completely crushed that of France, and when its superiority at sea was manifest, the French commodore Thurot, as we have seen in Chapter V., landed a body of troops at Carrickfergus. But for the disagreement and obstinacy of Brigadier-General de Flobert, the

* After the peace of Amiens, Collingwood saw his wife and two daughters from whom he had been parted for ten years.

† James's "Naval History," vol. iv. p. 340.

French would have found no difficulty in capturing Belfast, and imposing a heavy contribution on the town.

During dark and overcast nights or in misty weather, there will be many opportunities for steamships to get out to sea. They are not obliged to wait for a favourable wind; they can hide their lights, and no one will know the direction they have taken. A fleet may start in pursuit, but, as ships leave no trace after they have passed, who will be able to tell whither to go?

There have been instances in which, due regard having been observed in keeping the object of an expedition from becoming known, every other destination but the real one was imagined. Thus, when Bonaparte sailed from Toulon, in 1798, there were many places like Naples, Sicily, Morea, Portugal, or even Ireland, where it was conjectured that he might be leading his troops.

In his instructions to Nelson, Earl St. Vincent writes: "The object whereof appears to be an attack upon Naples or Sicily; the conveyance of an army to some part of the coast of Spain for the purpose of marching towards Portugal, or to pass through the Straits, with a view of proceeding to Ireland." * No one appears to have entertained the idea that the General was bent on carrying his soldiers to the banks of the Nile.

When Hoche quitted Brest in 1796, the British

* Ville de Paris, off Cadiz, May 21, 1798.

Government seems to have had no conception that he contemplated a landing on the Irish coast. Our greatest naval commander never fathomed Napoleon's real object in sending his fleets to the West Indies. Collingwood made the nearest approach to it, as he wrote to Nelson, "it was to take off the naval force, which is the great impediment to their undertaking." For all that he believed that the united French fleets were intended to be employed in an invasion of Ireland.

The enemy may strive to keep his plans from becoming known by a skilfully-arranged concentration at sea, where there are no telegraphs to impart information. As there is always a chance of mercantile ships being stopped to obtain news of his movements, he will naturally avoid the most frequented sea routes. Once he has got clear of the coast, he will find no great difficulty in doing so, as these trade routes are now pretty well known.

If, under any of these adverse circumstances, or through such a series of disasters at sea as we have no example of, an invader has been able to effect a landing, a country will be entirely at his mercy if there is not a sufficient force to hold the principal arsenals and dockyards, to stay his progress, and defend the capital.

In framing a scheme of defence for our shores, we are bound to place our trust in the navy, but not on the navy alone. Let there be no mistake, the officers of the land forces have not lost faith in the

sister service, and are unanimous in admitting that the fleet must ever be the first bulwark of our islands. Nevertheless, war being a series of chances and surprises, they very justly consider it indispensable to have a second one, which shall comprise all the land forces.

The army does not desire, in any way, to dispute that England's navy should be strong, but it raises its voice against the exaggerated idea which some naval officers uphold, viz. that the defence of the kingdom and empire is a matter to be left entirely to the navy, and that in this the navy will not tolerate any interference. A purely naval war between this country and another could never end in absolute victory; it must be left to the army to finish it. The army, therefore, has a right to expect that its wants are not forgotten.

Mahan rightly observes, "That the navy is the first line of defence, both in order and importance, by no means implies that there should be no other. This forced and extravagant interpretation, for which naval officers have been largely responsible, of the true opinion that the navy is the best protection for a sea frontier, has very much to do with that faulty strategy which would tie the fleet, whatever its power, to the home ports, and disseminate it among them. Navies do not dispense with fortifications nor with armies, but when wisely handled they may save a country the strain which comes when these have to be called into play, when

war, once remote, now thunders at the gates, and the sea, the mother of prosperity, is shut off."*

The Royal Commissioners † appointed in 1860 to inquire into the question of spending twelve millions on the fortifications of military ports, did not omit to take into account that circumstances might occur to prevent our fleet being at the right place at the right time, or that it might be dispersed by a storm, or overpowered. On these points they reported as follows:—"Should any such catastrophe occur, or should the fleet, from whatever cause, be unable to keep the command of the Channel, it appears to your commissioners that the insular position of the kingdom, so far from being an advantage, might prove a disadvantage for defensive purposes, inasmuch as it would enable any superior naval power or powers to concentrate a large body of troops on any part of our coasts, and more rapidly and secretly than could be done against any neighbouring country having only a land frontier; and an army so placed could maintain its base, and be reinforced, and supplied with more facility than if dependent on land communications."

If any further evidence is required to establish the necessity for an army to assist in safeguarding a sea-coast, we have it in Napoleon's letter on

* Mahan, "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," vol. i. p. 342.

† These Commissioners were experienced and able officers of the naval and of the military services.

England to Decrès, his Minister of Marine, 9th June, 1805, "Je ne sais pas, en vérité, quelle espèce de précaution elle peut prendre pour la mettre à l'abri de la terrible chance qu'elle court. Une nation est bien folle, lorsqu'elle n'à point de fortifications, point d'armée de terre, de se mettre dans le cas de voir arriver dans son sein une armée de cent mille hommes d'élite et aguerris. Voilà le chef-d'œuvre de la flotille; elle coûte de l'argent, mais il ne faut pas être maître de la mer que six heures pur que l'Angleterre cesse d'exister."*

In the previous chapter we have shown how King William III., on proceeding to Ireland in 1690, had depleted England of troops; in June of that year there were not more than ten thousand men left to guard the whole island. When the allied Dutch and English fleets were defeated at Beachy Head, by a rapid march the troops of Marshal Humières might have reached the shores of the Channel, and, if embarked in De Tourville's fleet, might in a few hours have been landed on the Kentish coast. We have seen De Tourville's futile attempt at invasion, and how readily the people came forward to meet the invaders. Macaulay's narrative on this point is well worth being quoted, and what makes it more valuable is the wisdom of its concluding sentence.

"The beacon on the ridge overlooking Teignmouth was kindled; the High Tor and Causland made answer; and soon all the hill-tops of the

* "Précis des Evènements," tome xi. p. 270.

West were on fire. Messengers were riding hard all night from Deputy-Lieutenant to Deputy-Lieutenant. Early the next morning, without chief, without summons, five hundred gentlemen and yeomen, armed and mounted, had assembled on the summit of Haldon Hill. In twenty-four hours all Devonshire was up. Every road in the country from sea to sea was covered with multitudes of fighting men, all with their faces set towards Torbay. The lords of a hundred manors, proud of their long pedigrees and old coats-of-arms, took the field at the head of their tenantry. Drakes, Prideauxes, and Rolles, Fowell of Fowelscombe, and Fulford of Fulford, Sir Bourchier Wrey of Tawstock Park, and Sir William Courtenay of Powderham Castle. Letters written by several of the Deputy-Lieutenants, who were most active during this anxious week, are still preserved. All these letters agree in extolling the courage and enthusiasm of the people. But all agree also in expressing the most painful solicitude as to the result of an encounter between a raw militia and veterans who had served under Turenne and Luxemburg; and all call for the help of regular troops in language very unlike that which, when the pressure of danger was not felt, country gentlemen were then in the habit of using about standing armies." *

* "The History of England," by Lord Macaulay, chap. xvi. p. 201.

This is what an enterprising commander can do. In 1814 several brigades from Wellington's army were sent to America. Major-General Robert Ross, a distinguished Peninsula officer, sailed for the Chesapeake, and landed his troops—four thousand five hundered men with three light guns—at Benedict, on the Patuxent. He marched up the right bank to Upper Marlboro', and at Bladensburg his progress was arrested by the United States troops—six thousand five hundred men, mostly militia, with twenty-six guns. After three hours' fighting these were defeated. Ross then pushed on, occupied Washington, and burnt the halls of Congress and other public offices. Jomini remarks on this feat—"To the great astonishment of the world, a handful of seven or eight thousand English were seen to land in the middle of a state of ten million inhabitants, and penetrate far enough to get possession of the capital, and destroy all public buildings; results for a parallel to which we should search history in vain."

The extreme navy school goes too far when it proclaims that the defence of the empire is a matter which simply concerns the navy. In March, 1889, at the Royal United Service Institution, a naval officer spoke thus: "But it seems to me that the case is so absolutely clear, that the defence of the empire is so absolutely dependent on the navy, that the other side are 'not in it,' to use a sporting expression. I do not wish to say anything in the

least offensive to the soldiers, but they are 'not in the hunt' in the matter." *

This opinion was uttered during a memorable discussion, one of the most interesting and longest which have been carried out at that Institution, on a paper read by Rear-admiral P. H. Colomb, on "The relations between local fortifications and a moving navy." The lecturer laid great stress on the vital importance we should set on the supremacy of our navy; this was admitted by the sister service, but he decried the construction of fortifications for the protection of our naval arsenals and ports.

The officer who opened the discussion, General Erskine, concluded his remarks in the following words: "It is not safe, I know, to utter prophecies, but I venture to predict on the present occasion that the conclusion of this discussion on which we are now entering will be somewhat to this effect, that the naval forces of the country should, in the first instance, be attended to; that they should be kept up in a state of strength and efficiency which would ensure, as far as poor mortals can control the future, our supremacy at sea; but that at the same time it would be unwise to dispense with the fortifications of our naval arsenals, and with the land forces which we have now at our disposal for the defence of our coasts." The concluding remarks of the Chairman, at the end of the second day's discussion, in fact, were to that effect.

* *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxlvii. p. 174.

On the 3rd of January of the same year the *Times* made an exaggerated statement which does not set a very high value on the stubbornness of our fellow-countrymen. "If the navy is made thoroughly competent for its work, no other defence for these islands or for the empire at large will ever be called into play. If the navy fail us, no other defence will avail to avert crushing disaster." This opinion may be acceptable to such of our naval officers who subscribe to the declaration—"By her navy England must stand or fall," but not to our people, who in the early years of this century showed that they intended to be as ready for the enemy on land as they were at sea.

There seems to be considerable difficulty in getting the officers of the two services to agree on the best way of ensuring the defence of the empire; and to see earnest men at loggerheads on the first principles of defence is not a pleasant sight. Unfortunately, the question hinges very much on the claim of the two services on the public purse, and on this point it is evident that one service should not suffer in the interest of the other. As the army and the navy are separately represented in the cabinet, and as there is no unity of direction in the sea and land forces of the country, it is questionable if we can expect to attain that thorough unity of design which is the essence of a good defence scheme. It is for this reason that we should all recognize the wisdom of delegating, the defence of

the empire to a Cabinet Minister, who, not being swayed by any service bias, may find some means for reconciling conflicting views.

We have an example of this in 1759. Great Britain was then ruled by an eminent minister who understood and thoroughly grasped the fact that it was his business to wield and to apportion the war resources of the nation. The result was that, instead of the course of action being left to be settled between the army and navy departments, it was laid down by the minister.

The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, speaking on this subject in March, 1896, said that there ought to be such mutual relations between the two great services that their combined work should ensure the adequate defence of the country. In any scheme of defence the navy and the army must be complementary to one another, and each must bear its share of the work which is common to both.

The lessons of history teach us that neither has ever been able to dispense with the other, and that it is only when they have worked in harmony that complete success has been achieved. Neither navy or army can alone carry out the defence of this country, for the simple reason that, wherever we go to war, ours must be not a passive, but an active defence, in other words, we must defend ourselves by attacking our enemies. No passive defence, in fact, can be fully successful.

An exhibition of unwillingness to defend one's self has never been productive of pacific results. History has at all times shown that to maintain its greatness a nation must before all things be a military power of the first order,* and ready to prove its superiority over others as often as it may be compelled to do so. The maintenance of a considerable land force will make it evident to the enemy that the only chance of success, after the risks at sea have been overcome, lies in attacking with numerous forces. An expedition on a large scale cannot be carried out by stealth, and the knowledge that the adversary is warned, that he has, besides the fleet, a considerable land force at his disposal, and that he has taken every precaution to prevent his being taken unawares, will often lead to the abandonment of such a risky enterprise as an invasion by sea.

An army is required not only to guard our shores, but to hold what territory we have with much toil and sacrifice secured abroad. We have a notable example of what the want of an army led to in the past, when, after seven years' trying, we were unable to reduce the 'revolted' American colonies to obedience. It will be urged that the intervening Atlantic was worth thousands of men

* In 1854 Germany looked on Great Britain as the defender of the independence of Europe against the ambitious designs of Russia. This benevolent feeling on the part of Germany changed when the Crimean campaign showed that our army and navy were not what they should have been.

to the cause of America, and that at that time France, Spain, and Holland all combined against Great Britain. Certainly in the War of the Revolution ours was the party overmatched; but did the Government at home ever make suitable efforts to stamp out the revolt; or was it that, ignorant of how to make war, they neglected to provide the army that was needed for it?

That was long ago; let us look at what is thought of our land forces on the Continent, now that the states of Europe are all under arms. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* of the 9th of October, 1896, says: "The British army is not sufficient for the defence of either the Mother Country, or of the Colonies, in the event of England having to fight an antagonist who, like Russia and France, is up to date both on land and at sea. England is not a match for a Russo-French coalition, and is utterly impotent against the united Continent. Nobody knows this better than the British Government, and that is the reason of their incessant efforts to set the Continental Powers by the ears." In these days of great general staffs, of military *attachés*, of parliamentary debates, of annual returns, of a free press, it is difficult to hide from the world the insufficiency of our forces.

The insufficiency of our army for the protection of our vast empire has often been urged, but, however well the question may have been argued, no practical scheme has been suggested for bringing

our land forces up to a just figure. It is but rational that with every increase of responsibility there should be a corresponding augmentation of force—we ask for nothing more; still, this principle of insurance is ignored, and an accession to our army is made simply a question of £ *s. d.* We often hear of there being three army corps and several brigades of cavalry complete, but any person who has some acquaintance with the British army knows too well how difficult it would be to provide them *complete*, if required at a given moment.

As far as the army goes, the country undoubtedly does not get a full return for the money it expends on it. The army is not a reality. There is no use in defending the existing system; it is not patriotic to do so, when it is universally admitted that a thorough change—not simply a patching-up—is necessary. We may be permitted to doubt if under the existing system of voluntary enlistment we can ever raise a much larger army—in the proper sense of the word—than we have now. Soldiering, even at home, is not popular; what must it, then, be when most of the service with the colours —the best years of a man's life—have to be spent abroad, in far distant and often unhealthy colonies?* It is this, quite as much as the low class of the

* Soldiering is not more popular with other nations, but they must bow to the inevitable, owing to a despotic law which cannot be evaded.

population from which our recruits are drawn, that deters men of a better class from enlisting. Besides, after seven years with the colours, soldiering has taught the man nothing that he can turn to account for earning a living.

Our present system will not give us what we require, and what conscription alone gives to other Powers. As this is too evident, we should strive to change the system. Conscription is not a blessing; still, some enactment which would compel all the able-bodied men of the population to acquire a given amount of military training could be easily devised. Such a system obtains in Switzerland, which is pre-eminently a peace-desiring country. If we are frightened by the question of expense, let us look how a small and anything but wealthy nation manages to do it.

Quite recently a Reserve Force Bill was being brought forward, providing that whenever any warlike expedition was contemplated, or in progress, the Secretary of State for War might, without any special proclamation, call out for permanent service any of the men of the first class of the army reserve during the first twelve months of service in that reserve. Would this be necessary if our army were such as it should be? What an admission that we have not sufficient made soldiers in our home army for a small expedition, often not employing more than ten thousand troops! Though the statement is frequently made, that the army was

never in such a high state of efficiency, the home battalions are unfit for active service abroad, and several makeshifts must be resorted to, such as drafting from other corps, composite battalions, etc.

What is left for our consideration is not what is good or necessary for to-day, but what will be required in the future, at a time when disputes will run high, and the greatest difficulty will be experienced in warding off hostilities.

In examining the question of invasion, we must look beyond these islands; we must consider the whole empire, in which there are land frontiers exposed to attack from powerful nations. The best way to prevent an invasion is to anticipate the enemy, to attack him on his own ground, to take the seat of war out of our country, and to preserve the population from the horrors of war. All this demands an adequate army and a thorough state of preparation.

When we look, therefore, at the objects for which we stand in need of a large army, we find that they are—first, to prevent an invasion of our shores by having an imposing force at home, with the power of forestalling the enemy and attacking him on his own ground; secondly, to guard our naval bases of operations abroad and the most important coaling stations; thirdly, to defend our colonies, and principally India and Canada, whose frontiers are greatly exposed.

In the cases of India and Canada, no fleet can

take a direct share in their defence; these countries are distant from the home base, and the land frontier lies far from the seashore. Russia, which is very near our Indian frontier, can put in the field two million five hundred thousand men, and, when a serious difference of opinion brought civil war in the States of the American Union, both sides raised large armies. In one of the most interesting works on that struggle* there is a table showing the number of men enlisted in the army and navy of the United States during the civil war. This number amounted to 2,778,304.

If we could honestly persuade ourselves that every individual in the home army was fit to go abroad on any contingency which might arise, we might rest satisfied, for who could wish a larger body of men to be kept under arms and withdrawn from useful occupations than is absolutely necessary? The home army, however, is not exactly what it should be; it is not ready for any emergency; it is full of half-made soldiers and recruits.† It is true that we have a tolerable reserve to bring up the home battalions to a

* "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," by T. Fisher Unwin, vol. iv. p. 767.

† In an army return, No. 107, published on the 13th of March, 1895, the number of recruits with less than one year's service is set down at twenty-eight thousand six hundred. As many youths misstate their age on enlistment, there must be many soldiers besides the recruits who have not sufficient stamina to undertake the hardships of a campaign without falling sick.

decent figure; still, as the reserve does not get a yearly training, many of the men in the last years of their reserve service must be somewhat rusty. Besides, if the reserve men are all taken for this purpose, how are we to make good the waste of the army in the field in the first months of the operations, when the inefficient left at home have not yet completed their training?

Let us take our army as it stood at the commencement of the present year. We had then available for service abroad in case of emergency—

Regular army	220,869
First-class army reserve	78,060
Second-class army reserve	82
Militia reserve	30,000
	329,011

Of the regular army, 76,995 were serving in India, and 26,000 in the colonies and in Egypt; the total available for service *anywhere* should therefore be reckoned at 226,016. From the paper strength of regiments a deduction of very nearly 25 per cent. will have to be made for young soldiers, insufficiently-trained recruits, and men who are absent, sick, or physically unfit. The numbers in the reserves will also be reduced by men who fail to appear, and by those found medically unfit. Looking at these figures and taking these deductions into account, can we thoroughly believe what responsible authorities tell us, that three army corps

and four cavalry brigades, amounting to 112,000 men, could be mobilized in two or three days in the event of war?

We have not had a serious war to test our present organization, and no war since the extension of the system of conscription has made it impossible for us to strengthen our army with foreign soldiers.

An army is as necessary for the prestige of a great country as the navy. We possibly do not need as large a one as continental states, where the adjoining frontier can be so easily crossed, but what we require is a greater state of readiness in the home army. The great point is to estimate exactly the force on which the maintenance of our present position actually depends. Given, as the experts assume, that it is necessary to have a hundred thousand or a hundred and fifty thousand men ready to protect our most exposed frontiers, or to act offensively or defensively in any other part of the world, the Cabinet should be held responsible that these hundred thousand or hundred and fifty thousand men, thoroughly trained, fit to go anywhere, and able to compare favourably with the soldiers of other powers, are always forthcoming when wanted.

We know there are serious difficulties in all this; nevertheless, the subject is of such vital importance that the nation must be educated to give it serious attention. Its existence as a powerful, wealthy, and free nation depends on it.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE DEFENCE.

Safeguarding the coast a matter of great importance—Best measures against invasion—A long stretch of coast cannot be protected alike at every point—Diversity of opinion on the proper manner of defending it—The navy is the best of all coast defences—Object of fortifying the chief ports and arsenals—Necessity for a careful study of a coast, and best lines of advance—Approaches defended by submarine mines—Moral effect of mines—Napier on mines at Badajos—Local submarine mining defences—Several measures for making the navigation difficult—Torpedo boats as protection for a coast line—Rapid information of the enemy's movements—Need for a proper scheme of defence—The coast to be looked at from an invader's point of view—Defence scheme to be tested by actual experiment—The coast to be patrolled by frigates and small steamers—Best moment for attacking the invader at sea—Korniloff's plan for attacking the Allies—The French fleet shut up in Louisbourg—The commander to raise the confidence of the defenders—The attitude of the population—Alternatives open to the defenders—Bonaparte censures Marmont's inactivity at Aboukir in 1799—Mentschikoff's remissness in resisting the landing in the Crimea—The landing to be resisted—Disposition of the troops for the defence—Difference in the conditions of the attacking and defending forces—Bodies of troops to be kept ready to meet a flank attack—Proper moment for attacking the

landing party—A threatening position taken some way back from the beach—Withdrawing to some position inland—Harold refuses to retreat on London.

A TREATISE on military operations beyond the seas would be incomplete if it only considered the subject from an offensive point of view. According to circumstances, a nation may have to play an offensive or a defensive *rôle;* therefore we cannot neglect to investigate what will be the proper course to pursue for frustrating a hostile landing on the coast.

To a country girt by the sea, or possessing a large sea-board, the safeguarding of the coast cannot but be a matter of great solicitude.

The principal measures for ensuring this object are—first, a strong navy with full freedom for attacking the enemy at sea, or, possibly, for blockading him in his ports; secondly, the protection of the principal naval ports, arsenals, and places of vital importance by the erection of defensive works, armed with guns equal in range and power to those carried by the most powerful battle-ships; thirdly, the provision of minor floating defences, torpedo boats, and submarine mines for the protection of bays, mouths of rivers or estuaries, and small harbours which offer facilities for a disembarkation; fourthly, an army or movable bodies of troops ready to resist a landing, or to meet the enemy in the field, should he have succeeded in gaining a footing on shore.

Success in frustrating a landing, beyond the action of the fleet, will depend on the attention paid to the protection of the coast. A long stretch of coast has the same weakness as a continuous line of works, which cannot be successfully defended at all points. To protect every part where a force might land by the erection of batteries and other works would lead to an enormous outlay. All that can be reasonably undertaken in this direction is the permanent protection of such points as are of vital consequence, and the capture of which would confer signal advantages on an invader for landing his troops and forming a good base of operations.

Though it may be assumed that the principal naval ports and dockyards—the indispensable bases for naval operations—are more or less kept in a permanent state of defence, still the many commercial ports, harbours of refuge, coaling ports, inlets and open beaches to be found around the coasts cannot be left totally undefended. If nothing else, the lesser naval and the great commercial ports and other localities which are the termini of important railway lines should not be left at the mercy of the enemy.

We cannot abstain from noticing the great diversity of opinion that exists on this point, and how tenaciously officers hold to their pet theories. Some would assign the defence of a coast entirely to fleets, and are loud in decrying every penny

spent on fortifications; others attach considerable importance to heavily-armed defensive works; some recommend the employment of submarine mines as the cheapest and most ready to hand of all defensive means; others advocate an attack of the invader's fleet and convoy by numerous torpedo and gunboats. All the advantages claimed for each plan are argued with considerable force, and show that the subject has been very diligently studied. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a sound system of defence must comprise a judicious combination of all these means.

At the time that Philip was arming for an invasion of England, Sir Walter Raleigh contended against the opinion of some of Queen Elizabeth's advisers, who recommended that the whole resources of the Government should be devoted to the equipment of the armies, and that the enemy, when he attempted to land, should be welcomed by a battle on the shore. He insisted, with good reason, on the importance of fitting out a fleet to encounter the Spaniards at sea, and, if possible, to prevent their approaching the land at all. "Surely, I hold that the best way is to keep our enemies from treading upon our ground: wherein if we fail, then must we seek to make him wish that he had stayed at his home. . . . But making the question general, the positive, *Whether England, without the help of her fleet, be able to debar an enemy from landing.* I hold that it is unable to do so; and therefore I think

it most dangerous to make the adventure. For the encouragement of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of being beaten, to the invaded, may draw after it a most perilous consequence.

". . . But I say that an army to be transported over sea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice of the invader, cannot be resisted on the coast of England, without a fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coast of France, or any other country, except every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army in each of them, to make opposition." *

The dreadful miseries of war, the ruin, the havoc, are such that we must strive to keep the enemy from treading on our soil. As in swordsmanship, to strike is held to be better than to parry, so the best of all means against invasion is to have the means for attacking the enemy in his own country. A knowledge that we possess this power would act as a deterrent on the adversary's projects of attack. To remain strictly on the defensive is an admittance of inferiority, which is sure to invite attack. It has been written of King Wladislas that no one dared any longer attack a people whose king, in place of attending a war on his own territory, carried it amongst others with such swiftness, that his arm, like lightning, often struck

* Raleigh's "Historie of the World," p. 799.

the enemy before he had the time to put himself on guard.

Though a decided superiority at sea is the best means for protecting a considerable extent of coast, still its defence must be intrusted partly to the naval and partly to the land forces. Mahan observes on this point, "The best of coast defence is a navy; not because fortifications are not absolutely necessary, but because beating the enemy's fleets is the best of all defences." He, however, adds, "Properly every seaport should be able to hold out for a length of time, longer or shorter, according to its importance, entirely independent of the fleet." *

The object of fortifying the chief ports and arsenals is to render them safe in case of attack, and to allow the ships-of-war to be employed in the most advantageous manner, viz. in keeping the sea for offensive purposes. The fleets are thus relieved from guarding the most vital points on the sea-board. With seaports adequately fortified and manned, no other alternative is open to an invader but to land his forces on the open shore, where he will find some difficulty in establishing a safe and convenient base.

Were the naval arsenals and ports not fortified, we might certainly have the mastery at sea, but the enemy's cruisers might evade observation, appear

* Mahan, "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," vol. i. p. 321.

before some important place, and do an immense amount of damage with their far-reaching guns. No commander of a cruiser, on the other hand, would think of attacking a fortified place, when he knew that he could not approach it close enough to do any appreciable damage.

Colonel Schaw, of the Royal Engineers, late Deputy Director of Works and Fortifications, demonstrates very clearly in the following words the advantages which the navy can reap from suitably-fortified ports: "The *rôle* of our navy is attack, not defence, or rather, defence by freedom to move wherever they might be wanted to meet an enemy or protect a friend. Our naval power must be felt at the utmost limits of our empire, and we cannot afford to chain our fleet or our sailors to our shores. The *raison d'être* of the defence of our military ports is to give a free hand to our navy, and to enable them to take the sea with the confident assurance that their bases of operations can be safeguarded in their absence." *

Though an invader will never think of wasting time in attacking places which are strongly fortified, and consequently difficult to carry, he should be given credit for attempting the disembarkation of his forces in such places only which could be turned into a good base for his subsequent movements, where he can find a good anchorage for his

* "Lecture on Coast Defence," *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxxxvii. p. 1150.

transports, and a secure asylum for all his military stores, materials, and provisions. A careful study of the coast and of the best lines of advance towards his objective, the capital, will show which are the localities most favourable for him. Those which present the greatest facilities for a landing would then, naturally, be strengthened by the erection of suitable works.

Not only are batteries and other works now armed with more powerful ordnance than in the past, but the approaches can be protected by submarine mines. Many localities which offer facilities for a landing can be rendered pretty secure by resorting to these invisible destructive engines of war, which can be manipulated by a few men with a minimum of exposure. The very uncertainty which encompasses the employment of submarine mines must make an invader very cautious in approaching the land.

The value of submarine mines is to a considerable extent of a moral nature. "There is something so horrible in the idea of being suddenly blown up without the slightest power to resist or retaliate, that mines, whether under ground or under water, have always, since their first introduction, had a most deterrent effect on attacks. The knowledge that certain waters are mined is certain to keep away from them any but the most determined or foolhardy captains, and it may be safely assumed that no modern fleet would risk the terrible danger

of running through a channel defended by submarine mines, until these mines have been in some way rendered harmless." *

There are no reasons for believing that our sailors are more bold than our soldiers, still, we know what an effect the report, or even mere supposition, that the ground under their feet is mined, has on the latter. In his description of the assault of Badajos, Napier writes: "And some of the soldiers immediately after, perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out, 'A mine!' At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops, who had not been stopped by a strong barrier, the deep ditch, the high walls, and the deadly fire of the enemy, staggered back, appalled by a chimera of their own raising; and in this disorder a French reserve, under General Veillaude, drove on them with a firm and rapid charge, pitching some men over the walls, killing others outright, and cleansing the ramparts even to the San Vincente." †

The principal aim of an invader must be to appear suddenly before some part of the enemy's coast which is known to be unprotected, and to throw his troops rapidly ashore. But if all the numerous places which cannot be protected by batteries and other defensive works were to possess means of submarine defence and a trained body

* "Coast Defence," Colonel Schaw, *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxxxvii. p. 1146.

† Napier's "Peninsular War," book xvi. chap. 5.

of men to manipulate them, drawn from the seafaring population of each place—men who are thoroughly accustomed to boat-work, and who from long experience possess an accurate knowledge of the locality they belong to—the enemy would have to destroy the submarine defences before attempting to land. This in many cases would afford time for the defenders' fleet or troops to arrive; or, if nothing further, would lead to a disclosure of the adversaries' designs.

The navigation can also be rendered difficult and dangerous by taking up the buoys, by removing the indicators of the deepest channels and discontinuing the lighting of the coast. The entrance of ports and rivers can also be closed by a boom, a measure which would render night attacks and reconnaissances in boats impossible.*

The boom, unless very solidly constructed, will not be able to stop steamers going at it full speed. We have an instance of such an obstruction in the memorable siege of Londonderry in 1689. The besiegers had erected on both banks of the Foyle forts and batteries, which made it very dangerous for ships to attempt going up stream. To make things more secure, several boats full of stones were sunk, and a row of stakes was driven into the bottom of the river. Besides this, a boom, constructed of large logs of fir, strongly bound, and measuring

* When a boom is so employed, the beam of an electric light thrown along its entire length will frustrate any attempt which may be made at night to destroy it.

more than a quarter of a mile in length, was stretched athwart the stream and firmly fastened by cables to both shores.

On the 15th of June an expedition under Kirke arrived in Lough Foyle, but it was thought unsafe to make any attempt either by land or by water to relieve the besieged. Kirke remained inactive for several weeks, until urged into action at the end of July by a despatch from Schomberg with orders to relieve Londonderry at all hazards.

Amongst the skippers in his convoy there were two, Micaiah Browning—a native of Londonderry—master of the *Mountjoy*, and Andrew Douglas, master of the *Phœnix*, who volunteered to make an attempt to break the boom. Their offer was accepted, and with their ships was joined the 36-gun frigate the *Dartmouth*, commanded by Captain John Leake.

On the 28th of July, just as the sun had set, the three ships under a press of canvas ran boldly up the Foyle. The frigate's guns were used with great effect and covered the merchantmen from the fire of the batteries. The *Mountjoy* took the lead and went with all its force and weight at the boom. The barrier gave way with a crash, but the shock sent the ship round, so that it stuck in the mud. The besiegers rushed to their boats with the intention of boarding, but were thrown into disorder by a well-directed broadside from the *Dartmouth*. The *Phœnix* dashed through the breach and bore

speedily on. The tide, which was rising fast, soon floated her companion; and by ten at night both ships were moored alongside the quay, where they were welcomed with joy by a ghostly and emaciated multitude.

The brave master of the *Mountjoy*—the gallant Micaiah Browning—alas! was no more; a shot from one of the enemy's batteries had slain him when nobly striving to bring deliverance to his famished fellow-townsmen.

There must be a just limit, both in the laying of submarine mines and in discontinuing the lighting of lighthouses, on account of the serious impediments which these two measures will cause to the local trade. In 1870-71, by suppressing the lighting of the coast, by removing the buoys and beacons, and by filling the entrance of their harbours with submarine mines, the Germans paralyzed nearly the whole of their sea-borne commerce. The blockade of their coast has been estimated to have entailed on the Germans a loss of £200,000 a day.

The main object of submarine defence is to safeguard the harbours from an attack by a hostile fleet; this is effected by closing the navigating channels, with the intent of retaining the enemy's vessels as long as possible under a cross-fire when attempting to force a passage.

To defeat countermining and cable-cutting, the mine-fields must be under the fire of the batteries ashore, or must be protected by guard-vessels and

gunboats, being swept at night by search-lights. When these measures are observed, the attacking boats cannot but experience great difficulty in approaching them. Colonel Schaw observes: "Former experiments at Portsmouth have made it evident that to succeed in the very dangerous undertaking of opening a passage through a submarine field, darkness is essential to cover the operations of the countermining vessels."*

Lieutenant Sturdee, R.N., in the naval prize essay of 1886, expresses himself in favour of torpedo-boats for harassing and destroying the transports before the troops have time to land. He recommends "torpedo boats as a very cheap and effective way of protecting a coast-line; and they will also help partly in the defence of commercial ports."†

The development of the torpedo-boat has given an immense pull to the defence. All along a coast there are many gunboats, tugs, and small steam vessels which, at a pinch, can be turned into torpedo-boats. Woe to a fleet of transports at anchor if attacked by a number of these destroyers. To frustrate such attacks requires a most careful watch, and all the energies of the naval officers of the invading side will be taxed to do this effectively.

* "Coast Defence," *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxxxvii., p. 1149.

† Naval prize essay, *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. cxxxiv., p. 406.

A watchful commander is sure not to neglect to take any measures which will give him timely warning of an attack. The electric telegraph and visual signalling will afford him information on all that is passing along the coast. When the precaution is taken to establish signalling stations, furnished with powerful telescopes, on the most commanding heights, they will signal the movements of the hostile fleet, the direction of its course, the number of vessels in a convoy, and other important particulars. All this makes it easier to prevent being taken unawares.

No invasion can be successfully opposed without a proper defensive scheme, and the most perfect defence scheme will be utterly worthless without an adequate army. What is required is not a mere paper army, but an effective one, complete in every requirement, and ready to gather together at the first note of the alarm.

The more the invaders' chances are augmented, the more it becomes necessary for the defenders to have a strong force with which to meet the enemy at the gate.

In framing a scheme for defence, the most sensible manner of acting is to look at the coast from an invader's point of view, and to study very carefully all the courses which are open to him. By adopting such a system it will be possible to ascertain which are the points an enemy is most likely to make for; this will likewise help to

establish which are ordinary diversions and which are real attacks. In the case of an invasion, the defenders have the advantage of knowing their ground, and this gives them an immense pull over their opponents.

The defence being a combined effort of the navy and the army, the scheme for the protection of the coast should clearly define the particular action of the two services. As the officers of the army and navy often hold very different views on this point, it becomes absolutely necessary to lay down in a very positive manner their respective responsibilities.

The defence scheme once drawn up should be tested by actual experiment, as there is no better way for detecting the weakness of our armour. It cannot be said that the state is thoroughly prepared for war if we have to assure ourselves of the efficiency of our measures when the enemy is at our door. By testing the scheme, it can be seen that no impracticable arrangements have been made, and that no detail has been overlooked. In the process of time some of our measures are sure to become obsolete; this must be fully taken into account, and the scheme revised so as to meet the new condition of things.

Stratagems always play such a leading part in an invasion by sea that it behoves the defenders to exercise untiring vigilance. Observant staff-officers should be detailed to watch different sections of the

coast, and the means for imparting information should be augmented. Every care will have to be taken to prevent the telegraph lines running along the coast being cut by boats' crews; and when the wires are exposed to this danger, it will be a wise precaution to shift the lines somewhat inland. By employing small steamers or steam-launches in patrolling, and by enlisting the aid of the coastguard, the invader should be kept from reconnoitring, or from throwing, under cover of darkness, a body of his troops ashore.

When Napoleon threatened to invade England, the sea from the Texel to the Channel Islands was patrolled by numerous frigates and small vessels. These were in communication with the fleets, and could give them early warning. Lord St. Vincent wrote on this point, "Our great reliance is in the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea."

If there is a fleet for the protection of the coast, the scouts and the electric telegraph will soon warn it of any approaching danger, and the speed which steamships have will soon bring them to the spot. Appearing from an unexpected quarter, the fleet will possibly derange the enemy's plans.

When in September, 1854, the Allies crossed the Black Sea from Baljick Bay to the Bay of Kalamita, the Russians had a strong fleet in Sebastopol. The fleet consisted of fourteen sailing ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, one corvette, and two brigs, and also eleven war-steamers. The

British had ten sail-of-the-line (two of them screw-steamers), two 50-gun frigates, and thirteen lesser steamers-of-war heavily armed.* Evidently the Russians were stronger than the English in number of ships, but what they did not know was that the French war-ships, being crammed with soldiers, were not available for battle.

The best time for an attack by sea is when most of the transports are still encumbered with troops, and the crews are engaged in the operation of landing. This point did not escape the attention of the Russian admirals, for on the 13th of September the fleet in Sebastopol was ordered to prepare to make sail. But the winds were adverse, and the Russians on further reflection seem to have deemed it rash to attack the Allies at sea.

In reviewing the proper action of the fleet, Korniloff made a speech, in which he stated: "I therefore purpose to put to sea and attack the enemy crowded as he is off Cape Loukoul. I think that, fortune favouring us, we might disperse the enemy's armada, and thus deprive the allied armies of supplies or reinforcements."† The admiral was doomed to be disappointed, for Mentschikoff had commanded the sinking of the fleet, and brave Korniloff had to submit.

It should nevertheless be remembered that Admiral Dundas with his off squadron was

* Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 142.

† Ibid., vol. iii. p. 142.

prepared for such a contingency, and that a British ship-of-war was standing sentry over the Russian fleet then at anchor in the harbour of Sebastopol.

A fleet shut up in the harbour can effect little towards the defence, and runs the risk of being gradually destroyed by the fire of the besiegers. In 1758, on the approach of the British armament to Cape Breton, the French naval officers in Louisbourg were much troubled by the critical position their ships were in; they were anxious to sail out and save them. Drucourt, the governor, would not hear of it, and insisted that they should remain and take part in the defence. This decision gave rise to much discontent among the naval officers, whilst their want of enterprise caused them to be much scorned by their comrades of the land forces.

The French had eleven battleships, carrying five-hundred and fourteen guns* and about three thousand men. Under cover of a fog one of their frigates, the *Echo*, slipped out and made for Quebec to seek aid; she was soon captured and brought past the city, to the bay of Gabarus by a British crew. Desgouttes, the naval commander, lest Boscawen should enter the harbour and destroy him, sunk four of his ships—the *Apollon*, the *Chèvre*, the *Biche*,

* The *Prudent*, 74 guns; the *Entreprenant*, 74 guns; the *Capricieux*, 64 guns; the *Célèbre*, 64 guns; the *Bienfaisant*, 64 guns; the *Apollon*, 50 guns; the *Chèvre*, 22 guns; the *Biche*, 18 guns; the *Fidèle*, 22 guns; the *Echo*, 26 guns; the *Aréthuse*, 36 guns.

the *Fidèle*—in the narrow strait which formed the entrance. Vauquelin, the gallant captain of the frigate *Aréthuse*, which had galled the besiegers continuously by her fire until at last she was beaten into silence, repaired damages as well as he could, and, on the fourteenth of July, under cover of a fog, daringly made for the sea; creeping unseen through the British fleet, he took to France the news of the dire position Louisbourg was in.

The French had still five ships in the harbour. On the 21st of June a shell set the *Célèbre* on fire, and in that state she drifted on the *Entreprenant* and *Capricieux*. To prevent the extinction of the flames the besiegers turned their guns on the blazing ships, which drifted ashore and were burnt to the water's edge. The two remaining, the *Bienfaisant* and the *Prudent*, were attacked by a body of six hundred bluejackets in boats and the crews overpowered. The *Prudent* being fast in the mud was set on fire, the other ship was towed to a safe anchorage under the British batteries.

In the siege of Sebastopol, after the Russian Black Sea fleet had been sunk, the seamen were organized for operations on land, and took an honourable part in the defence of the place. At Louisbourg there was evidently little cordiality between the two services, for it is stated that, when the crews of the sunken French ships and of the others joined the garrison, this caused great dissatisfaction to the soldiers.

In retaining the fleet in the harbour, Drucourt evidently placed great faith in the measures he had taken to defend all the approaches, and believed that these would have prevented the British troops effecting a landing. Nevertheless, though it might have been expected that the French fleet would have been inferior to the British, it could have put to sea and sailed round to attack the convoy. Even if defeated, its action would have been more profitable than in being ignominiously sunk and destroyed piecemeal in the harbour.

The confidence of the defenders must be raised by the spirit of alertness and enterprise displayed by their commander and by his zeal to keep the national territory from being soiled by the foot of the enemy. On his side the commander should be able to count on the enthusiasm of his troops who are called upon to fight in a most righteous cause, viz. to uphold the freedom and honour of their fatherland.

If the population is manly and is animated by a self-sacrificing spirit, it can strew serious difficulties in the path of the invader. It may turn a country into a barren desert, or it may disturb the enemy by harassing his communications. In invasions either by land or by sea the spirit of the population is a factor which must always be taken into account.

The nation must be educated to understand that the defence of the country is part of every citizen's duty, and that it is absolutely necessary for officers in command to seize upon provisions and stores for

the subsistence of the men. We have a striking example of the sacrifice to which a truly patriotic people will submit in the action of the Russians in 1812. They complied with the cruel orders issued, quitted and burnt their homes, destroyed their crops, and turned the country into a wilderness. In 1806 the Prussians had not been educated on this point. "In the retreat from Jena to Magdeburg and from Magdeburg to Prenzlau, the troops suffered incredible privations. They passed starving through a country in which there was plenty to eat; they were not allowed to touch it, while their French pursuers had the full benefit of it." *

To the defenders, given that they have no fleet to protect their coast, two alternatives are open. They can either resist the landing and endeavour to drive the enemy back to their ships, or they may take up some strong position inland where they can stay the invader's progress. As the opening scenes of a campaign generally exercise a marked influence for good or for evil during the whole course of a war, it becomes a matter of great consequence to prevent the adversary from acquiring an ascendancy from the very first. Should the invader succeed in establishing himself on shore without much difficulty, he would naturally by so doing acquire the prestige of being the strongest of the two parties. This consideration, if there is no other, will generally induce a commander to resist the landing.

* Spencer Wilkinson, *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. ccviii. p. 611.

What is more damaging is, that the fact of the enemy having landed will disturb the people to such an extent as to imperil subsequent operations. Under the circumstances there will be little chance of either the rulers or the people preserving their presence of mind; both will be overawed by the impending danger. The best measures are only the result of cool and unflurried deliberation; but an enemy on our soil, and the serious consequences which may follow, are sure to deprive many individuals of their faculties.

The enemy's great difficulty is to land; we should not, therefore, trust to defeat him once he has got on shore, but should meet him as he quits the transports, and prevent his landing. The defenders should not renounce the predominance which they possess in a contest on the beach.

Whatever prospect a strong position in the rear may offer, advantage should be taken of the helpless state in which a large mass of troops is in during the period of transit from the troopships to the shore. The ease with which it is practicable to defeat a landing should not be undervalued, and all the principles of tactics clearly point to a vigorous and determined resistance on the beach as the correct course to pursue.

The increased range, rapidity, and accuracy in firing have greatly added to the power of defence. If this is so in a general way, how much more must it be so when contending with a force which can only

approach the point of attack very slowly, and in full view of its opponents? Notwithstanding that the British were able in 1801 to drive the French from their position at Aboukir by a direct attack, we cannot believe that any prudent commander would now dare to repeat the same tactics. Abercrombie suffered considerable loss in his dashing assault; but no general could ever hope to score a success by a direct attack of a position defended by brave troops, armed with breech-loading weapons.

The landing should be contested, not only because that course offers a great prospect of success, but because a failure will lower the prestige of the adversary, and undermine the confidence of his troops. It is reasonable to believe that the enemy, once severely punished, will be chary of renewing the attempt.

Even if too late to resist the landing, every obstacle should be placed in the way of the enemy establishing himself firmly on the shore. In 1799, Bonaparte very justly reproved General Marmont for not having attacked the Turks at Aboukir. Marmont, hearing at Alexandria, on the 11th of July, of the arrival of the Turkish expeditionary force in Aboukir Bay, marched in that direction with twelve hundred men and five guns. Apprised on the way that the Turks were busy investing Aboukir Castle, he retraced his steps, and returned to Alexandria, there to await reinforcements.

Marmont was highly to blame, not only for

having sacrificed his outposts, who had to bear the attack of the Turkish naval and land forces without hope of relief, but for his utter lack of enterprise. In 1801, Friant, with about two thousand men, disputed the landing against a larger, a more disciplined, and a better led force. Sir Robert Wilson, who from his intercourse with Sir Sidney Smith and the Turkish authorities had a good opportunity of acquiring accurate information, declares that the Turkish troops which landed at Aboukir, instead of being, as Bonaparte stated in his account of the victory, seventeen thousand strong, did not quite amount to eight thousand.* This is corroborated by the report sent to Mustafa-Pacha after the disembarkation on the 11th of July (7 Séfir), in which the Turkish troops landed were reckoned at about seven thousand men.†

In Chapter IV. we have remarked on Prince Mentschikoff's remissness. Kinglake, referring to the first days of the operations of the allied armies, says, "Till that time, they had to do with a provincial governor, far away from the centre of power, incredulous of the rumours which heralded their coming, surprised by their descent on his coast." The Crimean coast was totally unprotected, and the Russian fleet had shut itself fast in the harbour of Sebastopol. The Prince took no steps for

* "British Expedition to Egypt," Lieut.-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, p. 29.

† Capefigue: "L'Europe pendant le Consulat," tome 1er.

contesting the landing, and contented himself with occupying a position on the heights overlooking the river Alma.* L'Invalide Russe explained: "Prince Mentschikoff, recognizing the impossibility of attacking the enemy on a flat shore commanded by the fire of the fleet, has concentrated the greater part of his forces in a favourable position, where he is prepared to receive the assailants."

The opposition to a disembarkation on the coast north of Sebastopol, shown by some French officers, had robbed the landing of the element of rapidity, and no attempt was made to gain a good footing on land, when the ships had arrived at a proper distance from the shore.

As the Armada was seen from Sebastopol and other points in the morning of the 13th of September, and as the distance from the Alma to Eupatoria is only thirteen miles, there can be no doubt that a portion of the Russian forces might by the morning of the 14th have been in a very handy position to resist the landing. On that day the conditions became very favourable to the Russians, for the surf rose in the afternoon, when the British infantry, with one half of its artillery, no cavalry, no baggage, no tents or transport, and

* "Je juge que l'ennemi qui laisse s'accumuler à quelques lieues de lui un pareil orage, sans rien faire pour le dissiper à son origine, se met dans une situation fâcheuse, dont le moindre inconvénient est de paraître frappé d'impuissance vis-à-vis des populations."—Marshal de Saint Arnaud, to the Minister of Marine, on the landing in the Crimea.

with only three days' rations, were cut off from the fleet. Sir William Mends states that this condition of things lasted for forty-eight hours; in any case it was this that delayed the march of the Allies until the 19th. Let us suppose that the surf had continued heavy for some days more, would not the Russians by their inaction have thrown away a most favourable chance?

With the large number of transports, of all sizes, of different nationalities, and hired of many owners, it would not have been a difficult matter for a daring Russian captain, with a fast ship, to slip in, mix with the Armada, and endeavour to ascertain its destination and other interesting particulars. The Russian naval officers had shown that they were not wanting in pluck or enterprise; to wit, the exploit of the steamer *Elboeuf*, which, some months before, had dashed through the allied fleets, and burnt some Turkish vessels near Heraclea.

The blockade runners in the Secession War have left us some daring examples. Wilson writes: "As showing the audacity of the runners, a vessel came up whilst the Northern squadron was bombarding Fort Fisher. She joined the squadron, her presence attracting no notice, and, under cover of the smoke, presently stole off from her astonished companions. Another vessel crept into Mobile, through Farragut's large squadron, just as it was preparing to move up for the attack upon the forts." *

* H. W. Wilson, "Ironclads in Action," vol. i. p. 192.

The proper measures to observe, to be in a position to contest the landing, are to post bodies of troops in judiciously-chosen localities, to have ample arrangements for the rapid transmission of intelligence, and to study the best utilization of railway transport. The coast should be studded with posts of observation, and be very carefully patrolled by night and in the early morning. This patrolling will prevent the enemy putting advanced parties ashore, under cover of darkness, to pave the way for a larger landing.

Though the power of fathoming the adversary's intentions is a gift, still, a commander who has a well-balanced mind, who knows the topography of his country, and who receives abundant information, ought not to have much difficulty in discovering the enemy's designs. As it is the unexpected which generally happens, he must be quick and able to alter his arrangements whenever a sudden change in the enemy's plans makes it imperative. These transitions cannot always be foreseen, and often come with surprising rapidity. It is necessary, therefore, to look into the situation diligently, to guard, as much as possible, against being swayed by doubt, and to act with great promptitude the moment their real import is detected.

The first essential in defence is the power of assuming the offensive. In an invasion of this nature the defence hinges on the commander having time to collect a sufficient force with which to con-

front the invaders; it is nothing more than a matter of being in the right place at the right time. As there may be several points where the landing may be attempted, the most rational arrangement with respect to the land forces is to keep large bodies of troops in central positions ready to repair at once to any seriously-threatened locality.

The small garrisons guarding the most vulnerable places along the coast should be looked upon in the light of outposts. These might possibly be able to contain the enemy until the arrival of reinforcements. To delay the invader even for twenty-four hours will be a gain for the defenders. Assuming the most unfortunate circumstance—that the defenders have been deceived in detecting the right point of attack—by making use of the available railways they will be able to make adequate dispositions for concentrating a large force on the enemy's most probable line of advance.

If proper measures are taken, the troops held at central points should have no difficulty in reaching the coast in time to oppose the enemy. Their commander, however, must be able to fathom the real intention of his adversary, without which he might be induced to direct the mass of his forces on some spot where the enemy only makes a demonstration, and be too late to repair to the place which has been selected for the main landing. The only safeguard is, as we have already said, to regard the operations from the invader's point of view, so as

to be able to discover what must be to him the most profitable course to pursue.

To disembark many thousands of troops, with all their horses, transport animals, stores, materials, and provisions, which an army must have, will always be a matter of some days, even if the weather is in the most favourable condition. By rapidly transmitting news, and by making use of railways and other means of transport, troops can at once be set in motion to reinforce the nearest outposts, until they gradually swell into a sufficient force to measure their strength with the invader on equal terms.

The general rule for a disembarkation in face of the enemy, as we have shown in Chapter XIII., is to prepare and cover the operation by a well-sustained fire from the fleet. The officer commanding the defence must bear this in mind when posting his troops, and should take every possible precaution against their being exposed to serious losses in this preliminary stage.

In an attack, the conditions of the two parties will be very dissimilar. The landing-party must advance in full view of the defenders, being exposed to their fire whilst in open boats moving slowly towards the beach. The aggressor must also be more or less ignorant of the number of the defending force, whose positions will only be revealed at the moment when he begins to experience its fire. The defenders, on the other hand, know their ground,

have taken measures for disputing every important position, and can be hidden from view.

They will possibly be posted on high ground, commanding the beach, in extended order covered by shelter-trenches. If they are kept under cover until the right moment for action arrives, they will have little to fear from the fire of the enemy's guns. We do not wish to contend that the explosion of the huge shells fired by the most powerful guns of a battle-ship is not likely to have a demoralizing effect, and to cause much execution, but we doubt if it will be effective enough when employed against lines of skirmishers. These missiles were introduced to pierce armour and to destroy fortifications, but not for employment against troops in extended order, against anything, in short, which does not offer a conspicuous target to fire at.

Long lines of low shelter-trenches, at a considerable distance, will offer no conspicuous mark for the fire of the fleet.

As the invader may divide his forces and attempt to effect a landing at different points, so as to turn the defenders' position or rivet their attention on a false locality, every precaution should be taken to have bodies of troops on the flanks sufficient to frustrate any attempt made in those directions.

To defeat the attack, the defending artillery may open on the enemy's boats as they near the shore. It is questionable, however, if artillery firing at boats in motion will cause much damage, and it would

appear preferable for the guns to unmask the moment the adversary's troops touch the land. With the present range of rifled ordnance, field-guns can command the approaches to the shore from a considerable distance, and many places may be found where a battery can be posted to bear on the landing-place without being exposed to the fire of the guns at sea. Opening suddenly, they will cause terrible havoc in the enemy's ranks as they form up on getting ashore.

There is no reason why a few heavy guns on shore, if well placed, well protected, and well served, may not, as of old, contend on even terms with a much larger number afloat. The difficulty of being able to bring these guns on the ground, however, should not be overlooked, and a commander may possibly have to dispense with these powerful auxiliaries.

With the very best arrangements for landing, there must occur a moment of disorder as the boats run aground. The moment when the assailants are huddled together in quitting their boats, striving to gain their places and form in regular order, is the defenders' first opportunity. This is the time when a well-directed fire can do much execution, and it is for this instant that the fire of the field artillery and infantry should be reserved. At this period a few guns in gun-pits opening suddenly with shrapnel would add greatly to the fire of small arms. It should not be a difficult matter for

the defenders to ascertain beforehand the exact range, thus rendering their artillery and infantry fire more effective. The fire of the fleet must more or less cease at this critical moment for fear of injuring the attacking troops.

Soldiers suddenly assailed by the fire of artillery and infantry must be more or less shaken; given that they have gained the beach, this will only be their first step; a harder task will lie before them, viz. to cross some hundreds of yards of open ground and to attack the defenders, who are posted under cover. It is of no avail to speculate on the result; the general opinion is that, if the defenders are in sufficient strength, are well armed, well posted, and determined, the attacking party in landing would be so severely handled as to be unable to carry the undertaking to a successful issue.

The locality selected by the invader for a landing may present no advantages for the defending force, and, as the former will approach the shore under the protection of a powerful squadron, the prospect of being able to overpower him as he attempts to land, under cover of the fire of its fleet, may be small. For all that, a landing may be indirectly contested by withdrawing from the immediate vicinity of the shore, and taking up a threatening position out of range of the guns of the fleet. The invader would hardly think it prudent to land his baggage, ammunition and provision columns, stores, and materials until his troops are masters of some

good position at a certain distance from the beach; he, therefore, cannot but be seriously disturbed by knowing that the adversary awaits him a short way off. His first step on landing will be to establish a safe base of operations, and this he can hardly set about until he is positively master of the country for some miles around.

After all the importance which we have attached to the necessity for resisting a landing, and after having admitted that a contest on the beach is the proper course to pursue, it may appear inconsistent to have to confess that this may not always be the best alternative. Such a variety of circumstances, however, occur in war, that it is impossible to lay down a hard-and-fast rule on any one point. Let us assume that the place selected by the adversary for disembarkation possesses no salient points for defence; that, for any reason, the concentration of the defender's forces has been slow; that the country beyond the beach is of such an intricate nature as to present very serious obstacles to the invaders' progress, and so on, and we shall soon see that there are special reasons which may at the time influence the commander into withdrawing from the neighbourhood of the landing-place to some position inland.

Though the retreat, and the fact of leaving a certain tract of territory in the adversaries' hands, may give rise to a certain amount of despondency, still, if by doing so the enemy's difficulties can be

augmented, if an overpowering force can be brought to bear against him, and if his communications can be rendered perilous, such a course may promise better results in the end than those reaped by simply contesting the landing when not thoroughly prepared for it.

In the following words Sir Edward Creasy shows that such an alternative was suggested to King Harold, after the landing of William the Conqueror. As he was inferior in numbers to his opponent, and had not yet been joined by the whole of his forces, "some of his captains advised him to retreat upon London and lay waste the country, so as to starve down the strength of the invaders. The policy thus recommended was unquestionably the wisest; for the Saxon fleet had now reassembled, and intercepted all William's communications with Normandy; so that as soon as his stores and provisions were exhausted he must have moved upon London, where Harold, at the head of the full military strength of the kingdom, could have defied his assault, and probably might have witnessed his rival's destruction by famine and disease, without having to strike a single blow." * "If we retire before the enemy," said Gurth, "leaving him in a strange land, winter approaching, his forage will fail. He will scarce dare to march upon London: if he does, we shall be better pre-

* "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," Sir Edward Creasy, p. 175.

pared to encounter him. My voice is against resting all on a single battle."

"Is that thy choice?" said Webba, indignantly. "Not so, I am sure, would have chosen thy father; not so think the Saxons of Kent. The Norman is laying waste all the lands of thy subjects, Lord Harold; living on plunder, as a robber, in the realms of King Alfred. Dost thou think that men will get better heart to fight for their country by hearing that their king shrinks from danger?" *

But Harold's blood was up, and he could not endure to think of the misery which his loyal subjects would have to suffer. Accordingly he chose the boldest plan, and determined to accept battle where he was.

There have, nevertheless, been instances in which, had the defenders kept steadily on the defensive, had they gradually retreated inland as the invaders approached them, trusting to their woods, rivers, and difficult passes, harassing and cutting their opponents off whenever they saw an opportunity, but never suffering them to score a success for themselves, they might have tired them out and finally overcome them. The invaders would then have met with something akin to the punishment which Arminius inflicted on Varus and his legions.

* "Harold, the Last of the Saxon Kings," by the Right Hon. Lord Lytton, p. 418.

CHAPTER XXV.

RE-EMBARKATION EFFECTED IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY.

Measures for the re-embarkation of the army should not be neglected—The battle of the ships in the Siege of Troy—The Persians driven to their ships and attacked on the beach at Marathon—Spanish expedition to Algiers in 1775—The Spaniards are defeated by the Moors with great loss—Sir John Moore sends officers to reconnoitre the harbours on the coast of Gallicia—Retreat of the British army—The re-embarkation commences—The French attack at Coruña, and are driven back—Re-embarkation of the British troops after the battle—General McClellan ordered to withdraw his army from the Peninsula of Virginia—He is hampered by the presence of twelve thousand five hundred sick and wounded—The water transport is insufficient—His supposed tardiness causes irritation at Washington—The Army of the Potomac retires from the Chickahominy—Its divisions march to Fort Monroe and Newport News, and embark—Orders for the re-embarkation are very necessary—Action when a landing on the beach miscarries—Re-embarkation from a good base of operations—Arresting the enemy's pursuit when no base has been established.

SUCH is the general confidence of mankind that, though fully aware of the difficulties which encompass an enterprise, they are often buoyed up by the hope of being able to succeed in overcoming them.

Sufficient allowance is seldom made for a succession of adverse circumstances, which may in the long run defeat all our efforts and lead to the collapse of the best-conceived plans.

An operation for which it is necessary to provide in all expeditions beyond the seas is the re-embarkation of the army. Agathocles, who wished to leave no hope to his followers but in victory, after having landed them in Africa, by fair words persuaded them to set fire to all their ships but one or two, reserved to carry messengers. This was an extreme measure, for, not only now, but at all times, one of a commander's chief cares has been to ensure the retreat of his troops. Thus it has become a maxim that next to victory comes a masterly retreat.

There are different circumstances which may make it necessary for the army to re-embark; such as—

(*a*) The miscarriage of an attempted landing.

(*b*) A lost battle shortly after the disembarkation, when the army has not yet penetrated far inland. This may be made more necessary by the loss of war materials or the demoralization of the troops.

(*c*) A preponderant force gathered by the adversary to resist the invasion, which may make it very clear that there is no prospect of attaining the object in view.

(*d*) A gradual retreat before a superior enemy in the direction of the sea.

A commander will have in any case to decide whether he should withdraw his forces from the enemy's territory, or whether he is strong enough to take up a good position and hold it, until the arrival of reinforcements, or the retreat of the adversary, will enable him to resume the offensive.

Of this we have a remarkable example in the third invasion of Portugal, when, in 1810, Massena advanced on Lisbon. Before the battle of Busaco, the French forces, under the Marshal's command, consisted of sixty-five thousand veterans, to oppose which the British commander had only fifty thousand men, half of them untried. After the battle, deeming the allied army unable to cope with the French in the open, and hampered by his political position, Wellington retreated to the lines of Torres Vedras.

These lines had been prepared with singular care, and consisted of three distinct ranges of defence; the last was a mere place of refuge, being intended to cover a forced embarkation. As the strength of the works defied attack, Massena only sought to feed his army until reinforcements could reach it. On the other hand, Wellington's object was to starve the French before succour could arrive. With the pertinacity which distinguished him, Massena maintained his position until the country for many leagues behind him had been turned into a desert. He then reluctantly retreated. In the meanwhile Wellington had received reinforcements from England and from Halifax, and

his army had increased to seventy thousand men. The French, from various causes, had lost many soldiers, and their forces did not number more than fifty thousand men. The state of Massena's army favoured his opponent assuming the offensive.

In the first martial exploit which has been rendered into verse and made famous, the illustrious Homer describes how a violent quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon had weakened the invading force. The Trojans led by Hector then pushed the Greeks back to the very verge of the sea, and attempted to set fire to their ships.

In the battle of the ships, the poet narrates how Agamemnon, sorely troubled by the slaughter of his people, desired that they should draw down the ships to the sea, and flee homewards, as soon as darkness concealed their movements. Ulysses, however, would have none of this counsel; "what is this," he said, "that thou wouldst have us launch our ships now, whilst the hosts are fighting? Surely, so doing, we should perish altogether, for the Greeks would not fight any more, seeing that the ships were being launched, and the men of Troy would slay us completely."

The Greeks took heart and drove the enemy back, till Apollo healed Hector of his wounds so that he went back to the battle. The men of Troy were at the ships, and Hector and Ajax were contending for one of them; the former held the stern of the ship with his hand, bidding his men that they

should bring fire to burn it. Ajax himself gave way, so did the spears of the Trojans press him; now he stood no longer upon the stern deck, but on the rowers' bench, thrusting with his spear at any one who sought to set fire to the ship.

After the death of Patroclus, Achilles put away his wrath and made peace with Agamemnon; in the battle which followed, the Trojans were driven into Troy, and the danger to the shipping was over.

In the battle of Marathon, ancient history offers a notable example of a re-embarkation effected in the face of the enemy. In the year 490 B.C., Darius ordered Datis to undertake the subjugation of Greece. In virtue of this command, Datis sailed with a large fleet and directed his attention first to Eretria, after the destruction of which he crossed over to the mainland, disembarked his troops on the Attic coast, and encamped on the Plain of Marathon. Hippias had recommended the plain because the ground was level and well suited for cavalry; but, as it was bordered on the right and left by marshy ground, the Persian horse, on the day of trial, were prevented from effecting a turning movement. The galleys, according to the custom of the times, were drawn up on the shelving beach, and the conquered islands behind were turned into depôts of provisions and stores.

Datis was a veteran general, and had under him gallant men who were familiar with victory. At

that period his troops were reputed invincible, and in various encounters with the Greek troops in Asia-Minor, in Cyprus, and in Egypt, the Persians had always remained victorious. It is very probable that Datis entertained the idea that he would have no difficulty in overcoming his opponents, and, in his confidence, may have taken no measures for re-embarking his troops in case of defeat. When the Persians fled from the battle-field of Marathon, they made for the sea-shore; their only hope of safety lay in launching their galleys speedily and drawing away from the coast.

The Athenians followed the retreating foe down to the water's edge, and dashed at the Persians who were endeavouring to launch their galleys. Here a terrific struggle ensued, in which Callimachus and several leaders and men of note fell, besides others of inferior rank. The Persians succeeded in saving their fleet, and only seven ships remained in the hands of the victors.

If the examples of a contested landing are rare, rarer still are the cases in which a force, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, with a large number of horses, waggons, and stores, has been compelled to retire in the face of the enemy and re-embark.

We have an instance of this in 1775. The Moors having attacked Melilla and the Pennon de Velez, Spain became anxious to see an end put to their arrogance and to their inroads on the coasts

of Valencia, Catalonia, and Andalusia. Charles III. thereon decided that an expedition should be sent to Algiers. A monk had portrayed the undertaking as easy, and Grimaldi received the royal command to make suitable preparations for it. The leadership of the troops—twenty-one thousand five hundred infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and a hundred guns—was assigned to General O'Reilly,* and Don Pedro Castejon had the command of the fleet. This was concentrated at Carthagena, and comprised six line-of-battle ships, fourteen frigates, and twenty-four gunboats, with three hundred and forty hired transports. The fleet was joined by many Tuscan, Neapolitan, and Maltese ships. In the army were the best troops of Spain, and the highest nobility of the kingdom eagerly came forward and volunteered to take part in the expedition, so fair a prospect of success did it offer.

O'Reilly showed no greater ability in handling his troops than Castejon did in conducting his fleet, and the two chiefs did not quite agree as to the manner of executing the enterprise. The expedition set sail from Carthagena on the 23rd of June, 1775, and without any apparent reason the Admiral cast anchor in the Bay of Almarazoon, where the fleet sojourned for six days. On the 1st of July it arrived before Algiers.

* Alexander O'Reilly was born in Ireland about the year 1722, and at an early age entered the Spanish Service. His selection to command the expedition to Algiers caused much jealousy amongst the Spanish officers.

For the prosperous result of the enterprise O'Reilly depended on finding the Moors unprepared. In this, however, he was thwarted, for Spain's enemies had warned the Algerians, and they had plenty of time to get ready to repel the attack. In his report on the defences of Algiers, Boutin states that the Spanish preparations were known in Algiers a month in advance. Knowing that the Spaniards were at peace with the English, the Regency had no doubt that the preparations were directed against themselves; besides which some of the consuls had taken the trouble to impart the information. The Dey had ample time to prepare for the defence, and gathered sixty thousand combatants for that purpose.

On arrival, the Spaniards found the heights from Algiers to Cape Matifu, a length of five and a half leagues, crowned with Moorish encampments. The defenders were concealed behind hedges of prickly pears and aloes. But when, above all things, promptitude was needed, O'Reilly lingered. For eighty days nothing was done, though the wind offered no obstacle whatever to the disembarkation. The fire of the Spanish war-ships, feeble and uncertain, did no harm to the city of Algiers, nor to its fortifications.

Flat-bottom boats for landing the troops had been forgotten; nevertheless, on the 8th of July, the General put his first division of eight thousand

men ashore. The disembarkation was carried out without the least opposition, at a spot one league from the Haratch, on the side of the city. With singular want of foresight, no step was taken to establish an intrenched camp which would have given a firm footing to the invaders on shore.

The troops were disembarked by divisions in succession, and engaged as each division got ashore. Very serious difficulty was experienced in dragging the guns through the heavy sand of the strand, and the advanced guard pushed forward without any artillery.

The Spanish General urged the first division up a hill which was held by the Moors, intersected by hollows, obstructed by brushwood and other impediments. The defenders suffered the enemy to approach the brow of this hill, when some leaping over the parapets, and others issuing from the ravines, rushed on the Spaniards and drove them in disorder with considerable loss towards the beach.

There they rallied on the second division, likewise of eight thousand men, which was about completing its disembarkation, and, sheltered by light trenches of sand, which they were able to throw up on the spur of the moment, both made head against the Moors for some time. The Spaniards fought bravely enough, but, badly led, they lost the advantage of superior tactics and discipline; tormented by thirst and heat, and exposed to a most galling

fire, they were overcome by the enemy, who poured over the trenches. To avoid greater slaughter, the divisions retired. Fortunately the Moors fell into error, and believed that the boats, which approached the shore for the purpose of picking up the wounded and rescuing the fugitives, were bringing reinforcements of troops and artillery. Had they understood the real purport of this move, they might have charged on both sides of the trenches, with the few horsemen that they had collected on the strand, and completed the defeat.

O'Reilly declared that the enterprise had failed, and that it was necessary to expedite the re-embarkation. This could not be effected without abandoning nearly all the guns which had been landed (about twenty pieces) and a large amount of war materials. In this disastrous day the Spaniards had above one thousand five hundred men killed, and the ships collected about three thousand soldiers seriously wounded. Many valuable lives were lost, and amongst the slain was the Marquis de la Romana.*

It was said that the Spanish ships did not cover the re-embarkation, and that this was done by some foreign frigates.

Some of the vessels of the expedition tarried in the Bay of Algiers to keep the enemy's cruisers in check; the rest of the fleet returned to the coast of

* The Marquis de la Romana was the father of the Spanish commander of that name who took part in the Napoleonic wars.

Spain. The greater portion of the ships arrived at Carthagena and Alicante on the 15th of July, 1775, being themselves bearers of the first news of this fearful defeat.

Whatever may be the reasons which may make a re-embarkation imperative, the operation will require to be conducted with all possible expedition. The weather, nevertheless, may be a retarding element, for to re-embark troops, and, above all, horses, by boats demands a calm sea. We have tried to depict in Chapter XX. the serious predicament in which the Emperor Charles V. found himself, when, shortly after landing, a tempest destroyed a large portion of his fleet, and drove the rest for shelter to a distant part of the coast. In that instance, the terrible storm which overcame the fleet was an accident which could not be foreseen, and the only way of saving the army from total destruction was to impose on the dispirited and famishing soldiers a painful march through a difficult and poor country.

When, after landing in the Crimea, the Allies advanced towards Sebastopol, their right flank rested on the sea. Their position was a dangerous one, but fortunately Prince Mentschikoff did not understand that his best chance of success lay in bringing the mass of his forces to bear on their left flank. A Russian attack from the east would have compelled the Allies to change front to the left, with their backs to the sea. Theirs would have been a most critical situation had the day gone against them,

for a glance at a map of that portion of the Crimean coast will show that, between the river Alma and Sebastopol, there is no position at all suitable for covering the re-embarkation of a considerable force.

The most instructive example we have of a re-embarkation in face of the enemy is that of the British army in 1808 after the battle of Coruña, and we are fortunate in having in Napier's "Peninsular War" a very complete account of this operation.*

Sir John Moore marched forward from Salamanca on the 12th of December, but foreseeing from the measures taken by Napoleon that his movement would sooner or later end in a retreat, he took the precaution of sending officers to examine the harbours which offered the best advantages for an embarkation. His plan was, if necessity demanded it, to retire towards the sea, re-embark his forces, and renew operations in the south of the Peninsula.

Falling back before the French on the morning of the 4th of January, Moore received at Herreiras the first report of the engineers who had examined the harbours. To effect a re-embarkation which is likely to be molested by the enemy it is indispensable to have a position which can fully cover the operation. According to the reports furnished to him, Vigo—where the transports then lay—besides its greater distance, had not the same advantages of ground as Betanzas and Coruña. The march on

* "Peninsular War," book iv. chap. 5.

Vigo was therefore abandoned, and Moore sent orders for the transports to come round to Coruña.

The British army reached that place on the 11th of January. Napier writes: "As the troops approached Coruña, the General's looks were earnestly directed towards the harbour, but an open expanse of water painfully convinced him that to Fortune, at least, he was not beholden; contrary winds still detained the fleet at Vigo." Thus, owing to an accident of the weather, he lost the fruit of the two marches he had gained on the French.

On the evening of the 14th the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and entered the harbour at night. The dismounted cavalry, the sick, the best horses, and fifty pieces of artillery were at once embarked. In the following words, Napier gives the reasons which led to the destruction of a number of horses: "The ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, the horses were generally foundered, it was impossible to embark them all in the face of the enemy, and a great number were reluctantly shot; worn down and foot-broken, they would otherwise have been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draught cattle until death relieved them from procrastinated suffering."

The late arrival of the transports augmented the difficulty of embarking so much, that some of the generals advised a negotiation for leave to rejoin the ships. Moore, however, "rejected this degrading

advice without hesitation." All the encumbrances having been shipped by the morning of the 16th, he intended to embark the fighting men in the coming night; but, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, South advanced to attack the position occupied by the British troops, and the Battle of Coruña ensued.

The British withstood the attack, and "when night set in their line was considerably advanced beyond their original position of the morning, while the French were falling back in confusion." Notwithstanding that the latter were still numerous, their disorder facilitated the original plan of embarking during the night. "Hope, upon whom the command had devolved, resolved, therefore, to ship the army, and so complete were the arrangements, that no confusion or difficulty occurred; the picquets kindled fires to cover the retreat, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak to embark, under the protection of Hill's brigade, which was in position under the ramparts of Coruña." The guns used in the battle (six British and three Spanish pieces, worked by English gunners) were spiked and thrown into the sea.

"When morning dawned, the French, seeing the British position abandoned, pushed some battalions to the heights of San Lucia, and about midday a battery opened on the shipping in the harbour. This caused great confusion amongst the transports, several masters cut their cables, and four vessels

went ashore; but the troops were rescued by the men-of-war boats, the stranded vessels were burned, and the fleet got out of harbour. Hill then embarked at the citadel, which was held by a rear guard under Beresford until the 18th, when the wounded being all on board, the troops likewise embarked; the inhabitants faithfully maintained the town meanwhile, and the fleet sailed for England."

A retreat is a dismal operation, and, though it may demand serious exertions on the part of the officers and impose great hardships on the soldiers, seldom elicits a word of praise. However creditably conducted, it is a precautionary expedient which does not appeal to the imagination, and lacks the halo of success.

It has been shown in Chapter XXI. how, in the latter days of June, 1862, the course of events had compelled the Federal army to abandon its position in front of Richmond and forced it to retire until it reached the James River. Little abashed by the collapse of his campaign, General McClellan had not given up all hope of capturing Richmond; his troops he described as in fine spirits and impatient for another fight, he still kept urging the President to send him reinforcements. He asked for thirty thousand additional men, which were not to be got.

The Union Government had not determined what it would do with the Army of the Potomac;

they had a new man in General Pope, and evidently waited to see if he was the long-looked-for genius who would bring victory to their standards. General Lee had enough experience of McClellan's over-cautious character to fear that he would resume the offensive; he was consequently able to disregard the enemy, which was only twenty-five miles from Richmond, and to threaten in his turn the capital of the Union. When, in pursuit of this object, the Confederates commenced massing their forces in front of General Pope, the decision was taken at Washington to withdraw McClellan's army from the Peninsula of Virginia. Until that moment no steps had been taken to provide any special transport for its removal, but as soon as its destination—Aquia Creek, on the Potomac—was fixed, the Government concluded that the troops could most readily reach that locality moving by water.

The execution of the movement was left to General McClellan, who, by telegram on the 3rd of August, was authorized to assume control over all the water transport within his reach, and to apply to the naval officers for what assistance they could render. At the same time, the Quartermaster-General was directed to send to Fort Monroe all the transports he could collect.

With the Army of the Potomac there were about twelve thousand five hundred sick and wounded, and the first step to enable it to move in any

required direction was to relieve it of this mass of ineffectives. How such a large number of patients had been allowed to remain with the army and hamper its movements we shall not pause to inquire. Steps were taken to remedy this mistake; and twelve hundred of the worst cases were shipped off on the 4th of August. The available transport could take no more.

The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac was not executed under pressure from the enemy. Nevertheless, on the 14th of August we find McClellan telegraphing to Washington that he does not like Jackson's movements; on the following day a report came that the Confederates were advancing on him in force from the Chickahominy. On the 17th he telegraphs to the General commanding the United States Army: "I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army beyond the Chickahominy."

The water transport was quite insufficient; there were no transports available for cavalry, all the schooners originally chartered for carrying horses had long since been discharged or turned into freight vessels. A large portion of the steamers at Harrison's landing were still loaded with provisions and stores, whilst the wharf facilities were very limited, admitting of but few vessels loading at one time. This difficulty was experienced later on in embarking at Yorktown and at Fort Monroe, and in disembarking at Aquia Creek.

McClellan estimated that the transports employed to carry the sick could remove twelve thousand infantry, and that at Fort Monroe there were some of too heavy draught to ascend the James River, which could have taken from eight to ten thousand. His chief quartermaster, Colonel Rufus Ingalls, reported to the Chief of the Staff: "If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe, after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport twenty-five thousand at the time." This was the plan the War Department thought best, for they proposed that they should send transports to Yorktown and Fort Monroe for all arms of the service and waggons.

Burnside with thirteen thousand troops reached Aquia Creek in less than two days. He had no cavalry, artillery, waggons, or teams; his force consisted of infantry alone, and his baggage was already on the transports, for it had not been landed when the troops arrived from North Carolina. On the 8th of August five batteries of heavy horse artillery were sent to him; these were despatched in eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, the last available transport at Harrison's landing.

One regiment of cavalry after that took ten steamers. Nearly every available transport ship had by this time been turned to account.

There was considerable irritation in the capital from the supposed delay in sending off the various parts of the army, but this irritation, with more truth,

can be traced to the fact that it was imperative not to waste a moment in getting additional troops in front of Washington. The situation had become sufficiently critical, and we find General Halleck, under date of August the 21st, telegraphing to McClellan, "By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land."

On the 14th and 15th of August two army corps left for Yorktown. General Porter's corps, which was the first to quit Harrison's landing, reached Williamsburg on the 16th, and there he was directed to halt until the entire army was across the Chickahominy. On arrival at Williamsburg, however, the contents of an intercepted letter caused him to believe that General Pope would have to contend against a very superior force which was then in front of him. He, therefore, on his own responsibility continued his march on to Newport News. A march of sixty miles executed by an army corps in three days and one night, with a halt of one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy, was not a bad performance. On the 19th and 20th the whole corps sailed for Aquia Creek.

Late in the afternoon of the 16th the camp at Harrison's bar was abandoned, and by the following night everything was across the Chickahominy. The rear guard crossed early on the 18th, after which the pontoon bridge was removed. On

the 18th and 19th the march was continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fort Monroe and Newport News. The retreat was covered by Generals Pleasonton and Averill.

Heintzelman's corps sailed from Yorktown on the 21st, and Franklin's from Fort Monroe on the 23rd. On the latter day, in the afternoon, the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac left for Aquia Creek. The transports for Sumner's corps had not arrived.

It is impossible for any one who is not acquainted with the details of the undertaking to form a conception of the inherent difficulties of such an operation. The military authorities at Washington certainly did not take them into account, or they would have abstained from urging more despatch. Suddenly informed of the intentions of the Government, and without any preparations, the Army of the Potomac quitted the Peninsula of Virginia for a fresh battlefield in twenty days.* As General McClellan said: "All the *personnel* and *matériel* of the army had been transferred from Harrison's landing to the different points of embarkation in

* By the end of August, when Lee arrived on the Rappahannock, the left of the Federal army occupying Fredericksburg was commanded by Burnside; Heintzelman and Porter had marched to the front, and Franklin and Sumner were soon in readiness to follow them.

the very brief period of five days without the slightest loss or damage."

Admirable orders are framed for effecting a landing, but the mode of withdrawal, should such a course become imperative, does not appear to have always been sufficiently considered. Though much must evidently depend upon circumstances, yet no orders for a disembarkation on a hostile shore can be considered complete in default of some clear instructions on the course to be followed in the event of a repulse.

If a landing on the open beach has miscarried, the re-embarkation of the combatants cannot be effected without a certain amount of disorder. The course of the attack may have crowded the invading troops in special localities; more than probably they will have lost some of their most able leaders; the fire of the defenders will be unevenly concentrated, and telling on particular parts of the beach; and the troops must, more or less, be disheartened and shaken on account of the miscarriage of the enterprise. A number of boats may have been damaged, and, very likely, many of the officers who were to direct their movements, and of the crews who were to row them, may have been killed or disabled. These are all circumstances fruitful of much disorder. The situation will be full of difficulties, and in these dire circumstances nothing but the exertions of the officers will prevent a panic. The fleet by its fire must keep the enemy's forces

from approaching too close to the beach, and, by checking the enemy, must try to render the re-embarkation possible.

When a good base of operations has been established, the orderly and speedy re-embarkation of the army should present no serious difficulties. Once the probability of having to re-embark has been foreseen, dispositions can be made for conducting the operation with the necessary despatch. As measures should always be taken for the protection of the base, a chain of works will be thrown up to keep the enemy at a fitting distance. Under cover of these, the horses, waggons, stores, everything which takes time to embark, should be put on board. The infantry would hold the works until this has been completed, and then be gradually withdrawn and embarked. Possibly advantage would be taken of darkness to effect this withdrawal.

The transports should be directed to steam to sea as soon as they are ready, so that the harbour or roadstead may not be encumbered by a considerable amount of shipping. When there is no time to embark the whole of the warlike stores and provisions, the least valuable must be destroyed.

In cases in which the landing has been effected on the open beach, and in which there has been no time or opportunity to establish a convenient sea base, matters will not present the same facility. A retreat with the object of re-embarking will

probably have been rendered imperative by a lost battle, or by finding the enemy too strong or too strongly posted. The object of the retreat will be too well understood to keep the other party from assuming the offensive, or from harassing the invaders. If these have sustained a defeat, the line of retreat will not be left entirely to their option; the victorious forces, who in all probability will be superior in numbers, will strive to force them in the direction most unfavourable to their purpose. Every effort should be made to keep the foe at a distance, either by gaining on him through better marching, or by taking advantage of the nature of the ground. The pursuit can be checked by destroying the bridges and obstructing the roads. If the retiring army has the good fortune to come across defensible positions, the adversary's progress may be arrested, and time gained to attain the ships.

As there is always a chance of being thwarted by the weather, the plan for the re-embarkation of the army should, in such cases more than in any other, have been arranged beforehand. Every possible detail should have been diligently considered. The coast may have some bays or mouths of rivers favouring a re-embarkation; a timely reconnaissance of these must be made, so as to select the most advantageous, and there the transports can be ordered to rendezvous. If there is time, some defensive works can be thrown up in advance,

which will enable the retreating troops to hold the ground for a time against a superior force. The fire of the fleet might possibly be made to sweep the ground in front of the works.

As all disorderly retreats, made in the face of a conquering enemy cause serious losses, every possible effort must be made to conduct the movement in a creditable manner. Celerity can be secured by paying strict attention to the principles which regulate the march of large bodies of troops. One of these is not to keep too much of the impedimenta with the troops, and to start the baggage and the trains to the rear betimes, so that the roads may be left clear for the passage of the combatants; another is to turn to account all the roads which lead towards the locality selected for the re-embarkation. More than at any other time strict discipline will be needed, for the depression of the troops will have a demoralizing effect, and may seriously retard the execution of the retreat.

INDEX.

A

Abercrombie, his services, ii. 92; is mortally wounded at the battle of Alexandria, 118

Aboukir, description of the bay, ii. 104

Abyssinia, committee appointed in 1867 to select a locality for landing, i. 264; reasons for recommending Zula, 264

Alexandria, bombardment of its forts in 1882, i. 184; analysis of the British fire, 185; losses of the Egyptians, 186; battle of, ii. 118

Algeria, punitive expeditions undertaken against it, ii. 127; Charles X. resolves to subdue it, 128; his design meets with much opposition, 129; Vice-admiral Duperré expresses himself against it, 130; staff for the expedition, 132; strength of the French forces, 133; arrangements for supplies, 134; land transport provided, 135; sailing formation, 137; landing at Sidi-Ferruch, 141; the peninsula turned into an intrenched camp, 143; stormy weather after landing, 145; capture of the camp of Staouëli, 149; occupation of the Plateau Chapelle et Fontaine, 150; trenches opened before Fort Emperor, 153; capitulation of Algiers, 155; the occupation of the country causes a series of contests, 156

Amherst (*Sir Jeffrey*), his unity of ideas with Boscawen and Wolfe, i. 148; selected by Pitt to command the forces sent to Cape Breton, ii. 73; rashness not a part of his character, 84; fails to co-operate with Wolfe on the St. Lawrence, 161, 175

Ammunition, expenditure of, in the attack of Kosseir in 1799, i. 367; in the bombardment of Lissa, 368; in the bombardment of Alexandria, 369

Arabi, his utter want of military knowledge, i. 354

Arms, improvement in small arms, i. 193; the best rifles can cause great slaughter amongst the troops in the boats, 367

Asclepiodotus, evades Allectus's fleet in a fog, i. 45

Ashantee (1873–74), the troops employed during the healthiest months of the year, i. 265

Attack, the initiative rests with the invaders, i. 343; circumstances which may lower the enemy's power, 345; Talmash's rash attack on Brest, 347; Nelson's failure at Teneriffe, 351; much will depend on the military ability of the opposing commanders, 354; demonstrations and false attacks, 357; rapidity in execution, 357; disastrous attempt of the Turks at Bogas, 358; Captain Cole's timely action at Java, 359; often succeeds when delivered in a difficult locality, 361; best battalions and most enterprising leaders to be employed, 365; arrangements to be made with regard to the action of the fleet, 365; ship's guns against field artillery, 366; an attempt to be made on the flanks, 371; the enemy if near should be followed up, 373; Datis yields the initiative to Miltiades at Marathon, 373; want of enterprise of Said Mustapha Pasha at Aboukir, 374

B

Baird, commands an Anglo-Indian force in the expedition to Egypt in 1801, ii. 93; progress of his force, 119; lands his contingent at Kosseir, 120; the troops descend the Nile and land at Cairo, 121; the Anglo-Indian force goes into camp at Aboumandour, 122

Base of operations, can only be established after landing, i. 316; difficult to secure a good port, 317; cannot be organized anywhere, 318; St. Arnaud's reluctance to attack the Star Fort, 320; dangerous position of the allies, 321; the Russians had formed a low estimate of the northern defences of Sebastopol, 322; flank march of the allies, 323; Balaclava a bad base, 324; advantages of a seaport, 325; French expedition to Rome in 1849, 325; advantages conferred by the port of Genoa in 1859, 327; Zula base of operations in the Abyssinian expedition, 328; General McClellan changes his base from the Pamunkey to the James River, 331; White House abandoned, 336; Ismailia in the expedition to Egypt in 1882, 339

Blake, appointed General of the sea, i. 139; his battles with Van Tromp, 177; severe damage done to his ships, ii. 311

Boats, an adequate number required for landing, 278; Sir William Mends, how the boats should be worked, 283; number of men in each boat, 284; horse boats and rafts, 285; constructed for landing artillery in 1854, 286; special, designed for landing horses and guns in shallow water, 286; boats to advance on a broad front, 291; surf-boats, 292; supervision of the boats to be placed in the hands of a naval officer, 293; orders for retiring to be taken from the principal transport officer, 296

Bonaparte, see *Napoleon*

Boscawen, Pitt's estimate of his character, i. 146; follows Captain Ferguson's advice, ii. 76

Bourmont (*Count de*), commands the expedition to Algiers in 1830, ii. 132

Boutin, his reconnaissance of Algiers, ii. 138

Brueys, anchors his fleet in Aboukir Bay, i. 60; defeated in the battle of the Nile, 61; his precaution to prevent information being given to the English fleet, 114; reconnoitres all possible landing-places in the island of Malta, 246

Bugeaud, Marshal, his estimate of the British infantry, ii. 271

Bushire, capture of, in 1856, i. 328

Cæsar, orders a reconnaissance of the coast of Britain, i. 249; determines to cross from Brundisium to the coast of Epirus, ii. 26; has the good fortune to land his army, 27; Libo blockades the rest of his fleet, 29; attempts to cross the Adriatic in a fisherman's boat, 30; Mark Antony crosses and enters Lissus, 31; joined by Mark Antony, 32; invests Pompey's camp, 33; his line of investment is broken, 35; marches into Thessaly and defeats Pompey at Pharsalus, 37; makes use of his war engines in landing, 59; his task in invading Britain not quite an easy one, 299

C

Calliope, H.M.S. steams out of Apia in the face of a hurricane, i. 252

Canada, France neglects to send reinforcements for its protection, ii. 161; troops sent there with Baron Dieskau in 1755, 166

Canséau (Canso); French raid and destruction in 1744, ii. 60

Carrion Nizas, observations with reference to Bonaparte's plan of campaign for 1796, i. 88

Carthage, mistress of the sea, ii. 2

Charles V. entreated by his subjects to reduce Algiers, ii. 203; disregards the advice of Andrea Doria, 204; amount of his forces for the enterprise, 204; the expedition encounters a severe storm after setting sail, 205; lands without opposition, 206; surprised by a tempest two days after landing, 208; attacked by Hassan Aga, 208; continuance of the tempest destroys all hope of success, 209; hears that a portion of Doria's fleet was safe

at Cape Matifu, 210; hardships endured by his troops on the march, 211; his noble bearing in this sequence of disasters, 213

Cheredin (*Khaïr-el-Dinn*), succeeds Haroudj as king of Algiers, ii. 198; places his dominions under the protection of the Sultan, 198; is appointed commander of the Sultan's fleets, 199; goes to Marseilles in command of a large fleet, 214

China, war of 1860, difference between the views of the French and British commanders, i. 159; landing of the allies, 260

Command, success depends on the ability and knowledge of the naval and military commanders, i. 125; misunderstanding between Thurot and Flobert, 126; dissensions between Commodore Wilmot and Colonel Luke Lillingston, 129; examples of a good understanding between admirals and generals, 130; the two services formerly not quite distinct, 133; the admiral responsible till the disembarkation is completed, 134; Admiral Duperré's want of enterprise in 1830, 135; selection of a leader, 138; Duke of Medina Sidonia compelled to assume command of the Armada, 139; a general must venture something, 144; he has a right to claim the confidence of the government, 145; some officers who have distinguished themselves at an advanced age, 153; unity of command, 158; Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud in the Crimea, 159; Sir Hope Grant and General Montauban in China, 159; the French decline to co-operate with England in 1882, 161

Creasy (*Sir Edward*), remarks on the fault of the Athenians in delaying the attack on Syracuse, i. 28; how Athens trained all her sons for service in the fleet, 82; efforts of the Athenians to provide a well-equipped fleet for action against Syracuse, 106; Thucydides' speech against the probability of an Athenian invasion, ii. 261; the English in 1588 inferior to the Spaniards in ships and in guns, 284

Crimea, absence of information, i. 98; Lord Raglan's letter on its scantiness, 99; allies ignorant of the defences of Sebastopol, 101; Kinglake's remarks on the waste of the Ottoman forces, 104; landing in, 279

D

Dardanelles, forced in 1807 by Admiral Sir John Duckworth, i. 17

Defence, safeguarding a coast a matter of great importance, ii. 339; a long stretch of coast cannot be protected alike at all points, 340; diversity of opinion as to the right manner of defending a coast, 340; the navy is the best of coast defences, 343; object in fortifying the chief seaports and arsenals, 343; the coast and the best line of advance to be carefully studied, 345; some measures for rendering the navigation difficult, 345; rapid information of the enemy's movements, 351; the coast to be looked at from an invader's point of view, 351; best movement for attacking the invader, 354; the commander must raise the confidence of the defenders, 357; alternatives open to the defenders, 358; the landing to be resisted, 358; the best use of railway transports to be studied, 364; bodies of troops to occupy central positions, 365; difference in the conditions of the attacking and defending forces, 366; troops to be held ready to meet a flank attack, 367; proper moment for harassing the landing-party, 368; a threatening position taken some way beyond the beach, 369; withdrawing the defending forces inland, 370; King Harold refuses to retire on London, 372

Defence Scheme, necessity for a proper scheme of defence, ii. 351; the scheme to be tested by actual experiment, 352

Disembarkations, every alternative to be studied to ensure non-interference from the enemy, i. 346; serious risks incurred in landing in face of a hostile force, 346; surprise the foundation of a successful disembarkation, 356; possibly may be effected at night, 357

Disembarkations (*contested*), operations against Cape Breton, ii. 73; Amherst's reconnaissance of the shore, 75; strengthening of Louisbourg and the coast, 76; division of the attacking forces, 78; the troops gain a footing on shore, 81; British loss, 82; Wolfe's opinion of the undertaking, 83; operations in Egypt in 1801, 91; composition of Abercrombie's force, 93; rendezvous in Marmorice Bay, 95; Aboukir the only possible place for landing, 101; dearth of information, 101; fate of reconnoitring officers, 102; anchoring of the armada, 104; landing delayed by the state of the weather, 106; arrangements for the boats, 107; time taken to draw up, 109; the troops exposed to heavy firing, 109; British and French losses, 112; numerical superiority of the attacking force, 117

Diversions, Clausewitz's observations, i. 23; he considers their advantages doubtful, 25; Mahan's definition of, 25

Doria (*Andrea*), Captain-General of Charles V.'s naval forces, ii. 203; fails to dissuade him from his contemplated expedition against Algiers, 204

Duchambon, surrenders Louisbourg, ii. 71

Duperré (*Vice-admiral*), over-anxious in the expedition to Algeria, i. 135; lies inactive in the Bay of Palma, 135; had no knowledge of the African coast, 136; French advance delayed by the late arrival of the transports, 137

Embarkations, part performed by the navy, i. 226; Admiralty supplies the moving power, 226; military staff to furnish the Admiralty with full details, 227; should see that all parts proceed together, 227; principles which regulate the despatch of troops by sea for active service, 227; transports to be allotted to each distinct unit, 227; concomitant and administrative services to sail at the same time as the combatants, 228; stores for each department to go separate, 229; care taken in the embarkation reveals itself at the end of the voyage, 230; examples of embarkations of cavalry, 231; some ways of embarking horses, 232; examples of embarkations of the other arms, 234; valuable assistance rendered by the navy when embarking troops, 238; can be carried out in several ports, 238

F

Fortifications, Colonel Schaw, their object, ii. 344; Mahan's opinion on the necessity for fortifications and an army, 322; arguments of the Royal Commissioners in 1860, 323

G

Gantheaume, escapes from the burning *Orient* at Aboukir, i. 64; ordered to prepare the *Muiron* and *Carrère* to take Bonaparte back to France, 64; his attempts to take reinforcements to Egypt, ii. 123; he fails and returns to Toulon, 124

Grant (*Sir Hope*), differs from General Montauban as to the front of the Peiho defences to be attacked, i. 159; his remarks on the overcrowding of Peh-tang, 261

H

Hannibal, recalled from Italy to defend Carthage, ii. 21; seeks an interview with Publius Cornelius Scipio, 23

Haroudj, strangles Eutemi and becomes king of Algiers, ii. 197; besieged in the citadal of Tlemcen in 1518, 197; is killed near the river Ouchda, 197

Hoche, overrides the objections of the naval experts, i. 132; his expedition to Ireland in 1796, ii. 302

I

Invasions, best measures to prevent them, ii. 308; the question not to be dismissed on the score of impossibility, 268; rendered more easy since the introduction of steam,

269; Admiral Dupetit-Thouars' remarks on an invasion of England, 271; vessels composing Napoleon's invading flotilla, 289; division of his forces, 289; Great Britain's preparations in 1805, 297; what might have occurred had the French landed on British soil, 300; James' opinions on this point, 300; Sir A. Alison remarks on Hoche's attempt, 306

K

Korniloff (*Admiral*), dies at his post, i. 307; his plan for attacking the allies at sea, ii. 354

L

Land forces, the defence of a coast cannot be entirely assigned to them, ii. 308; to be maintained in sufficient numbers, 308; serious predicament of a country attacked in the absence of the fleet, 302; an imposing land force may secure immunity from attack, 330; objects for which a considerable army is needed, 334

Landing, locality generally determined by the cabinet, i. 245; secondary points to be ascertained by personal observation, 246; all possible alternatives to be examined, 247; a knowledge of the coast needed, 247; demands good anchorage near the shore, 247; means for obtaining information on local obstructions, 248; ports, harbours, bays, and open coast, 249; influence of the weather, 250; knowledge of prevailing winds at certain seasons required, 251; reconnaissance to take into account the peculiarities of the climate, 264; localities most favourable for a landing, 266; when effected in a friendly country, 269; division of the forces for landing, 271; sequence of action of the three arms, 272; details to go with the first landing party, 273; aid for the wounded, 275

Laughton, differences between Thurot and Flobert, i. 126; the Spaniards in 1588 inferior to the English in ships and gunnery, ii. 284

Lee (*General Robert E.*), his fine qualities, i. 141

Lessons of the past, are still the best teachers, 196; Napoleon inculcates the study of past campaigns, 197

Lissa, expedition undertaken to find employment for the forces of a country, i. 29; the island assailed on three sides, 30; the battle unsatisfactory as a standard for future action, 180

Londonderry, relief of, ii. 347

Lorient, expedition to, i. 28, 131

Louisbourg, description of, ii. 64; landing of the New England forces, 67; first siege proceeds slowly, 68; restored to France, 71; landing at, in 1758, 80; difficulty in landing siege materials, 85; the besiegers galled by the fire of the *Aréthuse*, 86; no shelter for the defenders, 87; Drucour capitulates, 88; the French fleet shut up in the harbour, 355; its destruction, 355

Lyons (*Admiral Sir Edmund*), what he conceived to be Lord Raglan's impression of the expedition to the Crimea, i. 100; warns Lord Raglan of the probable losses in a prolonged siege, ii. 113

M

Mahan, definition of diversions, i. 25; disadvantage of having soldiers on board of war-ships, 199; navies do not dispense with fortifications, nor with armies, ii. 322; every seaport should be able to hold out for a length of time, 343

Marine (*mercantile*), of the principal nations, ii. 274

Marlborough, experiences difficulties in co-operating with the allies, i. 158; gives King James tidings of the expedition against Brest, 348; deserts King James, ii. 54

McClellan, changes his base from the Pamunkey to the James, i. 331; telegraphs to Colonel Ingalls to establish depôts on the James River, 335; White House abandoned,

336; change of base carried out by the 3rd of July, 336; Confederates bring some light batteries to play on Harrison's landing, 337; assumes command of the Army of the Potomac, ii. 218; his plan for operating against Richmond, 220; the government unwillingly yield assent to his plan, 225; provision of transports, 227; embarkation of his army, 232; is deprived of Blenker's division, 235; his army advances on Yorktown, 237; is deprived of McDowell's corps, 239; the Confederates evacuate Yorktown, 241; battle of Williamsburg, 241; battle of Seven Pines, 247; seven days' battle, 249; observations on the campaign of Virginia, 255; ordered to withdraw his army from the Peninsula of Virginia, 388; the army encumbered with sick and wounded, 388; insufficiency of transport, 389; withdrawal from Harrison's bar, corps reach their appointed points of embarkation, 392

Military expeditions by sea, purposes for which they may be intended, i. 2; to be determined upon on mature reflection, 4; the naval and military experts should be consulted, 5; a country to bear the burden with fortitude, 8; fruitless expeditions against Ferrol and Cadiz, 16; the British land forces might have been better employed in the war against France, 20; cost of Russian co-operation, 23; purposes for which the expeditions to North Holland and Walcheren were undertaken, 24

Miltiades, with inferior numbers counsels an attack of the Persian army at Marathon, i. 374

Mines, a coast to be protected by submarine mines, ii. 345; moral effect of mines, 345; panic from a supposed mine at Badajos, 346; possible organization of local submarine mining defences, 346

Montcalm, his services, ii. 159; receives no encouraging reply to his appeal for help, 162; forces at his disposal for the defence of Quebec, 166; disagrees with De Vaudreuil and begs his recall, 168; his dispositions for meeting an attack, 180; moves to encounter Wolfe on the plains of Abraham, 189; his death, 193

Mordaunt (*Sir John*), his want of enterprise in the expedition against Rochefort from the effects of ill-health, i. 147

Moore (*Sir John*), penetrates into Spain without a settled plan of operations, i. 11; lands at Maceira, 254; at Aboukir, ii. 110; retreat on Coruña, 385

N

Napier (*Sir William*), remarks on the action of the British Government in the beginning of the present century, i. 10; troops available to raise the strength of the British forces in the Peninsula, 20; advantages of a mixed naval and military expedition in 1808, 21

Napoleon, his reasons for seizing Egypt, i. 21; his communications with France lost by the battle of the Nile, 62; his departure from Egypt, 63; raises the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, 69; employs every artifice to conceal his expedition to Egypt, 109; rumours of his preparations reach the British Government, 110; sails from Toulon, 111; hastens his disembarkation on reaching Egypt, 116; his early promotion, 150; his measures for the invasion of England, ii. 287; witnesses the embarkation of his troops at Boulogne, 291; time he considered required for crushing England, 291; his plan, 291; comparison between his contemplated invasion of England and Cæsar's, 297; his observations concerning the weakness of England, 324; censures Marmont for his want of enterprise against Said Mustapha Pasha, 360; real number of the Pasha's troops, at Aboukir, 361

Naval Brigades, assistance which seamen render in a disembarkation, i. 302; seamen and marines often formed in a landing party, 303; how employed in Napoleon's armies, 303; crews of Russian Black Sea fleet take part in the defence of Sebastopol, 307; French seamen

man the forts in the defence of Paris, 309; crews of several ships formed into a naval brigade, 310; assistance rendered by our seamen in the Crimea, 313; Peel's naval brigade in the Indian Mutiny, 314; the naval brigade in the Zulu war, 314; in the Sudan, 315; gallant repairs of the Safia boilers under fire, 315

Naval warfare, Lissa and Yalu of no worth as a standard, i. 180; attack of coast batteries by warships, 189

Nelson, his views on the French designs on India, i. 13; sent to the Mediterranean, 110; his fleet reinforced from Cadiz, 112; goes in quest of the French expedition, 113; outstrips the French and reaches Alexandria, 115; sails for the coast of Anatolia, 117; reaches Syracuse, 117; reappears before Alexandria, 60; battle of the Nile, 61; follows Villeneuve to the West Indies, 53; his obstinacy at Teneriffe, 352

New England forces, raised for the reduction of Louisbourg, ii. 61; their landing at Cape Breton in 1745, 67

O

Oudinot (*di Reggio*), sent to occupy Rome, i. 325; the French Government miscalculates the strength of the resistance, 326; is attacked and defeated on approaching the city, 326

O'Reilly, appointed to command the expedition to Algiers in 1775, ii. 379; his want of activity, 380; repulsed by the Moors and compelled to re-embark, 381

P

Peh-tang, description of its position, i. 258; natural difficulties of the shore, 260; great danger from fire, 261; full of horrible stenches, 262

Pepperell, appointed to command the force in the first siege of Louisbourg, ii. 62

Population, of England and France in 1801 and in 1895, ii. 272

Preparations, very necessary in expeditions beyond the seas, i. 84; what they consist in, 84; waste in war, 85; distinction between peace work and preparation for war not always observed, 86; want of preparation in 1854, 86; plenty of leisure in peace to prepare for war, 89; depend often on the preponderance of the civil or the military element in the administration, 91; to be continuous and possess finality, 94; as little as possible should be left to chance, 95; distance from the national base adds to the ordinary difficulties, 97; should include acquisition of information, 98; preparation of reserves, 102

Q

Quebec, its capture a joint naval and military operation, ii. 159; description of the ground about the town, 168; reduced to a state of ruin, 172

R

Rafts, used by the French for landing troops dry-shod at Sfax, i. 285

Raglan (*Field-Marshal Lord*), his remissness in gathering information, i. 99; employed too long in routine work, 155; had no special liking for the invasion of the Crimea, 155; selects the landing-place for the allies, 256

Raleigh (*Sir Walter*), the Romans had a base at Clupea, i. 317; case of Canutus and Edmund Ironside, 363; difficulty in defending a coast, ii. 309; England cannot keep an enemy from landing without a fleet, 341

Ram, its reintroduction in naval actions, i. 182; the *Merrimac* rams the *Cumberland* in Hampton Roads, 183

Re-embarkation in face of the enemy, Siege of Troy, ii. 376; battle of Marathon, 377; Sir John Moore sends officers to examine the best harbours for the purpose, 384; his

choice falls on Coruña, 385; destruction of the horses, 385; the embarkation stopped by the battle of Coruña, 386; the French fire on the shipping, 386; the fleet sails for England, 387; McClellan ordered to withdraw his army from the Peninsula of Virginia, 388; insufficiency of transport for the purpose, 389; irritation in the capital from the supposed delay, 390; orders for the withdrawal to be forthcoming, 393

Regulus (*Marcus Attilius*), appointed to command the Roman army for the expedition against Carthage, ii. 7; is defeated and taken prisoner by Xanthippus, 11

Rendezvous, advantages of concentrating the fleet and transports, i. 239; allows facilities for horses to recover after a long sea voyage, 239; example of, in the China war, 240; the allies anchor off the coast of the Crimea, 244

S

Scipio (*Publius Cornelius*), selected to command the Roman army in the second Punic war, ii. 19; sets sail for Africa, 20; defeats Hannibal in the battle of Zama, 23

Secrecy, difficulty in keeping preparations from leaking out, i. 108; observed in expeditions to Holland and against Rochefort, 108; Sang-ko-lin-sin on our intentions against China in 1860, 108; expedition to the Crimea dictated by the people of England, 118; how England gave her plans to Russia, 119; how she neglected to turn our want of reticence to account, 119; greater difficulty now than ever in concealing our intentions and movements, 120; at Rochefort a ship sails accidentally amongst the British fleet, escapes, and gives the alarm, 121; secrecy well observed in the last Egyptian expedition, 123

Sfax, bombardment of, i. 368

Shirley, proposes to attack Louisbourg, ii. 60.

Sidney Smith, furnishes newspapers to Bonaparte, i. 64; causes which led to his losing the confidence of his superiors, 66; his conduct at St. Jean d'Acre, 68; commanded the seamen who dragged the field guns at Aboukir, ii. 107; suggests a disembarkation on the right flank of the French at Aboukir, 115

Spanish Armada, ii. 283

Squadron (*convoying*), to be detailed to protect a mass of transports, i. 244

Squadron (*escorting*), to regulate the movements of the transports and maintain discipline, i. 242

Staveley (*Sir Charles*), establishes order at Zula, i. 330

Steam, has altered the conditions of expeditions by sea, i. 165; comparison between the movements of the Anglo-Indian contingents in the two expeditions to Egypt, 168; first efforts to apply steam to navigation, 170; steam navigation when first employed at sea, 172; invention of the screw propeller, 172; steam transports facilitate the maintenance of an army in the field, 175; steam transports run less risk of being captured, 177; effects of present armament may prevent a vigorous pursuit, 177

Steam launches, to be employed in landing troops, i. 289

Steamers, for the constant patrolling of a coast, ii. 353

Steamers (*stern wheel*), may come useful in disembarking in shallow water, i. 290

T

Telegraph, Commander Sandri cuts the communications between Lissa and Pola, i. 31; renders more easy the maintenance of an army abroad on service, 175; favours the combination of two separate forces, 194; slowness of means of communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, in 1798 and 1801, 194; the Austrian fleet brought to the rescue of Lissa, 196

Tonnage, an estimate to be made of the amount required, i. 206; principle on which the capacity of ships is measured, 206; amount required

for the various arms, 211; classification of the registered steamers of the United Kingdom, 218; all demands for, to be submitted through a responsible officer, 229

Torpedo-boats, good for protecting a coast line, ii. 350

Transports, troops not generally conveyed in men-of-war, i. 199; crossing of the Black Sea by the allies in 1854, 203; will limit the amount of a force sent abroad, 208; arrangements made by Sir William Mends in 1882, 216; surveying merchant ships, 217; first class only to be chartered, 220; number of transports employed in Algerian, Abyssinian, and Egyptian (1882) expeditions, 221; Russia hires transports from other countries in 1878, 223; accommodation ladders for, 224; orderly disposition of, 270; each one to carry a sufficient number of boats, 281; additional crews to be carried, 282

V

Vergor, his previous conduct, ii. 181; surprised by the forlorn hope, 187

W

Walcheren, expedition to, i. 26; its cost and futility, 28

Warren (*Commodore*), ordered to co-operate with the New England troops in 1745, ii. 61; his fleet stops all communication with Louisbourg, 70

Wellington, sails for the Peninsula with indefinite orders, i. 11; lands at the Mondego, 253; his retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras, ii. 375

William (*the Conqueror*), his invasion compared with Napoleon's intended descent on England, i. 36; causes which led to his success, 38; danger he incurred when Harold ordered his fleet to reassemble, 43

Wolfe, selected by Pitt to command the troops for operations against Quebec, i. 148; allowed to choose his own officers, 151; difficulties in getting Carleton appointed Quartermaster-General, 152; remarks on advantage of gallant attempts, 372; amount of his forces in 1759, ii. 163; reconnoitres the heights of St. Michel, 175; the lateness of the season enjoins all speed, 177; evacuates the camp at Montmorenci, 179; causes Holmes's squadron to drift up and down the St. Lawrence with the tide, 182; De Bougainville ceases to follow Holmes's squadron, 182; naval demonstration against the Beauport camp, 183; last general orders, 184; Vergor's party surprised by the forlorn hope, 187; battle of the 13th of September, 190; his death, 193

Wolseley (*Field Marshal Viscount*), remarks on the wealth of our mercantile marine, i. 82; advantage of steam gun-boats, 167

Y

Yalu River, battle of, i. 78

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

00107792

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020